On Point: 8. Counsel, 6th Am.

State v. Joel D. Rhodes, 2011 WI App 145; for Rhodes: Chris L. Hartley; case activity

Self-Representation – Adequacy of Waiver of Right to Counsel 

The trial court undertook a valid waiver of counsel, pursuant to State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997):

¶18      We reject Rhodes’s claim.  The circuit court conducted a colloquy with Rhodes that the State aptly describes as exemplary.  

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas – Ineffective Assistance, State Court Failure to Reach – Standard of Review 

… When “no state court has squarely addressed the merits” of a habeas claim, however, we review the claim under the pre-AEDPA standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2243, under which we “ ‘dispose of the matter as law and justice require.’ ” Id. at 326 (quoting § 2243). This is “a more generous standard,” George v.

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas – Counsel – Appeal 

When a defendant in a criminal case specifically instructs a lawyer to file a notice of appeal, the lawyer’s failure to do so deprives the defendant of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, regardless of whether an appeal was likely to succeed. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000); Peguero v. United States,

State v. Aaron Deal, 2010AP1804-CR, District 1, 9/20/11 

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Deal: James A. Rebholz; case activity

Counsel’s refusal to argue to the jury that it should return a guilty verdict on felony murder, submitted as a lesser offense option of first-degree intentional homicide, wasn’t deficient in light of the defendant’s insistence on an all-or-nothing strategy.

¶8        At the Machner hearing,

State v. Burt Terrell Johnson, Jr., 2010AP2654-CR, District 1, 9/13/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Johnson: Sara Heinemann Roemaat; case activity

Counsel did not perform deficiently.

1. Decision not to make opening statement was reasonable strategy, given that the defense didn’t plan to call any witnesses but instead intended “to put the State to its proof,” ¶21.
2. Failure to object to State’s closing argument characterizing what the victim “saw”

State v. Carl Mills, 2010AP1746-CR, District 1, 9/7/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Mills: Randall E. Paulson, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Trail counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to jury instructions and verdict forms with respect to unanimity on multiple counts of sexual assault of a single victim, even though the verdict forms did not specify the types of sexual intercourse involved; 

State v. Stephen R. Jones, 2011AP864-CR, District 3, 8/30/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication; for Jones: Brian P. Dimmer; case activity)

Failure to move to strike juror wasn’t deficient performance. Juror’s public support of election of the presiding judge and the district attorney (who was not herself prosecuting this case) didn’t establish a significant relationship with either individual to establish “objective bias.” State v.

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Inadequate Argumentation – Sanction 

Counsel’s woefully inadequate argumentation (“a single, underdeveloped legal argument” that, “(w)orse yet … was foreclosed by” prior precedent) not only dooms his client’s effort to resist deportation, notwithstanding palpable equities on her side, but has consequences for counsel himself:

… We are disturbed, however, by Baniassadi’s perfunctory performance. People in Wroblewska’s position face life-changing consequences from their immigration proceedings.

Joseph Muniz v. Smith, 6th Cir. No. 09-2324, 7/29/11

sixth circuit court of appeal decision

Habeas – Ineffective Assistance – Sleeping Counsel 

The fact that counsel has slept through a portion of trial does not, alone, amount to denial of counsel so as to require relief under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), rather than inquiry into the prejudice component of  Strickland v.

State v. Steven A. Avery, 2011 WI App 124 (recommended for publication); for Avery: Martha K. Askins, Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Search Warrant – Execution – Reasonableness 

Warrant-based search of Avery’s property was a reasonable continuation of the original search 3 days earlier.

General statement:

¶18      Generally, searches are subject to the “one warrant, one search” rule.