On Point: 8. Counsel, 6th Am.

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2016AP6-CR,7/20/16, Distrct 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals here holds that Dalton is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing move to suppress the test results from a warrantless blood draw. The record contains no evidence that exigent circumstances existed a la Missouri v. McNeely, and the officer who ordered the draw gave no indication that he ever considered seeking a warrant.

OLR v. Peter J. Kovac, 2016 WI 62, 7/8/16; case activity

The supreme court suspended an attorney’s license for 90 days for professional misconduct in two criminal matters, including violating SCR 20:1.16(d) by failing to promptly provide the clients’ files to postconviction counsel. (¶¶5-6, 8, 9-10, 12). Because the attorney did not file an answer or defend against the OLR complaint,

Rashaad A. Imani v. William Pollard, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3407, 2016 WL 3434673, 6/22/16

Imani tried to exercise his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), but the Wisconsin trial judge prevented him from doing so. In State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial judge properly found Imani wasn’t competent to represent himself and that he hadn’t made a knowing and voluntary choice to represent himself. The Seventh Circuit now holds that even under the stringent standard for federal habeas relief, SCOW’s decision was wrong, and Imani is entitled to a new trial.

State v. David L. Vickers, 2015AP1631-CR, 6/22/16, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity, including briefs

Vickers, who was convicted of misdemeanor bail jumping and retail theft of a wireless router, filed a §974.06 motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer failed to move for suppression of stolen property found in his car and failed to investigate or call as a witness a co-defendant who later confessed to the theft. The court of appeals here affirms the convcition.

United States v. Bryant, USSC No. 15-420, 2016 WL 3221519 (June 13, 2016), reversing and remanding 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

As we explained in our prior post on the cert grant in this case, the Sixth Amendment does not apply in tribal courts. Congress has created a statutory right to counsel in such courts, including for indigent defendants, in prosecutions involving prison sentences greater than one year. But for charges involving less than a year of incarceration, only defendants who can afford a lawyer are entitled to have one. Bryant has several prior domestic violence convictions in tribal court for which he was not statutorily entitled to, and did not receive, a lawyer. The question here is whether these convictions can form the predicate for his new, federal-court conviction for “domestic assault within … Indian country” which applies only to those with at least two DV priors.

State v. Robert Lavern Cameron, 2016 WI App 54; case activity (including briefs)

This decision feels like an encounter with a swarm of mosquitoes on a pleasant summer evening. But because it is recommended for publication, you can’t just swat it away. Indeed, the court of appeals’ analysis of the issues will leave you reaching for a bottle of the calamine lotion.

Question presented:

Duane Buck’s death penalty case raises a pressing issue of national importance: whether and to what extent the criminal justice system tolerates racial bias and discrimination. Specifically, did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit impose an improper and unduly burdensome Certificate of Appealability (COA) standard that contravenes this Court’s precedent and deepens two circuit splits when it denied Mr. Buck a COA on his motion to reopen the judgment and obtain merits review of his claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for knowingly presenting an “expert” who testified that Mr. Buck was more likely to be dangerous in the future because he is Black, where future dangerousness was both a prerequisite for a death sentence and the central issue at sentencing?

State v. Michael S. Dengsavang, 2015AP637-CR, 6/1/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Michael Dengsavang raises several challenges to the trial court’s denial of his Machner motion. The court of appeals rejects one claim on the merits and declines to consider the rest, holding them previously abandoned.

State v. Mario Martinez Redmond, 2015AP657-2015AP658-CR, 5/17/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Redmond was charged and convicted of battery, disorderly conduct, and multiple counts of witness intimidation. His appeal raised various ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims. But the most interesting issue concerns Redmond’s failed motion to suppress a cryptic text message sent from his phone.

Michael Miller v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1869, 4/26/2016

An Indiana state court sentenced Michael Miller to a total of 120 years in prison on three counts of child molestation. On direct appeal, his lawyer raised challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of other-acts evidence, but did not contest the length of his sentence. Miller then filed a state collateral attack, alleging his original appellate counsel was ineffective for not attacking the sentence.