On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Mitchell D. Pask, 2010 WI App 53; for Pask: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

¶1 … (W)hen there is evidence that a defendant has an intention to take a child to a place that is partially screened or hidden from view, a jury may find that it is with the purpose to take the child away from public safety.

State v. Benjamin W. Mercer, 2010 WI App 47; prior history: Certification, 7/1/09, rejected 9/10/09; for Mercer: Steven P. Sager

A person can knowingly possess images of child pornography while viewing them on a computer, even though they aren’t stored on the hard drive.

¶29      Our impression of these cases is that courts are more concerned with how the defendants got to the website showing child pornography,

State v. Carl A. Lewis, Jr., 2010 WI App 52; for Lewis: John T. Wasielewski; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

Appellate Procedure – Standard of Review: Government Informant

¶16      Our discussion must begin, as it almost always does, with the standard of review.  In deciding whether a person is a government informant or agent for purposes of this Sixth Amendment analysis, the determination regarding the relationship or understanding between the police and the informant is a factual determination.

State v. Tory L. Rachel, 2010 WI App 60; for Rachel: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

SVP – Supervised Release Hearing: Burden of Proof on Petitioner

Under revisions to § 980.08 wrought by 2005 Wis. Act 434 (eff. date 8/1/06), the burden of proof has been shifted from the State (to prove unsuitability for supervised release) to the petitioner (to show suitability),

State v. Robert A. Tomaszewski, 2010 WI App 51; for Tomazewski: Devon M. Lee, SPD, Madison Appellate; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

¶6 n. 3:

Tomaszewski argues this is not a case in which reasonable suspicion that he was violating a traffic law would justify the stop. In Tomaszewski’s view, a temporary detention may be justified by reasonable suspicion only where an officer cannot determine,

State v. Karon M. Asmus, 2010 WI App 48; for Asmus: Donald C. Dudley

Interstate Detainer Act claim is waived by guilty plea:

¶3        A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses. State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶18, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886. This rule applies even though the defendant attempts to preserve an issue by raising it in the circuit court. 

Jennifer M. v. Franz Maurer, 2010 WI App 8

Issue: “(W)hether a circuit court has authority to order a represented adult ward to submit to an interview with her guardian ad litem, outside the presence of her counsel and over her attorney’s objection, where the order also requires the guardian ad litem to report the content of the interview to the circuit court,” ¶1.

Holding:

¶11 The policies underlying the no-contact rule are of sufficient importance in guardianship cases that the right to counsel guaranteed by Wis.

State v. Travis Joe Brimer, Jr., 2010 WI App 57; for Brimer: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison Appellate; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

“The right against self-incrimination only applies at criminal proceedings or “other proceeding … where the answers might incriminate [the defendant] in future criminal proceedings.” Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986) (citations omitted),” ¶7. Because a reconfinement hearing isn’t part of the criminal process,

State v. Dionny L. Reynolds, 2010 WI App 56; for Reynolds: Russell D. Bohach; BiC; Resp. Br.

Statement voluntary, following multiple interviews while in custody on unrelated offense:

¶45      Balancing Reynolds’ personal characteristics against the totality of the police detectives’ conduct, we note, first and foremost, that Reynolds voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before making his incriminating statement. Generally speaking,

State v. Thomas H.L. Barfell, 2010 WI App 61; for Barfell: Roberta A. Heckes; BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.; App. Supp. Br.; Resp. Supp. Br.

Sentencing – Guidelines, General Purpose

¶7        While Barfell is correct that he “has a due process right ‘to be sentenced on the basis of true and correct information’ pertaining to ‘the offense and the circumstances of its commission … and the defendant’s personality,