On Point blog, page 113 of 263
There was reasonable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests after “fender bender”
Milwaukee County v. Nicholas O. Moran, 2017AP1047 & 2017AP1048, District 1, 1/23/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The totality of the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion to believe Moran was operating while intoxicated, so police were justified in continuing to detain Moran to conduct field sobriety tests.
No erroneous exercise of discretion in TPR
State v. M.D.W., 2017AP1945 & 1946, 1/23/18, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.D.W. appeals only the disposition in the TPR of her two children. She argues that the court erred in its consideration of the statutory factors. The court of appeals disagrees.
Officer had reasonable suspicion to extend traffic stop
Dane County v. Brenna N. Weber, 2017AP1024, District 4, 1/11/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Weber was legitimately stopped for speeding, but argues there was insufficient basis for the officer to extend the traffic stop to conduct field sobriety tests. The court of appeals holds the totality of the circumstances justified the continued detention.
Once again, FTA leads to TPR
State v. A.S., 2017AP1349, District 1, 1/9/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to adjourn the disposition hearing in A.S.’s termination of parental rights proceeding after A.S. failed to appear, and the subsequent termination order didn’t violate A.S.’s rights to be present and to participate in the hearing.
“Mixed bag” of facts still enough for probable cause to arrest
State v. Terry Sanders, 2017AP636-CR, District 3, 1/9/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Sanders challenges his arrest for OWI, saying the officer lacked probable cause based on a “mixed bag” of facts that included inconclusive field sobriety tests and things an officer “would likely see [being done] by day by sober folks.” (¶9). The court of appeals does not agree.
TPR default judgment upheld
Kenosha County DHS v. V.J.G., 2017AP1150 & 2017AP1151, District 2, 12/27/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
V.J.G.’s failed to appear at the pretrial and grounds trial in the TPR proceedings regarding his children. The circuit court then discharged V.J.G.’s lawyer, set a new evidentiary and dispostional hearing, and terminated V.J.G.’s parental rights. The court of appeals rejects V.J.G.’s challenges to § 48.23(2)(b)3., the statute on which the court based its actions.
Court rejects challenge to strict application of 10-day deadline for requesting refusal hearing
State v. Hector Miguel Ortiz Martinez, 2017AP668, District 1, 12/27/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After his arrest for OWI, Martinez refused to submit to a breath test. The arresting officer gave him the standard notice of intent to revoke operating privileges containing the standard written warning that the driver has 10 days to request a refusal hearing. Martinez requested a refusal hearing, but not within the 10-day limit under § 343.305(10)(a), so the circuit court declined to hold a hearing. (¶¶3-5). Martinez argues that a language barrier and incomplete information from the arresting officer mean the standard notice he was given was not legally sufficient to start the 10-day clock running. Yes it was, says the court of appeals.
OWI driver owes restitution even if “victim” ran into him
State v. David M. Larson, 2017AP1610-CR, 12/27/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
David Larson was driving drunk when another driver, who was cited for failing to yield the right of way, collided with him in a roundabout. Larson drove away while police were investigating. After a contested hearing, the court awarded the other driver restitution for injuries to himself and damage to his car.
Initials, acronyms garble court of appeals opinion in termination of parental rights case
State v. M.K., 2017AP1952-1953, 12/27/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The record for a termination of rights appeal is required by law to be confidential. Thus, in such a case the court of appeals must refer to the individuals involved by their initials, pseudonyms, or other appropriate designations. This rule balances the individual’s right to confidentiality with the public’s right to know how our judges are applying and developing the law. Nobody disputes the wisdom of the rule. On Point questions its application in this particular appeal.
COA: Once defendant consented to blood test, she could not revoke it
State v. Kaitlin C. Sumnicht, 2017AP280-CR, 12/20/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Sumnicht was convicted of OWI second. She sought suppression of her blood test results on two grounds. First, she argued that that State did not develop an adequate factual record of her interaction with the deputy who allegedly obtained her consent to a blood test. Second, assuming that she did consent, she argued that she revoked it when her lawyer sent a letter to the State Laboratory of Hygiene before any testing was done and asserted her right to privacy in her blood. The circuit court denied suppression, and the court of appeals affirmed but its reasoning is unsatisfying.