On Point blog, page 7 of 17
Counsel – Ineffective Assistance – (Cross-)Examination of Witness with Respect to Immunity Grant
State v. Dion W. Demmerly, 2006 WI App 181, PFR filed 9/11/06
For Demmerly: Edward J. Hunt
Issue/Holding: Counsel’s cross-examination of state’s witness testifying under a grant of immunity was adequate where it revealed that the witness’s motivation for testifying was a desire to receive leniency on his pending charges, ¶22; and, also where any confusion about the grant of immunity was clarified by the trial court’s accurate admonition to the jury on the matter,
Counsel – Ineffective Assistance – Examination of Witness – Open-Ended Question
State v. Roberto Vargas Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, PFR filed 8/28/06
For Rodriguez: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶39 Questions that call for a narrative are generally improper because they do not alert court and counsel to the subject about which the witness is about to testify. There are exceptions, however, and whether to permit a question calling for a narrative response is within the trial court’s discretion under Wis.
Counsel – Ineffective Assistance – Deficient Performance: Failure to Litigate Suppression Motion in Preference to Accepting Plea Offer
State v. Juan F. Milanes, 2006 WI App 259, PFR filed 12/7/06
Milanes: Joan M. Boyd
Issue/Holding: Counsel’s failure to litigate a (Miranda) suppression motion was not deficient where the issue turned purely on a credibility dispute between defendant and the detective and pursuit of the motion would have required rejecting a favorable offer, ¶¶15-16.
Counsel – Ineffective Assistance – Deficient Performance: Adequate Investigation – Failure to Pursue NGI Defense
State v. Juan F. Milanes, 2006 WI App 259, PFR filed 12/7/06
For Milanes: Joan M. Boyd
Issue/Holding: Failure to pursue an NGI defense wasn’t deficient:
¶19 … The evidence in support of Milanes’ claim is remarkably weak; the strongest piece of evidence is the report of his psychiatric expert, which contains a conclusory statement that Milanes meets the statutory requirements. We will not discuss this issue in detail,
Defenses – Mistake, § 939.43(1) – Relation to Reckless Conduct
State v. Quentrell E. Williams, 2006 WI App 212
For Williams: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Because “recklessly” causing harm to a child, § 948.03(b), is determined solely from an objective point of view, evidence related to whether the actor “subjectively thought his [disciplinary action] was reasonable parental discipline” is irrelevant, including evidence of how the actor was him or herself disciplined as a child,
Defenses – Imperfect Self-Defense, Generally
State v. Thomas G. Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, PFR filed 7/10
For Kramer: Timothy A. Provis
Issue/Holding:
¶23 At trial, Kramer asserted he acted in self-defense, and the jury was instructed on imperfect self-defense. A successful defense based on imperfect self-defense reduces first-degree intentional homicide to second-degree intentional homicide. [12] The test is subjective; a defendant must present “evidence of actual beliefs that [he] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the force [he] used was necessary to defend [himself].”State v.
Fines — Attorney Fees, Distinguished From
State v. Kevin J. Helsper, 2006 WI App 243
For Helsper: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶20 Fines and attorney fee obligations involve different State purposes, and therefore a different constitutional analysis. When analyzing the constitutionality of a fee recoupment statute, the court is to consider, among other things, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose and the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose.
Hit-and-Run, § 346.67(1) – Element of “Accident”: May Encompass Intentional Conduct
State v. Stephen D. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, PFR filed 10/26/06
For Harmon: Timothy A. Provis
Issue/Holding:
¶14 The “two clear purposes” of Wisconsin’s hit-and-run statute are:
(1) to ensure that injured persons may have medical or other attention with the least possible delay; and (2) to require the disclosure of information so that responsibility for the accident may be placed.
Hit-and-Run, § 346.67(1) – Reporting Requirement as Related to Self-Incrimination
State v. Stephen D. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, PFR filed 10/26/06
For Harmon: Timothy A. Provis
Issue/Holding: The § 346.67(1) requirement that a driver provide name, address, vehicle registration number, and driver’s license “to the person struck” does not violate the 5thamendment under controlling authority of California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 426 (1971), notwithstanding that the statute encompasses intentional conduct:
¶29 In short,
Defenses – Issue Preclusion — “Actually Litigated” Requirement: OWI – Prior Judicial Overturn of Administrative Suspension, Not Necessarily Preclusive as to Subsequent Prosecution for Drunk Driving
City of Sheboygan v. Steven Nytsch, 2006 WI App 191, PFR filed 9/11/06
For Nytsch: Chad A. Lanning
Issue: Whether a prior judicial review of a driver’s license suspension, overturning the administrative suspension, had a preclusive effect on the issue of probable cause to arrest for drunk driving in the subsequent prosecution for that offense.
Holding:
¶11 Thus, a threshold prerequisite for application of the doctrine is that,