On Point blog, page 160 of 262
Circuit court had jurisdiction over OWI 1st despite the fact defendant had a prior countable OWI conviction
State v. John N. Navrestad, 2014AP2273, District 4, 7/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Disagreeing with the result reached in two recent unpublished decisions that addressed the same issue, a court of appeals judge holds that a circuit court had jurisdiction to convict Navrestad of OWI 1st in violation of a local ordinance even though he had a prior offense at the time of the conviction.
Evidence about “shooting party” sufficient to support endangering safety conviction
State v. Steven E. Steffek, 2015AP93-CR, District 2, 7/1/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The evidence was sufficient to convict Steffek of endangering safety by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, § 941.20(1)(a), as a party to the crime, despite the fact there was no evidence that anyone was dodging bullets in a “zone of danger.”
Gallion: “Mr. Cellophane shoulda been my name”
State v. John Eddie Farmer, Sr., 2014AP2623-CR, 6/30/15, District 1 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs
Defense lawyers encounter this problem too often. The circuit court inadequately explains the reasons for the sentence it imposed and then shores up its rationale at the postconviction stage. This decision holds that a circuit court, which failed to mention any sentencing objectives, nevertheless met Gallion’s “bare minimum requirements.” And even if it hadn’t, it wouldn’t matter because the court of appeals could search the record for reasons to affirm the sentence. Slip op. ¶14.
Request for resentencing due to inaccurate information fails
State v. Greenwood, 2014AP2219-CR,6 /30/15, District 3 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs
Greenwood, who was convicted of several misdemeanors, sought resentencing on the grounds that the circuit court had relied on inaccurate information at the initial sentencing. Specifically, Greenwood alleged that the court believed his sentences would be served in jail when, in fact, § 973.03(2) required that he serve his sentences in prison. The court of appeals rejected this claim.
Counsel wasn’t ineffective at TPR trial for failing to objecting to hearsay, “best interest of child” reference
State v. Kamille M., 2014AP2911, District 1, 6/26/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective at Kamille M.’s TPR grounds trial for failing to object to hearsay and to the state’s veiled reference to the best interests of the child during closing arguments.
Officer’s mistake of fact about car’s make and model didn’t invalidate stop
State v. Nathan Lewis Teasdale, 2015AP338-CR, District 4, 6/25/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer reasonably suspected that Teasdale was violating § 341.61(2), which prohibits displaying on a registration plates that are not issued for that vehicle, even though the officer was mistaken in believing that the make and model of the car was different from the make and model of the car for which the plates were issued.
Transcript of municipal court hearing doesn’t provide evidence supporting stop or refusal
Town of Bloomfield v. Petko Zvetkov Barashki, 2015AP226, District 2, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In a case the court of appeals aptly describes as “unusual,” the court exercises its discretionary power of reversal under § 752.35 to throw out Barashki’s OWI 1st conviction and refusal finding on the grounds that the evidence doesn’t show the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Barashki.
Voluntary TPR reversed; circuit court lacked proper evidentiary foundation to support decision to terminate
Caroline P. v. Shawn H., 2014AP2004 & 2014AP2005, District 3, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Even if the circuit court considered the statutory factors for termination of parental rights under § 48.426, the court lacked an evidentiary foundation in the record to make a determination as to whether termination was in the best interests of the child.
Evidence sufficient to support “bail jumping” verdict, no due process violation for accidental contact with victim
State v. Lavarren D. Etienne, 2014AP2881-CR, 6/18/15, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This appeal concerned the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict that Etienne intentionally violated a bond which prohibited him from having contact with “P.J.” Etienne said the contact was accidental. Due to the deference given to jury findings, Etienne’s argument failed. So did his claimed due process violation.
Traffic stop justified because officer saw driver drinking out of a brown bottle
State v. Timothy J. Relyea, 2014AP2860-CR, District 4, 6/18/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Put down that Sprecher® Root Beer if you’re behind the wheel! It could get you pulled over by a sharp-eyed cop who is knowledgable about the bottling practices of the beverage industry.