On Point: 8. Counsel, 6th Am.

State v. Mychael R. Hatcher, 2015AP297-CR, District 3, 8/16/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hatcher was convicted of sexually assaulting an intoxicated person, obstructing an officer, and bail-jumping. This 38-page court of appeals decision rejects claims that the trial court erred in refusing to accept Hatcher’s guilty plea, admitting expert testimony during the State’s rebuttal, admitting evidence of the victim’s flirting, and ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for suppression and for introducing into evidence a report showing the victim’s BAC.

Joseph J. Jordan v. Randall R. Hepp, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3613, 2016 WL 4119862, 8/3/16

Jordan claims the Wisconsin courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they held that he was not denied the right to represent himself and that his trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper vouching for a police witness’s credibility. The Seventh Circuit okays the state courts’ decision on self-representation but orders a hearing on Jordan’s ineffective assistance claim.

State v. Rodell Thompson, 2015AP1764-CR, District 4, 8/4/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The trial court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion in deciding to admit other-acts evidence in Thompson’s trial for sexual assault, false imprisonment, and battery, and Thompson’s IAC claims fail for want of prejudice.

State v. William J. Thurber, 2015AP161-CR, 7/27/16, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

“Was Thurber’s trial a game being played or was it a trial designed to search for the truth? Thurber is certainly no angel as evidenced by his current long-term incarceration for crimes apart from this case. I believe the justice system best defines itself by scrupulously adhering to high standards when the worst of the worst comes before it. We travel a slippery slope when we excuse mistakes by the judiciary, the State, and defense counsel because we ‘know’ the defendant is a criminal.” Slip op. ¶91. (Reilly, J. dissenting).

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2016AP6-CR,7/20/16, Distrct 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals here holds that Dalton is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing move to suppress the test results from a warrantless blood draw. The record contains no evidence that exigent circumstances existed a la Missouri v. McNeely, and the officer who ordered the draw gave no indication that he ever considered seeking a warrant.

OLR v. Peter J. Kovac, 2016 WI 62, 7/8/16; case activity

The supreme court suspended an attorney’s license for 90 days for professional misconduct in two criminal matters, including violating SCR 20:1.16(d) by failing to promptly provide the clients’ files to postconviction counsel. (¶¶5-6, 8, 9-10, 12). Because the attorney did not file an answer or defend against the OLR complaint,

Rashaad A. Imani v. William Pollard, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3407, 2016 WL 3434673, 6/22/16

Imani tried to exercise his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), but the Wisconsin trial judge prevented him from doing so. In State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial judge properly found Imani wasn’t competent to represent himself and that he hadn’t made a knowing and voluntary choice to represent himself. The Seventh Circuit now holds that even under the stringent standard for federal habeas relief, SCOW’s decision was wrong, and Imani is entitled to a new trial.

State v. David L. Vickers, 2015AP1631-CR, 6/22/16, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity, including briefs

Vickers, who was convicted of misdemeanor bail jumping and retail theft of a wireless router, filed a §974.06 motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer failed to move for suppression of stolen property found in his car and failed to investigate or call as a witness a co-defendant who later confessed to the theft. The court of appeals here affirms the convcition.

United States v. Bryant, USSC No. 15-420, 2016 WL 3221519 (June 13, 2016), reversing and remanding 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

As we explained in our prior post on the cert grant in this case, the Sixth Amendment does not apply in tribal courts. Congress has created a statutory right to counsel in such courts, including for indigent defendants, in prosecutions involving prison sentences greater than one year. But for charges involving less than a year of incarceration, only defendants who can afford a lawyer are entitled to have one. Bryant has several prior domestic violence convictions in tribal court for which he was not statutorily entitled to, and did not receive, a lawyer. The question here is whether these convictions can form the predicate for his new, federal-court conviction for “domestic assault within … Indian country” which applies only to those with at least two DV priors.

State v. Robert Lavern Cameron, 2016 WI App 54; case activity (including briefs)

This decision feels like an encounter with a swarm of mosquitoes on a pleasant summer evening. But because it is recommended for publication, you can’t just swat it away. Indeed, the court of appeals’ analysis of the issues will leave you reaching for a bottle of the calamine lotion.