On Point blog, page 168 of 485
Failure to use turn signal justified stop
Town of Grand Chute v. Shelley L. Kowalewski, 2015AP1788, District 3, 9/20/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The stop of Kowalewski’s car was supported by probable cause that she violated § 346.34(1)(b), which requires a drive to use a turn signal “[i]n the event any other traffic may be affected by the movement” of the vehicle.
Blood draw by paramedic was okay
State v. Steven W. Heath, 2014AP2466-CR, District 4, 9/15/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Heath challenges the blood draw evidence in his OWI prosecution, claiming that the paramedic who did the draw wasn’t a “person acting under the direction of a physician” as required by § 343.305(5)(b) and that the method and manner of the blood draw was not constitutionally reasonable. The court of appeals rejects his claims.
Toxicologist could give opinion about impairment
State v. Lory F. Kerk, 2015AP2608-CR, District 3, 9/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court didn’t err in allowing the state to elicit testimony from its expert toxicologist that Kerk was impaired by the amount of alcohol and prescription drugs found in her blood.
Court had jurisdiction over OWI mistakenly charged as a criminal offense
State v. Timothy A. Giese, 2015AP1838-CR, District 3, 9/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The supreme court’s recent decision in City of Eau Claire v. Booth Britton, 2016 WI 65, disposes of Giese’s claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over a mistakenly charged second-offense OWI.
No felony witness intimidation without proof of felony charges
State v. Gary Abdullah Salaam, 2014AP2666-CR & 2667-CR, 9/13/2016, District 1 (Not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Salaam raises four claims challenging his convictions, at jury trial, of recklessly endangering safety, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and three counts of witness intimidation. The court affirms as to the first two counts but finds insufficient evidence as to the witness intimidation charges.
Circuit court’s immigration warning didn’t comply with § 971.08(1)(c), and defendant has sufficiently alleged likelihood of deportation
State v. Jose Alberto Reyes Fuerte, 2016 WI App 78, petition for review granted 1/18/2017, reversed, 2017 WI 104; case activity (including briefs)
This decision is important to anyone who litigates claims for plea withdrawal under § 971.08(2) because it helps clarify the law in two ways. First, it provides two examples of a circuit court’s failure to comply with § 971.08(1)(c)’s requirement that the defendant be warned about the immigration consequences of a plea. Second, it explains what a defendant must allege to make a sufficient showing that his or her plea is likely to result in deportation.
Involuntariness finding doesn’t merit suppressing next day’s statements
State v. Armin G. Wand, III, 2015AP1366-CR, 9/8/16, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Armin Wand and his brother Jeremy were convicted of crimes relating to a fire at Wand’s residence that killed his three sons, seriously injured his wife and caused the death of the fetus she was carrying. Before he pled, Wand moved to suppress statements he made to officers on two consecutive days; the court suppressed the first day’s as involuntary but admitted the second day’s. He appeals on various grounds connected to the admission of those later statements.
Grabbing, pushing, blocking exit sufficient to support disorderly conduct conviction
State v. Kerry A. Siekierzynski, 2015AP2350-CR, District 3, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Siekierzynski’s acts during an angry, emotional confrontation with his ex-wife over child visitation were enough to support the guilty verdict for disorderly conduct.
Contact with suspected drunk driver wasn’t a seizure; and if it was, it was lawful
State v. Mary G. Zinda, 2016AP455-CR, District 2, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Two police officers approached Zinda as she got out of her car on her own driveway, but this did not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. And even if it was a seizure, it was supported by reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Zinda was operating while intoxicated.
Extension of traffic stop was reasonable
State v. John J. Valenti, 2016AP662, District 2, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After stopping and ticketing Valenti for speeding, a state trooper continued to detain him to investigate whether he was operating while intoxicated. The court of appeals rejects Valenti’s claim that the trooper lacked specific, articulable facts justifying expanding the investigatory purpose of the stop because the only fact on which the trooper acted was a general odor of intoxicants, which could have emanated from the passenger. (¶¶2-4, 6, 9).