On Point blog, page 155 of 263
Defendant’s behavior counts against him for speedy trial purposes, but doesn’t show he was incompetent to represent himself
State v. Ennis Lee Brown, 2015AP522-CR, District 1, 10/9/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The 14½-month delay in trying Brown didn’t violate his right to a speedy trial, as “all of the delays are attributable to the defense, and most are attributable to Brown’s poor behavior and inability to work with his assigned counsel.” (¶56). At the same time, the trial court didn’t err in allowing Brown to proceed pro se at the start of trial, as Brown’s “poor behavior and inability to work with his assigned counsel” don’t show Brown was incompetent to represent himself.
Evidence was insufficient to support ch. 55 protective placement order
Clark County v. S.A.G., 2015AP793, District 4, 10/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
There was insufficient evidence for the protective placement order because the County failed to prove that S.A.G. suffers from a disability that is permanent or likely to be permanent, as required by § 55.08(1)(d).
Parent’s failure to cooperate with discovery and with her counsel justified default judgment in TPR proceeding
State v. L.M.-N., 2014AP2405 & 2014AP2406, District 1/4, 10/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly entered a default judgment in L.M.-N.’s termination of parental rights proceeding based on her failure to appear at her scheduled deposition and, when she did finally appear, by refusing to testify.
Circuit court’s findings that driver made unexplained swerve into wrong lane were not clearly erroneous
State v. Mark Alan Tralmer, 2015AP715-CR, District 4, 10/8/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court’s implicit rejection of Tralmer’s suppression hearing testimony and acceptance of the police officer’s contrary testimony were not clearly erroneous and therefore must be upheld on appeal, State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748. Accordingly, the circuit court properly concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Tralmer for violating § 346.05(1) by swerving into the wrong lane of traffic when there is no obstruction requiring the driver to do so, as allowed under § 346.05(1)(d).
Parental unfitness finding “necessarily flows” from finding there are grounds to terminate parental rights
A.N. v. F.S., 2015AP1405 & 2015AP1406, District 3, 10/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A circuit court handling a TPR case is not required to make an explicit finding that a parent is unfit before proceeding to the dispositional phase because a finding of unfitness automatically follows from a finding there are grounds to terminate the parent’s rights.
Court commissioners not required to make verbatim record of Chapter 51 probable cause hearings
Dane County v. T.B., 2015AP799. 10/1/15, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
T.B. sought to vacate an order for a Chapter 51 commitment on the grounds that the circuit court lost competency to proceed when it failed to make a verbatim record of his probable cause hearing per Wis. Stat. §51.20(5). According to the court appeals, SCR 71.01(2)(a) excepts from the reporting requirement proceedings before a court commissioner that may be reviewed de novo,
Sec. 752.31(2)(f) reimbursement provision applies only to count of conviction
State v. Barbara J. Thiry, 2015AP863-CR, 10/1/15, District 4 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Here’s a defense win on an unusual issue. The State charged Thiry with 15 misdemeanor counts for mistreating 5 horses. A jury ultimately convicted her on just 1 count relating to 1 horse. She challenged a circuit court order requiring her to reimburse the county for the investigation expenses relating to all 5 of the horses it seized. The appeal hinged on the proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. §173.24.
Sec. 48.415(2)3 applies to CHIPS orders before parent has exhausted appellate rights
State v. E.P., 2015AP1298-1300, 10/1/15, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
A jury found grounds to terminate E.P.’s parental rights because his kids were in continuing need of protective services. The court of appeals rejected E.P.’s arguments that § 48.415(2)’s “6 months or longer” period (i.e. the time a child has been placed outside the home per a CHIPS order) begins to run only after he exhausted his appellate rights. The court also declined to order a new trial in the interests of justice.
Evidence supported finding that termination of parental rights was in children’s best interests
State v. A.W., 2015AP1480-1481, 10/1/15, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Focusing on §48.426(3)(c), one of the “best interests of the children” criteria, the court of appeals here affirmed the circuit court’s finding that the termination of AW’s parental rights would not significantly harm her children. Evidence that the S.B., the likely adoptive parent, would allow A.W. to continue to see her children supported the circuit court’s decision on this point.
Police had reasonable suspicion to detain person to investigate possible pot possession
State v. John C. Martin, 2015AP597-CR, District 2, 9/30/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police searched a tavern bathroom for a person named in an arrest warrant; they found no one, but they did notice a strong odor of raw marijuana. Martin was the last person seen leaving the bathroom. Ergo, the police had reasonable suspicion to detain Martin and investigate whether he had drugs on him.