On Point blog, page 2 of 14
Ambiguous Assertion of Rights — Silence
State v. Richard Allen Hassel, 2005 WI App 80
For Hassel: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding1: Hassel’s custodial statement, “I don’t know if I should talk to you” was ambiguous and therefore triggered no duty to terminate the interrogation, ¶¶16-19.
The court of appeals purported to follow Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), which holds that the police have no duty to clarify an ambiguous assertion of rights made after clearly waiving them.
Miranda Waiver – Inaccurate Advice, from Counsel
State v. Xavier J. Rockette, 2005 WI App 205
For Rockette: Timothy A. Provis
Issue/Holding:
¶24 We conclude that Rockette did not waive his Miranda rights. Rockette does not argue that Chausee did anything to coerce his confession. Indeed, the purpose of Rockette’s cooperation at the interview, which his own counsel set up, was to increase his chances of securing some leniency from the State.
Noncustodial Assertion of Rights
State v. Richard Allen Hassel, 2005 WI App 80
For Hassel: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Hassel’s noncustodial statement, “I can’t talk to you,” did not amount to a Miranda-protected assertion of rights, largely because such rights can’t be invoked “anticipatorily,” ¶¶8-15. (State v. Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d 224, 325 N.W.2d 703 (1982) distinguished as a rule of evidence safeguarding against substantive use at trial of prearrest silence.)
Statements – Voluntariness – Statements to P.O.
State v. Charles W. Mark, 2005 WI App 62, affirmed, 2006 WI 78
For Mark: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶14 … (I)f probationers are required to choose between answers that will incriminate them in pending or subsequent criminal prosecutions and loss of their conditional liberty as a price for exercising their right to remain silent, the statements are compelled.
Briefs – Factual Assertions – Need for Accuracy
Arents v. ANR Pipeline Co., 2005 WI App 61
Issue/Holding: ¶5 n. 2:
Wisconsin Stat. Rule 809.19(1)(d) and (e) (2001-02) requires the parties to provide in their briefs separate sections for their “statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review” and argument. In their appeal, the Landowners have, inappropriately, interspersed legal argument and “spin” into what should have been an objective recitation of the factual occurrences of this case.
Enlargement of NOI Deadline, Court of Appeals’ Authority / Factors to Consider
State v. Christine M. Quackenbush / State v. Michael D. Lee, 2005 WI App 2
For Quackenbush: Tyler J. Tripp
For Lee: Thomas F. Locante, SPD, La Crosse Trial
For Amicus: Joseph N. Ehmann, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue1: Whether, in light of State v. Iran D. Evans, 2004 WI 84, the court of appeals retains any authority under § 809.82 to extend the time for filing a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief.
Cross-Appeal by Defendant: Extension of NOA Deadline
State v. Keith E. Williams, 2005 WI App 122
For Williams: Christopher William Rose
Issue/Holding: The court of appeals has authority to extend the defendant’s deadline for filing cross-appeal to State’s appeal of postconviction grant of new trial:
¶4 However, as the State points out, the jurisdiction of the circuit court was initially invoked by the motion for postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. Rule 809.30(2)(h).
Appellate Procedure: Finality of Order – Postconviction Order Granting Plea-Withdrawal: Non-Final Order
State v. Bobby R. Williams, 2005 WI App 221
For Williams: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue: Whether a postconviction motion granting plea-withdrawal is final, so as to trigger the 45-day deadline in § 974.05(1)(a) for State’s appeal.
Holding:
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03 sets forth appeals as of right and appeals by permission. Subsection (1) explains that an order is final when it “disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties,
Interlocutory Appeal — Double Jeopardy Issue
State v. Barbara E. Harp, 2005 WI App 250
For Harp: Aaron N. Halstead, Kathleen Meter Lounsbury, Danielle L. Carne
Issue/Holding: ¶1, n. 3:
We grant Harp’s petition because the mistrial order implicates her right against double jeopardy. “Given the serious constitutional questions raised by claims of double jeopardy, review of such orders will often be necessary to protect the accused from ‘substantial or irreparable injury,’ one of the three criteria for testing the appropriateness of review under sec.
TPR – State’s Appeal, by GAL
State v. Lamont D., 2005 WI App 264
Issue/Holding: ¶1 n. 4:
Lamont argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over this matter because the guardian ad litem filed the notice of appeal and the State simply joined in the appeal instead of the other way around. We reject Lamont’s contention. WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.235(7) plainly states that the guardian ad litem “may appeal,