On Point blog, page 149 of 272
Defendant required to pay restitution for damage he didn’t directly cause
State v. Terry C. Craig, Jr., 2016AP177-CR, District 4, 8/11/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Craig struck and shattered the left tail light on an old car but he did not put a baseball-sized hole or a 2 inch crack on the left of it. That was preexisting damage. The circuit court ordered him to pay restitution for it any way, and the court of appeals affirmed.
Facts established probable cause to arrest and were sufficient to support guilty verdict
Village of Bayside v. Amber E. Schoeller, 2016AP256 & 2016AP257, District 1, 8/9/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court’s factual findings—which Schoeller doesn’t argue are clearly erroneous—doom her claims that the officer didn’t have probable cause to arrest her and that the evidence isn’t sufficient to prove she’s guilty of OWI.
Parent’s admissions to TPR grounds were knowing and voluntary
State v. A.L., 2015AP858 through 2015AP861, District 1, 8/5/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A.L. challenges her admissions that there were grounds to terminate her parental rights to her four children. The court of appeals holds her admissions were knowing and voluntary. The court also holds that calling A.L. as a witness at the trial of the father of one of the children without her lawyer being present doesn’t require reversal of her termination orders.
No error in admission of other acts evidence, no prejudice on IAC claims
State v. Rodell Thompson, 2015AP1764-CR, District 4, 8/4/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The trial court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion in deciding to admit other-acts evidence in Thompson’s trial for sexual assault, false imprisonment, and battery, and Thompson’s IAC claims fail for want of prejudice.
Officer had reasonable suspicion for traffic stop
State v. Jeffrey Jacob Udelhofen, 2016AP385-CR, 8/4/16, District 4 91-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The defendant was convicted of driving with a PAC (3rd offense). He appealed the denial of his suppression motion and argued that the State: (a) waited too long–until closing arguments at the suppression hearing–to specify which traffic law he allegedly violated; and (b) lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his car. The court of appeals held:
Defense win! Warrant can’t be based on anonymous tip lacking detail; exclusionary rule applies
State v. Paul L. Linde, 2014AP2445-CR, 8/2/16, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A court commissioner issued a warrant to search Linde’s cabin for evidence of drug manufacturing and for drug paraphernalia. It was based in part on a tip by an anonymous informant, a fact that proved decisive in the court of appeals decision to reverse the circuit court’s denial of Linde’s suppression motion.
Sentencing courts need not “parrot typical buzz words seen in sentencing transcripts;” implicit rationale is enough
State v. Danny F. Anton, 2015AP2336-CR, District 1, 8/2/16; (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This decision openly thumbs its nose at Gallion. Between it and SCOW’s recent decision in State v. Salas Gayton you have to wonder whether Gallion has been overruled sub silentio.
Cop had reasonable suspicion to support stop of truck despite losing sight of it
State v. Thomas M. Ort, 2015AP1571-72-CR, 8/2/16; District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Ort did not challenge the circuit court’s findings that Officer Vosters observed a silver truck speeding and that speeding would be a reasonable basis to stop the truck. Ort’s objection was that after observing the speeding, Vosters lost sight of the truck briefly and then later simply stopped “the first silver truck he saw.” The court of appeals disagreed:
Court of appeals rejects challenges to warrant authorizing collection of blood sample
State v. Lauren Ann Erstad, 2015AP2675-CR, 7/28/16, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Convicted of an OWI 2nd, Erstad challenged the search warrant relied upon to collect and test her blood because: (1) the affidavit supporting the warrant contained false information; and (2) the warrant authorized the “collection” of her blood but not the “testing” of it. The court of appeals rejected both arguments.
Court of appeals ignores “Perry Mason” moment; finds defense discovery violation, but no ineffective assistance of counsel
State v. William J. Thurber, 2015AP161-CR, 7/27/16, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
“Was Thurber’s trial a game being played or was it a trial designed to search for the truth? Thurber is certainly no angel as evidenced by his current long-term incarceration for crimes apart from this case. I believe the justice system best defines itself by scrupulously adhering to high standards when the worst of the worst comes before it. We travel a slippery slope when we excuse mistakes by the judiciary, the State, and defense counsel because we ‘know’ the defendant is a criminal.” Slip op. ¶91. (Reilly, J. dissenting).