On Point: 2. Prejudice

State v. Jonathan A. Ortiz-Rodriguez, 2018AP2401-CR, District 1, 11/26/19, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The State charged the defendant with repeated sexual assault of a child, which carries a 25-year minimum term of initial confinement. Trial counsel told the defendant that the State had offered to recommend 5 to 8 years if he would plead to one count of child sexual assault.  But then at sentencing the State argued for 20 years IC and 20 years ES.

State v. Scott A. Walker, 2019AP1138, 11/7/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A jury found Walker guilty of intentionally pointing a firearm at a person contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(c). He claims his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to raise a defense under Wis. Stat. §§ 939.45(2) and 939.49(1), which provide a privilege “to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with the person’s property.” The court of appeals has some doubt that Walker adequately raised this claim at the Machner hearing, ¶¶6-7, but decides it anyway on the merits, holding there was no prejudice because the facts couldn’t possibly make out the defense.

State v. Robert C. Washington, 2018AP1771-CR, District 1, 10/8/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Washington was convicted of first degree reckless homicide and first degree reckless injury for shooting his two sons, killing one and injuring the other. He argues his lawyer was ineffective for advising him to plead without discussing possible lesser included offense possibilities and for failing to advocate for him at sentencing. He also argues newly discovered evidence shows the shootings were accidental, not reckless.

State v. Tyrus Lee Cooper, 2016AP375-CR, 6/20/19, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)

Cooper moved for pre-sentencing plea withdrawal and filed an OLR grievance because his lawyer failed to provide him with discovery, contact witnesses, and communicate with him. Days before trial, his unprepared lawyer misled him about the strength of the State’s case and rushed him into a plea. The circuit court denied Cooper’s motion, but OLR later concluded that the lawyer committed 19 acts of misconduct, 5 directly relating to Cooper’s plea. Consequently, SCOW suspended his license. Now, in 4-3 decision SCOW holds that the lawyer’s professional misconduct does not satisfy the requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

You don’t have to say that 3 times fast . . . or slow. We all know it’s true. Here is a study that confirms the point. While the article focuses on death penalty cases, its conclusions apply broadly. Want to challenge Strickland? This article is a place to start.

State v. Casey M. Fisher, 2017AP868, District 1, 3/26/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Fisher’s § 974.06 postconviction motion clears the hurdle erected by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), but fails on the merits.

State v. Martez C. Fennell, 2017AP2480-CR, District 1, 3/26/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Fennell unsuccessfully challenges his convictions for armed robbery and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent, arguing that the charges are multiplicitous and that trial counsel should have subpoenaed a witness who would have impeached the victim’s identification of him.

Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017);  Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1. 

State v. Jeninga, 2019 WI App 14; case activity (including briefs)

Jeninga asserted that he would not have pled guilty to a weak child sexual assault charge if his trial counsel had filed an obvious motion to suppress child porn on his cell phone. Trial counsel, who missed the suppression issue, testified that the child porn caused to her to advise Jeninga to plead guilty, and he followed her advice. The court of appeals says trial counsel’s testimony was not enough to prove prejudice. Jeninga had to testify himself.

State v. Gary Lee Wayerski, 2019 WI 11, affirming and modifying an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court overrules Wisconsin’s longstanding test for deciding whether the state has “suppressed” favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), saying the test is unsupported by and contrary to Brady and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applying Brady.