On Point: 8. Counsel, 6th Am.

Joseph Muniz v. Smith, 6th Cir. No. 09-2324, 7/29/11

sixth circuit court of appeal decision

Habeas – Ineffective Assistance – Sleeping Counsel 

The fact that counsel has slept through a portion of trial does not, alone, amount to denial of counsel so as to require relief under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), rather than inquiry into the prejudice component of  Strickland v.

State v. Steven A. Avery, 2011 WI App 124 (recommended for publication); for Avery: Martha K. Askins, Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Search Warrant – Execution – Reasonableness 

Warrant-based search of Avery’s property was a reasonable continuation of the original search 3 days earlier.

General statement:

¶18      Generally, searches are subject to the “one warrant, one search” rule.  

MC Winston v. Boatwright, 7th Cir No. 10-1156, 8/19/11

seventh circuit court of appeals decision, denying habeas relief on review of unpublished decision in 2003AP3412 and 2005AP1255

Habeas – Jury Selection – Ineffective Assistance – Defense Counsel’s Discriminatory Use of Peremptories

In a nutshell, this case presents the question whether the constitutional rights of the petitioner, MC Winston,

Kevin G. v. Jennifer M. S., 2009AP1377, District 4, 8/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Jennifer M.S.: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Evidence held sufficient to support termination for failure to assume parental responsibility, § 48.415(6)(a), applying “totality-of-the-circumstances test” where “the fact-finder should consider any support or care, or lack thereof, the parent provided the child throughout the child’s entire life,” Tammy W-G.

State v. Jonathan M. Reynolds, 2011AP512-CR, District 4, 8/11/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Reynolds: Steven Cohen; case activity

Reynolds collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction (on the ground waiver of counsel was ineffectual because he didn’t know the potential range of penalties) is rejected. Basic procedure discussed and applied, ¶8.

¶11      Reynolds testified that although he received a copy of the complaint,

Kimberly A. v. Charles B., 2011AP129, District 3, 8/4/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Charles B.: Leonard D. Kachinsky; case activity

Counsel’s strategic decision not to voir dire jurors about what they may have heard during a heated sidebar discussion, and instead to request a limiting instruction to disregard anything they may have overheard, wasn’t deficient performance, ¶12. Nor was it prejudicial, given that he “offers no evidence,

State v. Francine T., 2010AP3140 / State v. Emilano M., 2010AP2596, District 1, 8/3/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Francine T.: Theresa J. Schmieder; for Emilano M.: Brian C. Findley; case activity

¶17      Francine and Emiliano argue that the trial court lacked competence [5] to enter the June 2, 2010 TPR order because it did not have competence to enter 
the January 31,

State v. Kenneth A. Hudson, 2010AP166-CR, District 3, 8/2/11 

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Hudson: James A. Rebholz; case activity

By rejecting and failing to cooperate with appointed counsel, after being warned of the consequence, Hudson forfeited his right to representation at trial.

¶27      In accordance with Cummings, Hudson was repeatedly warned by the court—and by outgoing counsel—that Carns would be his final attorney and that Hudson therefore needed to cooperate with him.  

State v. Kelvin L. Crenshaw, 2010AP1960-CR, District 1, 8/2/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Crenshaw: Joseph E. Redding; case activity

Counsel wasn’t ineffective with respect to: failure to argue a theory of defense unsupported by the evidence; failure to introduce medical records asserted to show police bias in conducting the investigation; failure to object to the concededly erroneous inclusion of “party to a crime”

State v. Jeremy M. Bootz, 2010AP2795-CR, District 2, 7/27/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Bootz: Craig S. Powell; case activity

Counsel “had no obligation to object to” the testimony of “a bona fide rebuttal witness,” hence didn’t perform deficiently.

The court summarizes ground-rules relative to rebuttal witnesses, overarching principles being: “A bona fide rebuttal witness is a witness whose testimony only becomes necessary and appropriate after the defense presents its case-in-reply.