On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Jeffrey S. Firebaugh, 2011 WI App 154 (recommended for publication); pro se; case activity

Because the Wisconsin Sentencing Commission had created no guideline “applicable” to Firebaugh’s offense (homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle), he isn’t entitled to resentencing on the basis of failure to “consider” a (non-existent) guideline.

¶12      At the time of Firebaugh’s sentencing, neither the CPSC nor the Commission had developed a sentencing guideline for homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle.  

State v. Joel D. Rhodes, 2011 WI App 145; for Rhodes: Chris L. Hartley; case activity

Self-Representation – Adequacy of Waiver of Right to Counsel 

The trial court undertook a valid waiver of counsel, pursuant to State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997):

¶18      We reject Rhodes’s claim.  The circuit court conducted a colloquy with Rhodes that the State aptly describes as exemplary.  

court of appeals decision (recommended for publication); for Little: Jeffrey W. Jensen; case activity

Probable Cause to Arrest 

¶14      In Stewart’s case, the pertinent facts are:

•           On March 10, 2009, a reliable confidential informant told Agent Gray that one of the people who had been arrested with Alderman McGee was going to be bringing cocaine to Milwaukee.  After Gray obtained the names and photographs of individuals who had been arrested in Alderman McGee’s case and showed them to the informant,

State v. Brian K. Avery, 2011 WI App 148 (recommended for publication), supreme court review granted, 2/23/12; for Avery: Keith A. Findley; case activity; prior 974.06 appeal: 2008AP500-CR; direct appeal: 1997AP317

Newly Discovered Evidence – New Forensic  Method – Photogrammetric Analysis 

Expert photogrammetric opinion, derived from video enhancement technology (“VISAR”) not commercially available until after Avery’s trial,

J. K. v. Mark Peters, 2011 WI App 149 (recommended for publication); case activity

Appellate Procedure – “Waiver,” Distinguished from “Forfeiture” 

¶1 n. 1:

In using the term “waiver,” we are aware of the recently decided case of State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, where our supreme court clarified the distinction between the terms “forfeiture” and “waiver.”  See id.

State v. James T. Kettner, 2011 WI App 142 (recommended for publication); for Kettner: Andrew R. Hinkel, Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Hearing-Impaired Juror – Inability to Hear Certain Testimony 

A juror’s inability to hear most of alleged victim S.K.’s answers in a videotaped interview didn’t violate Kettner’s rights to impartial jury or due process, given that S.K. also testified in person consistent with her videotaped answers. 

State v. Courtney C. Beamon, 2011 WI App 131 (recommended for publication); for Beamon: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; petition for review granted, 4/25/12

Fleeing, § 346.04(3) – Elements 

¶4        ….  In State v. Sterzinger, 2002 WI App 171, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 925, 649 N.W.2d 677, this court separated the language of § 346.04(3) into segments:  (1) No operator of a vehicle,

State v. Devon L. Bean, 2011 WI App 129 (recommended for publication); for Bean: Scott D. Obernberger; case activity

Sew-up Confession 

The fourth interrogation of Bean within a 60-hour period following his arrest did not, under the particular facts, amount to an impermissible “sew-up” confession.

General principles. The question, in brief, is whether the time between arrest and formal charge was “inordinate.”

State v. Steven A. Avery, 2011 WI App 124 (recommended for publication); for Avery: Martha K. Askins, Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Search Warrant – Execution – Reasonableness 

Warrant-based search of Avery’s property was a reasonable continuation of the original search 3 days earlier.

General statement:

¶18      Generally, searches are subject to the “one warrant, one search” rule.  

State v. Paschall Lee Sanders, 2011 WI App 125 (recommended for publication); for Sanders: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

The definitions of “mental disorder” in since-amended pattern instruction Wis JI—Criminal 2502 (2009), though concededly contradictory, didn’t prevent from being tried the issue of whether Sanders qualified for commitment as a sexually violent person:

¶14      As we have seen, two sentences in what the circuit court told the jury are contradictory:

(1)   “Mental disorder means a condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence and causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”  (Emphasis added.)

(2)   “Not all persons with a mental disorder are predisposed to commit sexually violent offenses or have serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”

As noted earlier,