On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. C.G.B., 2017 WI App 32; case activity

While the juvenile code gives a judge the authority to dismiss a juvenile delinquency petition and refer the case for a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) over the district attorney’s objection, State v. Lindsey A.F., 2003 WI 63, 262 Wis. 2d 200, 663 N.W.2d 757, the code does not give the judge the authority to dismiss a petition and order a consent decree over the DA’s objection.

State v. Thomas G. St. Peter, 2016AP683-CR, District 1, 4/18/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

St. Peter is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the judge violated his due process rights when it relied on inaccurate information to jump the parties’ joint recommendation for time served and impose more jail time. State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1 (sentencing based on inaccurate information violates due process). Not only that, but the judge erroneously exercised his sentencing discretion by failing to link the relevant facts and factors of the case to the standard sentencing objectives. —And you thought an erroneous exercise of sentencing discretion was as mythical a beast as a unicorn!

State v. Kenneth William Jaworski, 2016AP5, District 1, 4/18/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state filed a ch. 980 commitment petition against Jaworski shortly before the mandatory release (MR) date the Department of Corrections had calculated for him. But DOC later realized it had miscalculated Jaworski’s MR date, which was actually about two months earlier than the date the petition was filed. DOC’s miscalculation (whether negligent or, as Jaworski argues, made in “bad faith”) doesn’t mean the petition was untimely because a ch. 980 petition may be filed anytime before the person is released or discharged from his predicate sexual offense sentences.

Marathon County v. P.X., 2016AP1490, 4/18/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

P.X., who has longstanding diagnoses of autism, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and intellectual disabilities, was the subject of a Chapter 54 guardianship and a Chapter 55 protective placement, when the County sought to extend his Chapter 51 civil commitment. P.X. argues that he is not a “proper subject for treatment” under Chapter 51 because he is not “capable of rehabilitation” under Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179. Instead, the county is using medication to “control” his behavior.

State v. D.W., 2016AP1827, 4/11/17, District 1,(1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The briefs in this TPR case are confidential, so we only know what the court of appeals’ opinion tells us about the case. D.W. apparently alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his trial lawyer’s failure to call witnesses and failure to move to have his son’s (A.W.’s) placement changed to a family member. He also argued that his plea was defective. The court of appeals decision is long on facts, short on law, and essentially rubber stamps the Machner court’s findings without analysis.

Barron County DHHS v. C.K., 2015AP1378, 2015AP1379 & 2015AP1380, District 3, 4/11/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

C.K.’s argues she should get a new TPR trial because the circuit court erred by deciding an element of the grounds allegations without getting her personal waiver of the right to have the jury decide the element and by admitting evidence about drug activity at her home. The court of appeals rejects her claims.

State v. Frank V. Blonda, 2015AP2431-CR, 4/11/17, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).

 M.L., the victim in this case, called her sister, Vincenza, and allegedly told her that Blonda had hit her in the head with a telephone. Vicenza reported this to the police.  Later, M.L. told the DA’s victim advocate that she did not want to press charges, Blonda did not hit her with the phone, and she had been drinking and wasn’t sure how she had been injured. She also filed a victim impact statement, which said that her injury was due to an accident that happened in Blonda’s absence. Unfortunately, the State didn’t disclose these statements to Blonda until the first and second days of his trial.

Cle A. Gray, Jr. v. Robert Humphries, 2016AP584-CR, 4/6/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including state’s brief)

Gray sought to prevent the Department of Corrections from taking certain money from his prison accounts to pay the costs and restitution Gray had been ordered to pay, but the court of appeals holds DOC’s collection actions were valid under the judgment of conviction and relevant statutes.

County of Dodge v. Alexis N. Unser, 2016AP2172, 4/6/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Unser wasn’t unlawfully moved outside the “vicinity” of the traffic stop when the officer transported her six miles to conduct field sobriety tests.

State v. Terrence L. Perkins, 2016AP1427-CR,4/4/17, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At Perkins’ suppression hearing, Officer Stetzer testified that he saw Perkins drive through a stop sign and part way through a cross walk into the middle of an intersection where he then backed up to allow a car to pass before proceeding. The squad car video did not capture Perkins’ stop sign violation; it only recorded him backing up. Perkins argued that the position of the squad car would have prevented the officer from seeing whether he complied with the stop sign before proceeding into the intersection. He thus argued that Stetzer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him.