On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Michael W. Carlson, 2001 WI App 296
For Carlson: Steven L. Miller

Issue/Holding: Erroneous impaneling of a juror who, because he could not understand English, should not have been seated, wasn’t harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶46. The harmless error rule adopted last term by this court in State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442,

County of Milwaukee v. Edward S., 2001 WI App 169, PFR filed
For Edward S.: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the 14-day deadline set by § 51.20(7)(c) for final hearing is extendible when delay is caused by the respondent’s own action.

Holding: The otherwise mandatory deadline for final commitment hearing is waivable when the delay is caused by the respondent — here, firing his attorney. 

State v. Thomas Wenk, 2001 WI App 268, PFR filed 10/31/01
For Wenk: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue: Whether trial court denial of a petition for conditional release from an NGI commitment was an erroneous exercise of discretion.

Holding: Although the state expressed doubt that it had met its burden of proof, the trial court was free to disregard that view. And, although the experts recommended release upon certain conditions,

State v. Isaac H. Williams, State v. Willie Hogan, 2001 WI App 263, PFR filed 11/23/01
For Williams: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate
For Hogan: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue1: Whether the § 980.08(1) requirement that the SVP wait 18 months after initial commitment before petitioning for supervised release violates substantive due process.

Holding:

¶7.

Reuben Adams v. Macht, 2001 WI App 10, 241 Wis. 2d 28, 623 N.W.2d 215

Issue: Whether the Wisconsin Resource Center policy prohibiting former employees from visiting the institution is enforceable against a patient seeking visits from a former employee who is also the mother of his child.

Holding: The policy is reasonable and based on legitimate security concerns.

The court pays lip service to the idea that 980 inmates are patients,

State v. Dennis R. Thiel (III), 2001 WI App 32, 241 Wis. 2d 465, 626 N.W.2d 26
For Thiel: John D. Lubarsky, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the standard for waiver of right to counsel in a criminal proceeding applies to Ch. 980.

Holding: “… (B)ecause WIS. STAT. § 980.09(2) guarantees the right to counsel at the probable cause hearing, the same standards and procedures for resolving right to counsel issues in a criminal context should apply to the § 980.09(2)(a) probable cause hearing.”

State v. Steve Norton, 2001 WI App 245
For Norton: Peter M. Koneazny, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue: Whether an unanticipated, post-sentencing revocation amounted to a new factor justifying modification of sentence.

Holding:

¶10. Although we agree with the State that, in general, revocation of probation in another case does not ordinarily present a new factor, the specific facts involved in this case require an exception to the general rule.

State v. Andre D. Crockett, 2001 WI App 235, PFR filed
For Crockett: David D. Cook

Issue:Whether facts suggesting that the defendant might have been less culpable than his codefendants amounted to a new factor justifying modification of sentence.

Holding: A new factor may be relate to facts “unknowingly overlooked” at sentencing; here, although the asserted new factor may have been unknowingly overlooked by the sentencing court,

State v. John Casteel, 2001 WI App 188, PFR filed

Issue: Whether Casteel’s failure to argue in a prior new-factor based attempt to modify sentence bars him from now arguing that the special action release program, § 304.02 — a statute extant at the time of the prior motion to modify — is a new factor.

Holding:

¶17. We note that the special action parole release statute was first adopted in 1989.

State v. Anthony A. Parker, 2001 WI App 111

Issue: Whether transfer to an out-of-state prison was a new factor supporting sentence modification.

Holding:

¶11. Parker contends that his transfer out of state is a new factor that frustrates the purpose of his sentence because his placement no longer coincides with the judgment of conviction confining him to ‘Wisconsin state prisons.’ Parker’s reliance upon these words is excessively literal and finds no support in the case law.