On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

Dodge County v. L.A.S., 2017AP302, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under § 51.20(9)(a) the circuit court must appoint two licensed physicians or psychologists to examine and write reports on an individual subject to involuntary commitment proceedings. This requirement applies only to the initial commitment proceeding, not to the proceeding to extend a commitment.

Monroe County DHS v. T.M., 2017AP875 & 2017AP876, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

T.M.’s parental rights were terminated on abandonment grounds under § 48.415(1). (¶¶2-10). She argues this violated her substantive due process rights under Kenosha Cty. DHS v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845, because the period of alleged abandonment included time during which the County suspended her visitation rights based on her failure to satisfy conditions it was impossible for her to meet. (¶14). The court of appeals disagrees.

Winnebago County v. C.S., 2016AP1955, 8/16/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

C.S. argues that §51.61(1)(g) is unconstitutional because it allows the government to administer involuntary medication to a prisoner without a finding of dangerousness. The court of appeals elected not to decide the issue due to mootness, but that seems like a mistake.

State v. K.J. & State v. A.W., 2016AP1501/1502 and 2017AP720/721, District 1, 8/8/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2016AP1501; 2016AP1502; 2017AP720; 2017AP721

The circuit court didn’t lose competency to terminate the parental rights of K.J. and A.W. after an initial TPR petition failed, nor did the doctrine of issue preclusion apply to the second TPR trial.

State v. J.L.B., 2016AP2358, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court erred in finding that a six-year-old child’s videotaped interview was admissible under § 908.08 because nothing in the interview showed the child understood the importance of telling the truth and that there are negative consequences to untruthfulness. See § 908.08(3)(c); State v.

State v. D.J.A.R., 2017AP52, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

After D.J.A.R. was adjudicated delinquent for second degree child sexual assault under § 948.02(2), the circuit court ordered him to register as a sex offender. (¶¶4-6). It relied on § 938.34(15m)(am)1., which requires finding that the juvenile’s conduct was sexually motivated and that registration is in the interest of public protection. That was a mistake, because D.J.A.R.’s offense is governed by § 938.34(15m)(bm), which mandates registration unless the requirements of § 301.45(1m) are met. (¶¶11-14). The mistake was harmless, however. (¶15).

State v. Jesse U. Felbab, 2017AP12-CR, 8/2/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

If at first you don’t succeed, try, try, try again. That’s surely the State’s take away from this decision. Deputy Schoonover stopped Felbab for erratic driving and determined that field sobriety tests and a drug-detecting dog were in order, so he called for a back up.  This led to the State charging Felbab with possession of THC. He moved to suppress.  Before giving its decision, the court told the parties that it would be willing to grant a motion to reopen if the losing party wanted to enter more evidence into the record. Hint. Hint.

State v. Travail L. Lewis, 2017AP234-CR, 7/25/17 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After shots were fired in a high crime area of Milwaukee, police dispatched Officer Robert Crawley (no relation to the 7th Earl of Grantham) to investigate. He and his partner saw Lewis (African American) walking down an alley holding the waistband of his pants. They told him to stop and hold up his hands. Then they drew their guns. Lewis told them that he had a gun but no permit, so they arrested him. The State charged him with misdemeanor carrying a concealed weapon. Lewis  filed an unsuccessful suppression motion. On appeal, the State wisely conceded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Lewis based on State v. Gordon, 2014 WI App 44, 353 Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483.

State v. Janaya L. Moss, 2016AP1856-CR, 7/25/17 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Moss and another woman had a fight in a bar; responding police found Moss intoxicated to the point of incoherence. They arrested the other woman and frisked her, but could not find any identification (she would give only a first name). One officer noticed a wallet on a nearby table and asked the other woman if it was hers; she did not respond. The officer opened the wallet, revealing Moss’s ID but also cocaine and marijuana.

State v. K.H., 2016AP1180, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

During a lengthy colloquy regarding her “no contest” plea to grounds for terminating parental rights to her son, K.H. “seemed confused.” She said she hadn’t taken all of her prescribed medication. The court was concerned that she “was not able to fully understand the proceedings.” So her lawyer conducted a direct examination to determine her understanding of what she was doing. Eventually, the court was satisfied that she did and found that her plea was freely, voluntarily and intelligently given. Then it proceeded to establish a factual basis for it. On appeal, K.H. contends that (1) her plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and (2) the court erred in accepting the plea before the factual basis for it was proven as required by §48.422(7).