On Point: 8. Counsel, 6th Am.

State v. Robert Daris Spencer, 2022 WI 56, July 6, 2022, affirming in part and reversing in part an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

A majority of the supreme court holds that Spencer had no right to be personally present or even to have counsel present when the trial judge decided to dismiss a juror for cause just before deliberations began because the judge’s interaction with the juror wasn’t a critical stage of the proceedings. 

Chippewa County Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. J.W.., 2021AP1986, 7/19/22, District  3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Janine” raised an insufficient evidence claim and several ineffective assistance of counsel claims in her appeal from an order terminating her parental right to her son.  This post focuses on two of the IAC claims. Counsel failed to object to (1) portions of the county social worker’s testimony, and (2) new information that the GAL introduced during closing statements.

State v. Alberto E. Rivera, 2021AP1100, 7/12/22, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity, (including briefs)

The court of appeals rejects Rivera’s claims for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to raise two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Rivera challenged trial counsel’s counsel’s failure to seek suppression of an in-court identification because (a) it was tainted by an earlier suggestive “showup” procedure, and (b) his right to counsel was violated during the line-up because his retained counsel was not present for it.

State v. Richard M. Arrington, 2022 WI 53, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2021 WI App 32, 7/1/22, case activity (including briefs)

In a majority opinion written by Roggensack, SCOW holds that the State did not violate Arrington’s 6th Amendment right to counsel by using a jailhouse snitch to help cinch a 1st-degree homicide conviction against him. Thus, Arrington’s lawyer did not perform deficiently by failing to file a suppression motion. Dallet wrote a concurrence joined by A.W. Bradley and Karofsky arguing that a 6th Amendment violation did occur and that Arrington’s lawyer performed deficiently by not moving to suppress the snitch evidence. The concurrence agrees, however, that Arrington was not prejudiced by counsel’s conduct.

State v. Theophilous Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

This case doesn’t break new ground or develop existing law. Instead, it reverses the court of appeals for not applying the standard a circuit applies when deciding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction motion that alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

State v. Nhia Lee, 2019AP221-CR, petition dismissed as improvidently granted, 5/24/22; case activity (including briefs)

SCOW presumably took this case in order to address one or both of these issues: (1) whether a circuit court must appoint counsel at the county’s expense when the SPD is unable to do so within 10 days of the defendant’s initial appearance; and (2) whether Lee was denied the right to counsel, due process and a speedy trial as he sat in jail for over 100 days waiting for a lawyer. After briefing and oral argument, 5 justices voted to dismiss his petition as improvidently granted.

State v. Jovan T. Mull, 2020AP1362, petition for review of a per curiam opinion granted, 5/18/22, case activity (including briefs)

Question Presented (from petition):

Under binding case law, in reviewing an ineffective assistance claim, the court must defer to a trial attorney’s strategic decisions. Here, the circuit court found Mull’s attorney used reasonable strategies in choosing a defense and handling cross-examination of a witness, and it deferred to the attorney’s strategy. But the court of appeals substituted its own decisions for those of Mull’s trial attorney. Did the court of appeals impermissibly fail to defer to Mull’s attorney’s strategic decisions?

State v. Percy Antione Robinson, 2020AP1728-CR, certification granted 5/18/22; case activity (including briefs); ; remanded  5/10/23

Question presented:

The 4th Amendment requires that a judicial officer determine probable within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). Milwaukee County complies with this mandate by having the judicial officer review a sworn affidavit from law enforcement and set initial bail. This procedure does not require the accused to appear in person. The judicial officer simply conducts a paper review and completes a CR-215 form. Does this procedure trigger the accused’s right to counsel?

State v. Eric Trygve Kothbauer, 2020AP1406-CR, District 3, 5/3/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Kothbauer challenges his trial lawyer’s representation in a prosecution for operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. The court of appeals holds trial counsel wasn’t deficient or, even if he was, the deficiency wasn’t prejudicial.

State v. Percy Antione Robinson, 2020AP1728-Cr, certification filed 4/19/22, District 1; case activity (including briefs)

Whether Milwaukee County’s CR-215 procedure for determining probable cause triggers an accused’s 6th Amendment right to counsel for any subsequent “critical stage” of the legal proceeding?