On Point blog, page 167 of 484
Involuntariness finding doesn’t merit suppressing next day’s statements
State v. Armin G. Wand, III, 2015AP1366-CR, 9/8/16, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Armin Wand and his brother Jeremy were convicted of crimes relating to a fire at Wand’s residence that killed his three sons, seriously injured his wife and caused the death of the fetus she was carrying. Before he pled, Wand moved to suppress statements he made to officers on two consecutive days; the court suppressed the first day’s as involuntary but admitted the second day’s. He appeals on various grounds connected to the admission of those later statements.
Grabbing, pushing, blocking exit sufficient to support disorderly conduct conviction
State v. Kerry A. Siekierzynski, 2015AP2350-CR, District 3, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Siekierzynski’s acts during an angry, emotional confrontation with his ex-wife over child visitation were enough to support the guilty verdict for disorderly conduct.
Contact with suspected drunk driver wasn’t a seizure; and if it was, it was lawful
State v. Mary G. Zinda, 2016AP455-CR, District 2, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Two police officers approached Zinda as she got out of her car on her own driveway, but this did not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. And even if it was a seizure, it was supported by reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Zinda was operating while intoxicated.
Extension of traffic stop was reasonable
State v. John J. Valenti, 2016AP662, District 2, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After stopping and ticketing Valenti for speeding, a state trooper continued to detain him to investigate whether he was operating while intoxicated. The court of appeals rejects Valenti’s claim that the trooper lacked specific, articulable facts justifying expanding the investigatory purpose of the stop because the only fact on which the trooper acted was a general odor of intoxicants, which could have emanated from the passenger. (¶¶2-4, 6, 9).
A longer prolonged stop/dog sniff, but a different result
State v. Troy Paulson, 2015AP456-CR, 8/31/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion, not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This is the second dog sniff case from District 2 in less than a week. See our post on State v. Downer Jossi here, which recognized that SCOTUS’s Rodriguez v. United States overruled SCOW’s State v.
“Twilight zone” between great bodily harm and bodily harm is for jury
State v. Anthony Darnell Davis, 2016 WI App 73; case activity (including briefs)
Davis argued that he could not be convicted of recklessly causing “great bodily harm” to a child where the injuries he inflicted were bone fractures which, by statute, qualify as only “substantial bodily harm.” See Wis. Stat. § 939.22(38). The court of appeals disagreed.
Pro se defense win: Officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop
State v. Paul R. Vanderlinden, 2015AP901-CR, District 3, 8/30/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Vanderlinden was convicted of OWI 2nd and driving with a PAC 2nd. An officer had stopped Vanderlinden’s car because two witnesses had reported him drinking beer and leaving the theater with a beer in his pocket. According to the court of appeals, this did not amount to reasonable suspicion of OWI.
Conviction for OWI 1st reversed and remanded for entry of conviction for OWI 3rd
State v. Ronald Marshall Jewett, 2015AP1014-CR, District 3, 8/30/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The question presented in this case is whether a certified driving record from the Wisconsin DOT is sufficient evidence to establish 2 prior OWI convictions in Minnesota–even though the original court records for those convictions no longer exist. The court of appeals says “yes.”
No error in joinder, denial of substitution
State v. Joe Bonds Turney, 2015AP1651-CR & 2015AP1652-CR, District 1, 8/30/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Turney claims the trial court erred in permitting joinder of two cases for trial and in denying his motion for substitution of judge following his arraignment. He also argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which was based on trial counsel’s failure to object to a witness’s reference to his post-arrest silence. The court of appeals rejects his claims.
Post-disposition change of child’s placement doesn’t merit new dispositional hearing
State v. T.L.T., 2016AP471, District 1, 8/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Five months after the circuit court terminated T.L.T.’s parental rights to E.A.T., child welfare authorities moved E.A.T. from his foster placement with V.B. to a new adoptive foster home. T.L.T. argues the termination decision rested heavily on the prospect V.B. would adopt E.A.T., so the post-disposition change in placement materially affects that decision. (¶¶2-12). She asks the court of appeals to exercise its discretionary power to reverse under § 752.35 because the real controversy was not tried and justice miscarried. (¶¶15-16). The court of appeals declines.