On Point: 2. Prejudice

State v. Desmond Myers LaPean, 2019AP1448, 7/14/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

LaPean pleaded to a sexual assault of a child with an agreement that the state would cap its recommendation at 10 years of initial confinement and 10 of extended supervision. But at sentencing, the state first recommended 12 and 12. After defense counsel’s objection, the state instead requested 10 and 14. Counsel didn’t notice the second breach, but the prosecutor eventually did, telling the court the agreement was for 10 and 10. The court gave 12 and 10.

State v. Keith C. Henyard, 2020 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)

The State charged Henyard with 8 crimes potentially leading to 157 years in prison. Commissioner Parise engaged Henyard in a colloquy, accepted his waiver of a preliminary hearing, and bound him over for trial. Parise left the bench and 5 months later sold his professional services to Henyard to get him a better deal. The majority denied Henyard’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for lack of a prejudicial “actual conflict of interest.” Judge Reilly, in another Emperor’s New Clothes moment, dissented expressing concern about the integrity of a judiciary that obscures errors and shifts blame to defendants.

State v. David Gutierrez, 2020 WI 52, reversing in part a published court of appeals opinion, 6/3/20; case activity (including briefs)

In a 5-0 decision, SCOW affirms all parts of this published court of appeals decision but one. The court of appeals held that the circuit court erred in refusing to admit evidence that excluded Gutierrez as the source of male DNA in the underwear and around the mouth of a victim of child sexual assault. The assaults involved oral sex and attempted vaginal intercourse. SCOW reversed the court of appeals on that point.

State v. Ronald Eugene Provost, 2020 WI App 21; case activity (including briefs)

It’s unclear why this opinion is recommended for publication. Best guess is that is provides a (rather thin) gloss on the “systemic breakdown” exception to the rule that delays attributable to defense counsel don’t weigh in favor of a speedy trial violation. The court cites and adopts a statement from a New Mexico court that defense counsel’s delays represent a “systemic breakdown” only when they are caused by “problems that are both institutional in origin and debilitating in scope.” (¶40). Sounds like a slightly longer way of saying “systemic breakdown,” no?

State v. Phyllis M. Schwersenska, 2018AP1619-CR, District 4, 4/30/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Schwersenska was convicted of embezzling money from a joint bank account she held with her daughter, H.R. The court of appeals holds trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to raise the defense that, as joint owner of the account, none of the money in the account belonged solely to H.R. and so she can’t be guilty of theft from H.R.

State v. Ryan C. Diehl, 2020 WI App 16; case activity (including briefs)

At Diehl’s trial for operating with a blood-alcohol content exceeding .02, the state asked the arresting officer and Diehl himself multiple questions that invited the jury to infer he had multiple OWI convictions. Because these questions were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to them, and Diehl is entitled to a new trial.

Iron County DHS v. N.H.-D., 2019AP1520, District 3, 2/12/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

N.H.-D.’s claims that the termination of her parental rights violated various due process rights, but those claims are forfeited and undeveloped. Her claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is meritless. 

State v. Jacqueline A. Ziriax Anderson, 2018AP2410-CR, District 3, 2/11/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state offered Anderson a deal: plead to OWI 2nd and it would recommend the minimum mandatory penalties. The state made that offer because the arresting officer had resigned from the department due to some “mental health issues” and the prosecutor apparently wasn’t eager to call him as a witness. Anderson’s lawyer found this out immediately before Anderson entered her plea—but didn’t tell Anderson. She learned about it afterward. (¶¶3-4, 8-11). While trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to tell Anderson that information before she pled, that doesn’t entitle her to plea withdrawal because she fails to show she would have insisted on going to trial if trial counsel would have told her, as required by State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 312, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).

Terez Cook v. Brian Foster, Warden, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 18-2214, 1/29/2020

Pursuing a federal writ of habeas corpus is always a long shot; in non-capital cases fewer than 1% of petitions are successful. Terez Cook gets it done here, convincing the Seventh Circuit his lawyer was ineffective at his trial for a home-invasion robbery (and that the Wisconsin court of appeals’ decision to the contrary was not just wrong, but unreasonable). The federal court is puzzled by a few aspects of our state court’s denial of Cook’s claims. But the thing that seems to push that denial over the line into unreasonableness–AEDPA‘s stringent requirement for habeas relief–is that it got a crucial fact wrong. The state court’s opinion relies on a confession by Cook–a confesssion for which there’s apparently no evidence. How did our court go astray? Well, the state described the (non-existent) confession in its brief, and then Cook’s direct-appeal counsel apparently didn’t check the facts, and neither did the court of appeals.

Kenosha County DHS v. M.M.B., 2019AP1776 & 1777, 1/22/20, District 2 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.M.B. is the father of two children, each of whom has a serious genetic disorder that threatens normal brain growth and function. The disorder can’t be cured but it can be controlled by adherence to a ketogenic diet. Both children were adjudicated CHIPS due to M.M.B.’s asserted inability to provide for their special needs; he allegedly does not believe that they have the disorder and does not comprehend the recommended diet. He also, per the county, doesn’t respond to their emotional needs in appropriate ways.