On Point blog, page 1 of 216
COA dismisses appeal for lack of jurisdiction where one count is not “final” due to deferred judgment agreement.
State of Wisconsin v. Gustin J. King, 2024AP2064-CRNM, 2/18/26, District II (recommended for publication) (per curiam); case activity
The COA, in the first published decision on the issue, holds that it does not have jurisdiction to review a judgment of conviction when one or more of the criminal counts is unresolved due to the existence of a deferred judgment agreement (DJA).
COA finds that county failing to timely file annual review of protective placement does not deprive the circuit court of competency.
Department on Aging v. J.J., 2024AP1850, 2/10/26, District I (recommended for publication); case activity
The COA held in a decision recommended for publication that the deadline for counties to file the annual review of a person subject to protective placement is directory and failing to file timely does not deprive the circuit court of competency, while reminding parties that timely annual review remains statutorily and constitutionally required.
COA holds that exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence of defendant’s flight from police after traffic stop was allegedly unlawfully extended.
State of Wisconsin v. Alsherrife Mire, 2024AP2481-CR, 2/4/26, District II (recommended for publication); case activity
In a decision recommended for publication, the COA affirmed the circuit court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of his allegedly unlawfully extended traffic stop because evidence of his flight from police was not derived from the stop.
Defense Win: COA, in decision recommended for publication, finds reverse waiver statute unconstitutional
State v. Noah Q. Mann-Tate, 2024AP2585-CR, 2/3/26, District I (recommended for publication); case activity
In a massively consequential decision, COA reaffirms the uniqueness of children facing criminal charges and finds our notoriously-stringent reverse waiver statute unconstitutional as a result.
COA: Criminal charges for violating conditions imposed as a result of refusing a warrantless blood draw are constitutional.
State v. Nicholas L. Sparby-Duncan,2024AP1012-CR, 1/6/26, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
In an opinion recommended for publication, the COA affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Nicholas Sparby-Duncan’s motion to dismiss charges for failing to install an ignition interlock device (IID) and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) above .02. The COA found that the IID and PAC charges did not impose criminal penalties for Sparby-Duncan previously refusing to submit to a warrantless blood draw, although he was required to install an IID – which subjected him to the .02 PAC — as a result of his 2008 conviction for refusing.
Publication Orders for October, November and December
As usual, we bring you coverage of COA’s orders regarding publication, this time for October, November and December.
COA resolves recurring challenge to DV enhancer, rejects reliance on Rector, and applies definition of “separate occasions” from prior case law
State v. Brian Tyrone Ricketts, Jr., 2024AP2291-CR, 12/9/25, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
Following on the heels of the recent litigation as to the meaning of “separate occasions” that reached SCOW in the Rector case, COA holds that two charges in the same case constitute “separate occasions” for the purposes of the domestic abuse repeater.
COA issues first impression decision on constitutionality of warrant to search contents of smartphone, holds “the warrant must specify the particular items of evidence to be searched for and seized from the [smart]phone,” and its authorization must be “limited to the time period and information or other data for which probable cause has been properly established… in the warrant’s supporting affidavit”
State v. Emil L. Melssen, 2024AP1942-CR, 11/20/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Emil Melssen appeals from a judgment of conviction following a jury trial, in which he was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and related charges. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and the circuit court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained in the execution of two search warrants. COA rejects Melssen’s sufficiency argument, but concludes that the warrant to search his smartphone violated the Fourth Amendment because it was overbroad and not carefully tailored to its justifications. The court remands for a determination on the remedy.
COA clarifies “serious crime” factor in involuntary med challenges; rejects challenges to treatment plan and affirms
State v. B.M.T., 2025AP1745-50, 11/21/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity
In this appeal from an involuntary medication order, COA provides additional guidance as to how the “seriousness” of a crime is determined and rejects a challenge that the medication plan was insufficiently individualized.
COA holds that DHS may refile petition to revoke NGI committee’s conditional release after dismissal for violating 72-hour requirement
State v. Kyle A. Schaefer, 2023AP1747-CR, 11/18/25, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
Schaefer appeals from an order granting the Department of Health Services’ petition to revoke his conditional release under WIS. STAT. § 971.17(3)(e). When DHS originally detained Schaefer, it filed the required probable cause statement and petition to revoke his conditional release in the circuit court case but failed to timely submit the documents to “the regional office of the state public defender” within 72 hours as required by § 971.17(3)(e). After the circuit court dismissed the petition pursuant to State v. Olson, 2019 WI App 61, ¶2, 389 Wis. 2d 257, 936 N.W.2d 178, DHS refiled the same petition with a new date of detention. Schaefer’s conditional release was thereafter revoked on the second petition. COA affirms, holding that DHS may refile after a petition is dismissed for lack of compliance with § 971.17(3)(e).