On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Jamie Lane Stephenson, 2019 WI App 63, petition for review granted, 3/17/20, affirmed, 2020 WI 92; case activity (including briefs)

At a hearing on a committed person’s petition for discharge from a ch. 980 commitment, the state has the burden of proving the person is still a sexually violent person—that is, that the person: (1) has a mental disorder; and (2) is dangerous because that mental disorder makes it more likely than not the person will commit sexually violent offenses in the future. § 980.09(3). The court of appeals holds that even though the state needs an expert to prove the person has a mental disorder, it doesn’t need an expert to prove the person is dangerous because of the mental disorder.

State v. Tunis Jay LeFever, 2019AP702-CR, District 2, 10/30/19, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer stopped LeFever for speeding, noticed that he had bloodshot eyes, and detected a faint odor of alcohol but wasn’t sure of the source. He asked LeFever to complete field sobriety tests. The officer noted indicators of impairment on some of the tests and LeFever’s bright green tongue. A PBT test did not detect the presence of alcohol in LeFever’s system. The officer suspected marijuana.

Sauk County v. R.A.S., 2018AP2253, 10/31/2019, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.A.S. was committed after a ch. 51 jury trial. The county alleged and the court instructed on two forms of dangerousness–those in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and 2.d.. R.A.S. asked that the verdict form require the jury to agree on one, the other, or both to commit him, but the circuit court refused, instead submitting a form that just asked the jury if R.A.S. was “dangerous.” The court of appeals now affirms this decision, rejecting R.A.S.’s due-process claim and saying that In re Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 359 Wis. 2d 272, 856 N.W.2d 603, controls the question–though it in fact has only glancing relevance to the issue.

State v. Ross Harris, Jr., 2018AP1667, 10/24/2019, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The charges in this case, disorderly conduct and battery, arose from an altercation in a hospital elevator. The state said Harris, newly a grandfather, had attacked A.D., the fiancé of his newborn grandchild’s maternal grandmother, while both were visiting the baby. Harris said it was A.D. who had attacked him.

State v. Jeffery Scott Wiganowsky, 2019AP884-CR, District 4, 10/24/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wiganowsky was charged for OWI in Wyoming in 2015. He negotiated a deferred prosecution agreement, which he successfully completed, so the charge was dismissed. But his driving privileges were administratively suspended due to his blood-alcohol content. (¶9). That counts as a prior OWI “conviction” under §§ 340.01(9r) and 343.307(1)(d).

State v. T.S.W., 2019AP450-451, District 1, 10/22/19 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court failed to hold a hearing on T.S.W.’s motion for change of physical placement of her child, J.C., before the jury trial on the grounds phase of her TPR. She argued that this violated her right to due process because if she had prevailed at the hearing, the jury would have heard evidence that J.C. had been placed in the parental home with T.S.W., rather than outside the parental home.

State v. John W. Lane, 2019AP153-CR, District 4, 10/17/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lane consented to a blood draw after his OWI arrest, but a week later wrote the State Hygiene Lab saying he was revoking his consent to the collection and testing of his blood. The authorities tested the blood anyway. Lane’s challenge to the test result is foreclosed by State v. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 387 Wis. 2d 744, 930 N.W.2d 223.

State v. Jamie Ellin Grimm, 2019AP789-Cr, District 2, 10/16/19 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity (including briefs)

When a driver approaches an oncoming car within 500 feet,  §347.12(1)(a) requires her to “dim, depress or tilt” her high beams so that “glaring rays” aren’t directed into the eyes of the approaching driver. It is undisputed that Grimm flashed her beams within 500 feet of an approaching squad car.

State v. Larry W. Olson, 2019 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)

Olson and the state resolved some felony counts with an agreement that he’d plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The court found him NGI and committed him for 19 years, placing him on conditional release immediately. A few weeks later, Olson admitted violating his release conditions by smoking methamphetamine. DHS, which supervises NGI committees, immediately took him into custody. For reasons unknown, it held him for eight days before filing a petition to revoke his supervised release. This, everyone agrees, violated Wis. Stat. § 971.17(3)(e), which says such a petition “shall” be filed within 72 hours of detention (excluding weekends and holidays). The dispute on appeal is what that violation means: the state says there’s no consequence at all; Olson says a late petition is no good and must be dismissed. In legalese, the question is whether the word “shall” is mandatory or directory.

Dane County v. T.R., 2019AP1336-1338, 10/10/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is a confidential case, so we don’t know what the briefs argue or the record shows. However, it seems the circuit court failed to make the findings essential to its order terminating T.R.’s parental rights to her 3 children, and the court of appeals shored up the decision in  order to affirm.