On Point: B. Published opinions

State v. Timothy Charles Bauer, 2010 WI App 93; for Bauer: Catherine M. Canright; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Search-Incident – Automobile

By failing to address Bauer’s Arizona v. Gant argument, instead relying solely on State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 174, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986), the States’ argument compels the court to reverse the suppression order:

¶9 Here,

State v. Matthew C. Parmley, 2010 WI App 79; for Parmley: Christopher M. Eippert; BiC: Resp.; Reply

A sex offender may obtain an exception from the registration requirement 0f § 301.45(1m)2, if “the person had not attained the age of 19 years and was not more than 4 years older or not more than 4 years younger than the child.” At the time of his offense,

State v. Brian K. Sowatzke, 2010 WI App 81; for Sowatzke: Andrew R. Walter; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶13      Sowatzke had two countable OWI “convictions, suspensions or revocations” (i.e., he had two OWI convictions) at the time he was arrested on May 9; he had a BAC of 0.048 percent at the time he was arrested on May 9; his legal BAC limit was 0.08 percent at the time he was arrested on May 9.  

State v. David D. Ramage, 2010 WI App 77; for Ramage: Jevin J. Mulrooney; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Co-tenant’s permissive use of Ramage’s computers conferred on her authority to consent to warrantless police removal of computer and search of their contents. Contrary authority, People v. Blair, 748 N.E.2d 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Lacey,

State v. Carl Ralph Eichorn, 2010 WI App 70; for Eichorn: Melissa Fitzsimmons, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Evidence was sufficient to support stalking conviction, though the requisite “course of conduct” occurred over short span of time:

¶9     In sum, there is more than sufficient evidence under our standard of review to support beyond a reasonable doubt Eichorn’s stalking conviction.

State v. Kyle Lee Huggett, 2010 WI App 69; for Huggett: Craig A. Mastantuono; BiC; Resp; Reply

The State forfeited a potential appellate argument by conceding it in the trial court, in response to Huggett’s postconviction motion, ¶14.

Unmentioned by the court: the State is the appellant. Why does that matter? Because the general rule is that the respondent on appeal may raise any argument,

State v. Mitchell D. Pask, 2010 WI App 53; for Pask: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

¶1 … (W)hen there is evidence that a defendant has an intention to take a child to a place that is partially screened or hidden from view, a jury may find that it is with the purpose to take the child away from public safety.

State v. Benjamin W. Mercer, 2010 WI App 47; prior history: Certification, 7/1/09, rejected 9/10/09; for Mercer: Steven P. Sager

A person can knowingly possess images of child pornography while viewing them on a computer, even though they aren’t stored on the hard drive.

¶29      Our impression of these cases is that courts are more concerned with how the defendants got to the website showing child pornography,

State v. Carl A. Lewis, Jr., 2010 WI App 52; for Lewis: John T. Wasielewski; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

Appellate Procedure – Standard of Review: Government Informant

¶16      Our discussion must begin, as it almost always does, with the standard of review.  In deciding whether a person is a government informant or agent for purposes of this Sixth Amendment analysis, the determination regarding the relationship or understanding between the police and the informant is a factual determination.

State v. Tory L. Rachel, 2010 WI App 60; for Rachel: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

SVP – Supervised Release Hearing: Burden of Proof on Petitioner

Under revisions to § 980.08 wrought by 2005 Wis. Act 434 (eff. date 8/1/06), the burden of proof has been shifted from the State (to prove unsuitability for supervised release) to the petitioner (to show suitability),