On Point blog, page 130 of 485
Inconsistent (unpublished) decisions on what’s required for domestic abuse surcharge
State v. Anthony Iven Jones, A/K/A Hashim Hasan, 2017AP364, 6/5/18, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A jury found Jones guilty of bail jumping. one of his bond conditions had been that he stay 500 feet away from his former wife. He made a threatening phone call to her and was discovered by a police officer to be “approximately 92 feet away” from her house. He first claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, but the court does not agree, based on the essential facts just noted. (¶12).
Denial of substitute counsel affimed; it was defendant’s responsibility to procure his witnesses for trial
State v. Anthony Donte Dixon, 2017AP2221-2222-CR, 6/5/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity
Dixon wasn’t happy with his trial lawyer. They hadn’t communicated before the final pre-trial conference. When they did communicate, Dixon told his lawyer that he wanted him to contact several alibi witnesses and provided their names and numbers. Two witnesses didn’t return counsel’s call. One “simply gave her information” [no explanation of that means.] On the day of the trial, counsel informed the court that Dixon wanted to fire him and was prepared to get a new lawyer on his own. The trial court denied the request so Dixon tried his case pro se.
Constant video tracking of car gave reasonable suspicion it was correct target of stop
Winnebago County v. Lesa L. Maus, 2017AP1979, 5/30/18, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Maus challenges her stop on the ground that the citizen witness who called in a driver going the wrong way on the interstate said the car was beige, but her car, the one stopped, was black.
COA: There was reasonable suspicion for stop, man on ground with deputy’s knee on his back being handcuffed wasn’t arrested
Dane County v. Damian A. Bethke, 2017AP1284, 5/31/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Bethke was acquitted of his OWI charge, so this is an appeal only of his refusal, and his claim is that the officer who detained him violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Wrong return address on notice of intent to revoke license doesn’t undo refusal revocation
County of Door v. Donald L. McPhail, 2017AP1079, 5/30/18, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
When McPhail was arrested for first-offense OWI, he refused a blood test. The arresting officer gave him the notice of intent to withdraw his operating privilege, which told McPhail he had 10 days to request a hearing, and that he should send his request to 1201 S. Duluth Ave in Sturgeon Bay. But that’s the Sheriff’s department, not the clerk of courts, which is at 1205 (though the two are part of the same complex).
Order revoking operating privileges for unlawful refusal of blood test upheld
State v. Jeffrey A. Jacobi, 2017AP1816, 5/30/18, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Based on facts specific to this case, the court of appeals held that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe Jacobi was intoxicated when he bumped into a car while driving his motorcycle. It also wagged its finger at appellate counsel for carelessness in compiling the record and for misrepresenting the record. It also noted his failure to file a reply brief.
TPR court appropriately considered whether, after termination, children would continue to have contact with biological family
State v. P.J., 2018AP376-2018AP381, 5/30/18, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
P.J. challenged the termination of her parental rights to her 6 children on the grounds that the circuit court failed to appropriately consider the substantial bond that she had with her children and improperly relied on testimony by the various foster parents that the children would continue to have contact with each other. The court of appeals affirmed.
Defense win! Extension of Ch. 51 involuntary medication order vacated for failure to explain ads, disads, and alternatives
Waukesha County v. M.J.S., 2017AP1843, 5/30/18, District 2, (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
Section 51.61(1)(g)4 and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607 establish that a person subject to a possible involuntary medication order is entitled to receive a reasonable explanation of the proposed medication, why it is being prescribed, its advantages and disadvantages (include side effects), and alternatives to it. If the person is incapable of expressing an understanding of these matters or incapable of applying the information to his situation in order to make an informed decision, then he is incompetent to refuse them. In this case, M.J.S. failed to show for the examination where a doctor would have attempted the statutorily-required explanation. The circuit court ordered involuntary meds; the court of appeals reversed.
Seemingly unaware of multiple statutes, court of appeals declares appeal from NGI conditional release plan moot
State v. Justice G. Armstead, 2017AP1586-CR, 5/30/18, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Armstead pled NGI to 2 misdemeanors, pursuant to §971.16. The court ordered his conditional release into the community for 6 months, along with involuntary medications. Five months into the order, Armstead filed a motion for postdisposition relief arguing that both the examining physician and the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard for ordering involuntary medications. The circuit court denied the motion. The conditional release order expired a week later but Armstead appealed anyway. The court of appeals dismissed his appeal as moot. In doing so, it made a significant error of law.
Court of appeals upholds extension of traffic stop based on strong odor of perfume and cigarettes
State v. Jasetta Smith, 2017AP1807-CR, 5/23/18, District 2, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Better go easy on the perfume or cologne. An officer ran the license plates on the car Smith was driving at 1:08 a.m. one night. He saw that the registered owner’s license was suspended, stopped the car, learned that Smith was not the owner, and smelled the overpowering odor of perfume and cigarettes.