On Point blog, page 155 of 262
Evidence deemed sufficient for Chapter 51 commitment and involuntary medication order
Ozaukee County v. M.L.G., 2015AP1469-FT, 9/23/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
More specifically, the court of appeals held that the County had offered evidence sufficient to establish that MLG was dangerous under §51.20(1)(a)2.c and that he was substantially incapable of understanding his treatment options under § 51.61(1)(g)4b:
Blood-alcohol curve defense didn’t require modification of standard jury instruction on prima facie effect of blood alcohol test results
Little Chute Village Municipal Court v. Dennis M. Falkosky, 2015AP770, District 3, 9/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The trial court didn’t err by refusing to modify the standard OWI jury instruction, Wis. J.I.—Criminal 2668, by taking out language giving blood alcohol test results prima facie effect as to the defendant’s BAC at the time of driving and replacing the language with the instruction addressing the blood alcohol curve, Wis. J.I.—Criminal 234.
Evidence supported extension of stop to perform FSTs
County of Shawano v. Kory V. Amborziak, 2015AP462, 9/22/15, District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
Ambroziak didn’t challenge an officer’s decision to stop his car for disorderly conduct. Instead, he contended that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to conduct field sobriety tests but he lost based on the facts found by the circuit court:
Boyfriend can’t assert defense based on girlfriend’s privilege to “reasonably discipline” her child
State v. Glen Artheus Beal, 2014AP2534-CR, 9/22/15, District 1 not recommended for publication); case activity
A jury convicted Beal of child abuse as a party to a crime because multiple witnesses testified that he punched his girlfriend’s daughter and also restrained the daughter so that her mother (his girlfriend) could hit her. See §939.05(2)(a) and §939.45(5). Beal argued that although he was not entitled to assert the parental discipline privilege himself, he should have been able to present a defense based on his girlfriends’ right to assert that privilege.
Police had probable cause to arrest person whose home was being searched pursuant to a warrant
State v. Daniel Tawan Smith, 2015AP291-CR, District 4, 9/17/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police had probable cause to arrest Smith, who was seen driving away from his home just as police arrived to execute a search warrant to look for evidence that he was selling marijuana.
Statements on 911 call and to police at the scene admissible under excited utterance exception to hearsay rule
State v. Shironski A. Hunter, 2014AP2521-CR, District 1, 9/15/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The trial court didn’t err in admitting statements witnesses made during a 911 call and to police at the scene of the crime because the statements were excited utterances. Moreover, the statements weren’t testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes, so admitting them didn’t violate the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him.
Failure to require jury to decide whether conduct qualified for sentence enhancer was error and prejudiced defendant
State v. Lonel L. Johnson, Jr., 2014AP2888-CR, District 3, 9/15/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity
High fives for the defense! The domestic abuse repeater enhancer applied to this defendant increased his maximum penalty for the charged offense. Thus, the court of appeals held (and the State conceded) that the jury had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his underlying conduct qualified as an act of domestic abuse. That’s what Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) requires, but it didn’t happen here. The real win, however, is that for once the State did NOT prevail on its claim of harmless error!!
Challenges to default TPR judgment rejected
State v. T.N., 2014AP2407 & 2014AP2408, District 4, 9/10/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly entered a default judgment against T.N. in his TPR proceeding when, despite the court’s warnings and admonitions, T.N. failed to appear at a scheduled court appearance.
Traffic stop based on failure to signal before turning doesn’t require evidence that failing to signal actually affected other traffic
State v. Manuel Talavera, 2015AP701-CR, District 2, 9/9/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
To justify a warrantless traffic stop based on a violation of § 346.34(1)(b), the officer doesn’t need evidence that a driver’s failure to signal before turning his vehicle actually affected other traffic because the statute simply requires motorists to signal turns whenever “other traffic may be affected by the movement.” Thus, evidence that Talavera failed to signal when there was a (police) vehicle following two car lengths behind him was sufficient to justify stopping him.
Finding of incompetence to refuse medication or treatment supported by evidence
Ozaukee County v. C.Y.K., 2015AP1080-FT, District 2, 9/9/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Even though the examining psychiatrist opined that C.Y.K. was not substantially incapable of making an informed choice about accepting or refusing medication or treatment, the record as a whole supported the circuit court’s order for involuntary medication and treatment.