On Point blog, page 172 of 495
WEAJA doesn’t cover forfeiture action brought by the State instead of a state agency
State v. Judith Ann Detert-Moriarty, 2017 WI App 2; case activity (including briefs)
The Wisconsin Equal Access to Justice Act, § 814.245, doesn’t apply to a person who prevailed in a forfeiture action brought in the name of the State of Wisconsin because the clear statutory language covers only actions brought by “a state agency.”
Summary judgment in TPR case affirmed
Jefferson County DHS v. C.C., 2016AP1983, District 4, 12/21/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly granted summary judgment on the petition terminating C.C.’s parental rights despite C.C.’s claims that the circuit court violated the mandatory notice provision under § 802.08(2) and that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of grounds for termination.
Court rejects claim that revocation hearing lawyer was ineffective
State ex rel. Vincent Martinez v. Brian Hayes, 2014AP2095, District 2, 12/21/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Martinez claimed the lawyer who represented him at his ES revocation hearing should have objected to certain hearsay evidence and to the ALJ’s failure to find good cause for the lack of appearance of certain witnesses. The court of appeals rejects the claim because even if counsel was deficient, Martinez wasn’t prejudiced.
Expungement decision requires proper exercise of discretion, including statement of rationale
State v. Rachel M. Helmbrecht, 2017 WI App 5; case activity (including briefs)
A circuit court’s decision on whether to order expungement under § 973.015 involves the exercise of discretion, and therefore the general rules governing the proper exercise of discretion apply to the expungement decision.
Objective facts justified officer’s contact with driver
State v. Marie A. Martin, 2016AP913-CR, District 1, 12/20/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A police officer’s contact with the driver of a car idling in a parking lot at 2:00 a.m. was lawful because the objective facts justified a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Time, place, quick turn, hanging out in parking lot = reasonable suspicion of OWI
State v. Gregory J. McMillan, 2016AP127-CR, 12/16/2016, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
12:30 a.m., Saturday, Dodge Charger, driving away from tavern-rich area of McFarland. No bad driving, but a “relatively sudden” right turn with a squad two car lengths behind. The turn is onto a dead-end street with only “large industrial-type buildings.” Officer drives around a back way and sees McMillan standing at the back of his car talking on his phone. From where he’s standing, McMillan could have snuck into the shadows had he seen the squad following him, instead of coming around a back way. Officer stops McMillan. Reasonable suspicion?
Defendant pleading to “sexual contact” enticement need not understand “sexual contact”
State v. Shannon Olance Hendricks, 2015AP2429-CR, 12/15/2016, District 1/4 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 5/15/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 15 ; case activity (including briefs)
A defendant pleading to a sexual assault involving sexual contact (as opposed to sexual intercourse) is required to understand the meaning of “sexual contact.” If he or she does not, he or she is entitled to plea withdrawal. State v. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 467, 671 N.W.2d 18. Here, the court of appeals holds that a defendant pleading to child enticement with a purpose to engage in a sexual assault by “sexual contact” need not understand the meaning of this phrase.
No abuse of discretion in sentence or sex offender registration
State v. David H. Ninnemann, 2016AP1294-CR, 12/14/2016, District 2 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
David Ninnemann appeals from sentencing after revocation of his probation. He challenges the length of his jail sentences and the court’s order that he register as a sex offender, but the court of appeals upholds both of the trial court’s discretionary decisions.
Court of appeals says Chapter 54 can override a person’s advance planning
E.C. v. Susan Krueger, 2015AP2196, 12/13/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity
E.C., an elderly woman with Alzheimer’s, planned for her future while she was still competent. She named her son, G.C., as her power of attorney for finances and health care. After she became incompetent, her family began fighting about her care. Krueger, E.C.’s daughter, filed a Ch. 54 guardianship proceeding. The issue in this case is whether Chapter 54 can trump a person’s advance planning.
Two DC convictions from same incident not multiplicitious
State v. George W. Mallum, III, 2016AP765-CR, District 1, 12/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Mallum was convicted of two counts of disorderly conduct arising out of a single incident, but because the charges were not identical in fact the convictions are not multiplicitous.