On Point: 8. Counsel, 6th Am.

State v. Lamont Donnell Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 5/18/18, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2016AP897-CR, case activity

Appellate lawyers will want to pay attention to this decision because it clarifies the law and procedure governing claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In particular, resolving an issue of first impression, it holds that in a multi-count case, trial counsel’s ineffective assistance doesn’t automatically result in a new trial on all counts. In this case, SCOW affirmed a decision ordering a new trial on just 1 of 6 counts.

McCoy v. Louisiana, USSC No. 16 – 8255, 2018 WL 218-617, 5/14/18, reversing and remanding State v. McCoy, 2018 So.3d 535 (La. 2016); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary).

In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, SCOTUS holds that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the objective of his defense and to insist that his lawyer refrain from admitting that he is guilty of a charged crime when he objects to that admission. It further holds that if a lawyer concedes guilt in this situation, Strickland and the harmless error rule do not apply. The defendant automatically gets a new trial.

Winnebago County v. J.M., 4/18/18, 2018 WI 37, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2016AP619, case activity.

This opinion will interest lawyers who handle Chapter 51 cases and appellate lawyers of all stripes. It establishes that persons undergoing Chapter 51 mental commitments are entitled  to the effective assistance of counsel and formally adopts the Strickland test for ineffective assistance. It further holds that, due to the overwhelming evidence of dangerousness in this case, J.M. was not prejudiced when his counsel failed to object to him appearing before the jury wearing prison clothes accompanied by uniformed guards–even as he testified. Of particular interest to appellate lawyers, SCOW granted a motion to strike significant parts of Winnebago County’s oral argument because its lawyer asserted facts outside the appellate record.

State v. Gerrod R. Bell, 2018 WI 28, 4/10/18, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2015AP2667-2668-CR; case activity (including links)

A defendant is presumed innocent until the State proves him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That’s what the Constitution says. Yet, in this child sexual assault case, the State cleverly told jurors that they could not acquit the defendant unless they believed his accusers had lied about the alleged assaults and unless they had evidence of the victims’ motive for lying.  Bell argued that this prosecution strategy impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him. In a 3-1-1 opinion, SCOW approved the strategy and ruled against him.

State v. Ricardo L. Conception, 2016AP1282-CR, 3/28, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Concepcion pled to 10 counts of possession of child pornography. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of his suppression motion because the search of his home was a private-party search, not a government search. It also held that Concepcion’s sentence (9 in, 6 out) was not unduly harsh, and his trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to tell the sentencing court that he is a “hero” of “exemplary character and stature.”

State v. Daniel Wilson, 2017AP813-CR, 3/27/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This appeal raises, among others things, a novel issue specific to child sexual assault cases. Is the State actually required to prove the 2nd element of repeated child sexual assault–that at least 3 assaults took place “within a specified period of time” as §948.025(1)(b) plainly states? Or is it relieved of that burden by virtue of various opinions holding that the State does not have to prove the “specifics” of a child sexual assault?

The latest edition of the Volokh Conspiracy analyzes a recent 12-4 en banc decision by the 6th Circuit decision in which the majority answers the question above “no” based on current precedent. However, a “concurrence dubitante” argues that this conflicts with The Founders’ intent when they drafted the 6th Amendment. Another concurring opinion calls on SCOTUS to change its precedent. A dissent argues that based on the facts of this case,

State v. Dakota R. Black, 2017AP837, 3/22/18, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A jury convicted Black of the homicide of B.A.T., a five-year-old child in his care; the child was bruised and died of subdural hemorrhages. Black defended on the theory that the child’s injuries came in a fall, either on the stairs or on the playground.

State v. Gary Lee Wayerski, 2015AP1083-CR, petition for review of unpublished court of appeals opinion granted 3/13/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point):

Whether trial counsel was ineffective where he did not ask the testifying defendant about the purported confession he gave to a jailhouse snitch, and defendant would have denied the conversation occurred.

Whether the state violated Brady when it did not inform defense that the snitch had pending child-sex charges during the trial.

State v. Terrance Lavone Egerson, 2016AP1045-CR, District 1, 2/27/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Egerson moved to withdraw his pleas, alleging his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to challenge the domestic abuse repeater enhancers appended to the charges Egerson faced. According to Egerson, those enhancers never applied, so he was overcharged and led to believe his sentencing exposure was greater than it was. The court of appeals holds trial counsel wasn’t deficient because the complaints supported charging them and, in any event, Egerson hasn’t shown prejudice.