On Point blog, page 159 of 263
Police had probable cause to arrest for OWI despite not knowing exactly when defendant drove
Winnebago County v. Kelli M. Kosmosky, 2015AP585, District 2, 8/5/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A reasonable officer would be led to believe there was more than a possibility Kosmosky had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated under the facts presented, even though he didn’t know exactly when she operated her vehicle.
The evidence was sufficient to establish chain of custody of blood drawn from defendant
State v. Jacob A. Martinez, 2015AP272, District 2, 8/5/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible of publication); case activity (including briefs)
Though there were multiple tests of the blood drawn from Martinez after his arrest for OWI—one for ethanol, two for THC (the second necessitated by the invalidity of the results of the first test)—the record and testimony are sufficiently complete “to render it improbable that the original item has been exchanged,
Reasonable objection to blood draw must be articulated at time of blood draw
State v. James Michael Warren, 2014AP792-CR, District 3, 8/4/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Under State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), which was the law at the time of Warren’s arrest, a person must present their reasonable objection and the basis for the objection at the time of the blood draw, and failure to do so means the person can’t raise it later in the case.
Officer’s mistake about center high-mount stop lamp requirement was unreasonable, so stop was invalid
State v. Kim M. Lerdahl, 2014AP2119-CR, District 3, 8/4/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In an interesting decision that sheds some light on how to apply the newly-adopted “reasonable mistake of law” doctrine to traffic stops, State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, the court of appeals holds that it a police officer’s mistaken belief that the truck she stopped was required to have a center high-mount stop (or brake) lamp (CHMSL) was not a reasonable mistake of law and, therefore, the stop was unlawful.
Contempt order in child support case was supported by the record
Michelle L. Steele & State of Wisconsin v. Jason G. Foster, 2014AP1947, District 3, 7/31/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court’s held Foster in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s child support payment order. While the circuit court’s findings of fact in support of its contempt order were “lacking” (¶19), the record overall supports the contempt order.
Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to argue it was impossible for parent to assume parental duties
Dane County DHS v. D.M., 2014AP2291, District 4, 7/30/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for arguing § 48.415(6) is unconstitutional as applied to D.M., as she fails to demonstrate that the County made it impossible for her to satisfy the conditions for return of her child, D.L.
Evidence sufficient despite lack of direct evidence of time of operation
Oneida County v. Randall J. Busarow, 2014AP2766, District 3, 7/28/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Though there wasn’t direct evidence of exactly when Busarow drove and whether he was intoxicated at that time, the state need not prove the elements of an offense only by direct evidence; reasonable inferences from the evidence may suffice. Bautista v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 218, 223, 191 N.W.2d 725 (1971). The evidence in this case supported the reasonable inferences that Busarow was intoxicated when he drove and that he drove within three hours of the blood test.
Knocking out one basis for traffic stop was not enough to invalidate it
State v. Tammy R. Fullmer, 2015AP640-CR, District 4, 7/30/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Trial counsel was deficient for failing to effectively impeach the officer’s testimony that Fullmer failed to stop in front of a stop line because the intersection in question didn’t have a stop line; however, there were multiple other observations the officer made that justified the traffic stop even in the absence of the stop line violation (e.g., extremely slow driving, driving down the middle of a two lane road, weaving in her lane), so Fullmer wasn’t prejudiced. (¶¶4-7, 11, 14).
It doesn’t take much to explain a sentencing decision
State v. Steven Ray Gaddis, 2015AP130-CR, District 1, 7/28/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Even the sentencing judge admitted his sentencing explanation “could have been more extensive” (¶10). But, hey, it was good enough for government work.
Juvenile court applied proper standards when ordering disposition, despite “imprecise” language referring to adult sentencing standards
State v. Ali H., 2015AP41, District 1, 7/28/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Though the juvenile court judge “was perhaps imprecise with its language,” the court of appeals concludes the judge did not erroneously apply adult sentencing considerations of punishment and deterrence when it decided to order Ali placed at Lincoln Hills.