On Point: A. Certification requests

State v. Andreas W. Rauch Sharak, 2024AP469-CR, 1/16/25, District 4; case activity (including briefs)

Rauch Sharak’s appeal concerns whether Fourth Amendment safeguards are implicated when an electronic service provider (ESP) scans for and reviews digital files in an individual’s account that are flagged as child pornography; and when law enforcement subsequently opens and views any flagged files that the ESP sent to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).

State v. Morris V. Seaton, 2021AP1399-CR, certification filed 2/8/23, certification granted, 3/24/23, remanded, 2023 WI 69;District 2; case activity (including briefs)

Question presented (from the court of appeals’ certification):

In light of the 2014 amendment of WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b) (2019-20), codifying and expanding the “greater latitude” rule and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶¶23-25, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158, interpreting and applying that amendment, are State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982), and State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, 238 Wis. 2d 467, 618 N.W.2d 214, still controlling law as they relate to the admissibility of prior nonconsensual sexual wrongs in cases involving an adult victim of an alleged sexual assault where consent is the primary issue?

Walworth County v. M.R.M., 2022AP140-FT, certification filed 7/14/22, certification granted, 9/14/22, reversed, 2023 WI 59; District 2; case activity

1. Does the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, ¶38, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, have retroactive application or only prospective application?

2. In a ch. 51 case involving a petition to extend a commitment order, is circuit court competency determined from the expiration of the earlier commitment order or from the expiration of the extension order, even where the extension order is determined on appeal to be invalid?

State v. Percy Antione Robinson, 2020AP1728-Cr, certification filed 4/19/22, District 1; case activity (including briefs)

Whether Milwaukee County’s CR-215 procedure for determining probable cause triggers an accused’s 6th Amendment right to counsel for any subsequent “critical stage” of the legal proceeding?

Wisconsin Justice Initiative v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2020AP2003, certification issued 12/21/21; case activity (including briefs)

Question certified (composed by On Point):

Was the single ballot question submitting the “Marsy’s Law” constitutional amendments to voters legally insufficient because it:

(1) does not “reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment,” State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 201, 204 N.W. 803 (1925);

(2) is misleading, in that it contained “misinformation” and did not “mention[] [its subject] in accord with the fact,” State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 660, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953); or

(3) should have been submitted as more than one ballot question because the proposed amendment encompassed more than one subject matter and accomplished more than one purpose, McConkey v. Van Hollen, 2010 WI 57, ¶¶25-26, 41, 326 Wis. 2d 1, 783 N.W.2d 855.

State v. Corey Rector, 2020AP1213, certification filed 11/24/21; granted 2/16/22; affirmed 5/23/23; District 2; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from the certification):

Whether the plain meaning of “separate occasions” in the sex-offender-registration statute means that the two convictions must have occurred at different times in two separate proceedings so that the qualifying convictions occurred sometime before a defendant is convicted in the current case. Stated otherwise, can the qualifying convictions occur simultaneously, as they did in this case, and as Wittrock and Hopkins held?

Rusk County v. A.A., Appeal No. 2019AP839 and 2020AP1580 (consolidated); certification granted 4/13/21, District 3; case activity here and here

SCOW recently held that recommitment proceedings are governed only by the procedures in §§51.20(10)-(13). Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140. Thus, the procedural requirements in §§(1)-(9) do not apply. Id., ¶¶24, 27. This court of appeals certification asks SCOW to decide whether S.L.L. violates the plain language of Chapter 51. If not, then does Chapter 51 violate 14th Amendment due process and equal protection given that, under S.L.L.‘s construction, it denies people undergoing recommitment fundamental procedural rights guaranteed to people undergoing initial commitments.

Daniel Doubek v. Joshua Kaul, 2020AP704, 3/31/21, District 2, certification granted 6/16/21; decision issued, circuit court reversed, 2022 WI 31; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

Are Evans v. DOJ, 2014 WI App 31, 353 Wis. 2d 289, 844 N.W.2d 403, and Leonard v. State, 2015 WI App 57, 364 Wis. 2d 491, 868 N.W.2d 186, “good law” in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014)?

State v. George Steven Burch, 2019AP404-CR, District 3 (10/20/20), review granted 11/18/20, circuit court judgment affirmed, 2021 WI 68; case activity (including briefs)

Burch … contends the [Green Bay Police Department] and the [Brown County Sheriff’s Office] violated his Fourth Amendment rights in three ways: (1) the GBPD exceeded the scope of his consent to search his cell phone by downloading the phone’s entire contents, rather than only the text messages; (2) the GBPD unlawfully retained the entire cell phone download after it completed its June 2016 investigation into the vehicle incidents; and (3) the BCSO had no lawful authority to conduct a second search of the cell phone download in August 2016. Because these issues raise novel questions regarding the application of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the vast array of digital information contained in modern cell phones, we certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

State v. Jacob Richard Beyer, 2019AP1983, 9/24/20, District 4; case activity (including briefs); certification granted 11/18/20, reversed, 2021 WI 59

Wisconsin courts apply a robust guilty-plea waiver rule: in general, a plea will block a defendant from appealing any issue litigated before the plea. There is one important statutory exception: Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10) entitles a defendant to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress evidence or a motion to exclude his or her own statements, guilty plea or no. But other matters that may have arisen–pre-trial evidentiary decisions, fights over discovery, etc.–are typically not reviewable unless the defendant insists on a trial.