On Point: Published 2014

Kenosha County v. Blaire A. Frett, 2014 WI App 127; case activity

State v. Melody P.M., 2009 AP2991 (WI App June 10, 2009), a 1-judge opinion, held that Wis. Stat. § 973.015 permits circuit courts to expunge civil forfeiture violations. Here, the court of appeals explicitly overrules  Melody P.M. and holds that civil forfeiture violations may not be expunged.

State v. Fernando Moreno-Acosta, 2014 WI App 122; case activity

While § 943.201(2) requires the state to prove the defendant used personal identifying information belonging to an actual person, it need not prove that the defendant knew the information belonged to another “real, actual person.”

State v. Jennifer M. Parisi, 2014 WI App 129; case activity

The warrantless entry into Parisi’s apartment was lawful because police had probable cause to believe the apartment contained evidence of a crime and there were exigent circumstances justifying entry without a warrant.

State v. David M. Carlson, 2014 WI App 124; case activity

Note to trial courts: When ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based what trial counsel said to his client, hold an evidentiary hearing. Note to defense counsel: Data showing the sentences received by defendants charged with the same crimes as your client is about as useful as data showing a patient diagnosed with a lethal illness the survival rates of similarly-diagnosed patients.  Note to all: A single, inaccurate, hyperbolic remark during the course of a long sentencing explanation is harmless even if the trial court relied upon it.

State v. Kelly M. Rindfleisch, 2014 WI App 121; case activity

Just how “particular” must a warrant to search a Gmail and Yahoo! Mail be in order to survive the Fourth Amendment’s “particularity” requirement? And does the answer change when the warrant is for searching the email accounts of someone other than the person suspected of the crime described in the warrant? In this split opinion the majority upheld broad search warrants requiring Google and Yahoo to turn over email expected to show that one former Walker aide had committed a crime, but which showed that the account owner (another former Walker aide) had also committed a crime.

Tina B. v. Richard H., 2014 WI App 123; case activity

The circuit court lost competency to decide a guardianship proceeding under § 54.34 because it failed to decide the case within the statutory time limit, but the circuit court’s decisions in a related guardianship proceeding under § 48.977 are affirmed.

State v. Frank M. Zdzieblowski, 2014 WI App 130; case activity

The prosecutor during voir dire elicited a promise from prospective jurors that they would convict if the State proved the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and then reminded the jurors of that promise in his rebuttal closing argument. The court of appeals holds the prosecutor’s unobjected-to voir dire questioning and rebuttal closing argument neither rose to the level of plain error nor warranted a new trial in the interest of justice.

State v. Fernando Ortiz-Mondragon, 2014 WI App 114, petition for review granted 12/18/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 73; case activity

Ortiz-Mondragon’s trial counsel wasn’t ineffective under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), for failing to advise Ortiz-Mondragon that his convictions were “crimes involving moral turpitude” (CIMT) and would result in mandatory deportation and a permanent bar on reentry. Unlike the conviction in Padilla, CIMT is a “broad classification of crimes” that escapes precise definition, and there’s no clear authority indicating any of the crimes to which Ortiz-Mondragon pled were crimes of moral turpitude. Thus, the deportation consequences of Ortiz-Mondragon’s plea was unclear and uncertain, and his attorney wasn’t deficient in failing to unequivocally inform him that his plea would result in deportation and inadmissibility.

State v. Joel I.-N., 2014 WI App 119; case activity

The unrecorded statement Joel I.N., a juvenile, gave to the police was admissible despite the fact the police failed to record the statement as required by §§ 983.195(2)(b) and 938.31(3)(b) because “exigent public safety circumstances” rendered recording his statement infeasible under § 938.31(3)(c)5. Joel also knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.

State v. Charles L. Chew, 2014 WI App 116; case activity

In its first decision addressing Wisconsin’s recently adopted “castle doctrine,” § 939.48(1m), the court of appeals holds Chew wasn’t entitled to a self-defense jury instruction under the statute because the men Chew shot at were not “in” his “dwelling.”