On Point blog, page 1 of 216
COA: Criminal charges for violating conditions imposed as a result of refusing a warrantless blood draw are constitutional.
State v. Nicholas L. Sparby-Duncan,2024AP1012-CR, 1/6/26, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
In an opinion recommended for publication, the COA affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Nicholas Sparby-Duncan’s motion to dismiss charges for failing to install an ignition interlock device (IID) and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) above .02. The COA found that the IID and PAC charges did not impose criminal penalties for Sparby-Duncan previously refusing to submit to a warrantless blood draw, although he was required to install an IID – which subjected him to the .02 PAC — as a result of his 2008 conviction for refusing.
Publication Orders for October, November and December
As usual, we bring you coverage of COA’s orders regarding publication, this time for October, November and December.
COA resolves recurring challenge to DV enhancer, rejects reliance on Rector, and applies definition of “separate occasions” from prior case law
State v. Brian Tyrone Ricketts, Jr., 2024AP2291-CR, 12/9/25, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
Following on the heels of the recent litigation as to the meaning of “separate occasions” that reached SCOW in the Rector case, COA holds that two charges in the same case constitute “separate occasions” for the purposes of the domestic abuse repeater.
COA issues first impression decision on constitutionality of warrant to search contents of smartphone, holds “the warrant must specify the particular items of evidence to be searched for and seized from the [smart]phone,” and its authorization must be “limited to the time period and information or other data for which probable cause has been properly established… in the warrant’s supporting affidavit”
State v. Emil L. Melssen, 2024AP1942-CR, 11/20/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Emil Melssen appeals from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial, in which he was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and related charges. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and the circuit court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained in the execution of two search warrants. COA rejects Melssen’s sufficiency argument, but concludes that the warrant to search his smartphone violated the Fourth Amendment because it was overbroad and not carefully tailored to its justifications. The court remands for a determination on the remedy.
COA clarifies “serious crime” factor in involuntary med challenges; rejects challenges to treatment plan and affirms
State v. B.M.T., 2025AP1745-50, 11/21/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity
In this appeal from an involuntary medication order, COA provides additional guidance as to how the “seriousness” of a crime is determined and rejects a challenge that the medication plan was insufficiently individualized.
COA holds that DHS may refile petition to revoke NGI committee’s conditional release after dismissal for violating 72-hour requirement
State v. Kyle A. Schaefer, 2023AP1747-CR, 11/18/25, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
Schaefer appeals from an order granting the Department of Health Services’ petition to revoke his conditional release under WIS. STAT. § 971.17(3)(e). When DHS originally detained Schaefer, it filed the required probable cause statement and petition to revoke his conditional release in the circuit court case but failed to timely submit the documents to “the regional office of the state public defender” within 72 hours as required by § 971.17(3)(e). After the circuit court dismissed the petition pursuant to State v. Olson, 2019 WI App 61, ¶2, 389 Wis. 2d 257, 936 N.W.2d 178, DHS refiled the same petition with a new date of detention. Schaefer’s conditional release was thereafter revoked on the second petition. COA affirms, holding that DHS may refile after a petition is dismissed for lack of compliance with § 971.17(3)(e).
COA authorizes circuit courts to consider prejudice when determining whether to join cases for trial
State v. Max Bell, 2024AP1923-CR, 2024AP1924-CR, & 2024AP1925-CR, 11/13/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Whether to join cases for trial is a separate inquiry from whether to sever cases that have been joined. While the severance subsection of the joinder statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3), directs the circuit court to sever charges if a party is prejudiced by joinder, the circuit court is not required by statute to consider prejudice when determining whether charges should be joined. See Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1),(4). Nevertheless, the COA held in a decision recommended for publication that a circuit court is permitted to consider prejudice when making its initial joinder decision. The COA affirmed joinder of Max Bell’s charges for trial and his subsequent convictions in each case.
COA critiques Gramza but extends its holding to apply to § 973.195 petitions for sentence adjustment
State v. Angela R. Joski, 2023AP1371-CR, 10/29/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity
The state appealed Joski’s early release under Wis. Stat. § 973.195, arguing that pursuant to State v. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81, ¶24, 395 Wis. 2d 215, 952 N.W.2d 836, Joski must fully serve the mandatory minimum three-year term of initial confinement prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 346.65. COA agrees due to Gramza‘s interpretation, and reverses.
Defense Win: COA clarifies defense of others doctrine and holds erroneous instructions merit new trial
State v. Tommy Jay Cross, 2023AP2013-CR, 11/4/25, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
In an opinion that might remind some readers of their first year of law school, COA outlines the basic principles of Wisconsin’s self-defense doctrine and holds that the jury was given inaccurate instructions on the subject as it pertains to defense of others.
COA: Licensed hemp processor may be prosecuted for controlled substance offenses without referral from administrative agency that regulates hemp industry
State v. Christopher J. Syrrakos & Kristyn A. Shattuck, 2024AP554 & 2024AP556, 10/29/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The COA held, in a decision recommended for publication, that a licensed hemp processor may be prosecuted for offenses related to possessing, manufacturing, and delivering products that contain concentrations of THC above the threshold to be classified as “hemp” without a referral by the agency concerned with regulating the hemp industry.