On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Robert J. Tisland, 2012AP1570-CR, District 4, 1/22/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Even if two legislative acts made inconsistent changes to a criminal statute and meant the changes made by the earlier act were superseded by the later one, a charge filed under the provisions of the superseded act was not, under the circumstances of this case, a charge for a crime unknown to law that deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction or competency; instead, it was a technical charging error that didn’t prejudice the defendant.

County of Calumet v. Lisa L. Dolajeck, 2014AP2100, District 2, 1/21/15 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals here affirms a decision denying a motion to dismiss OWI charges and a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. It holds that the sheriff in this case had reasonable suspicion to make the stop, and nothing requires law enforcement officers to record a stop even if they have  video cameras in their squad cars.

St. Croix County DHHS v. Michael D. & Juanita A., 2014AP2431, District 3, 1/16/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 4/16/15, reversed, 2016 WI 35; case activity

The court of appeals holds that the notice requirements of §§ 48.415(2)(a)1. and 48.356(2) were not satisfied because the last order concerning out-of-home placement of Juanita’s child did not include the written notice of the applicable grounds for termination or the conditions for Matthew’s return. The County therefore failed to meet its burden of proof on the continuing CHIPS ground under § 48.415(2)(a)1. and the termination order is vacated and the TPR petition dismissed.

State v. Mariah E., 2014AP1788, District 2, 1/14/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The decision to waive a juvenile into adult court is reviewed for erroneous exercise of discretion, State v. Tyler T., 2012 WI 52, ¶24, 341 Wis. 2d 1, 814 N.W.2d 192, and in this case the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in waiving sixteen-year-old Mariah to adult court on charges of battery of a police officer, battery to an emergency worker, and resisting and obstructing.

Fond du Lac County v. Robyn M. Pollack, 2014AP1936, District 2, 1/14/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Pollack’s license was properly revoked after refusing a chemical test because the police officer had probable cause to arrest her for OWI under the totality of the circumstances.

Milwaukee County v. Andy S., 2014AP1885, District 1, 1/13/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence was sufficient to prove dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a., as it showed Andy “[e]vidence[d] a substantial probability of physical harm to himself … as manifested by evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm.”

State v. Kiwana L., 2014AP2306, District 1, 1/13/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Kiwana L.’s substantive due process rights were not violated by the conditions set by the circuit court for return of her daughter Jasmine because those conditions were narrowly tailored to address her mental health issues; thus, the termination of her parental rights based on continuing CHIPS grounds under § 48.415(2) was proper.

State v. Jonathan Thomas, 2014AP543-CR, District 1, 1/5/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

At his trial on a charge of second degree reckless homicide for causing the death of Michael Brown, Thomas claimed Brown accidentally shot himself while handling a gun. The jury found Thomas guilty of the lesser included offense of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, § 940.08(1). The court of appeals rejects Thomas’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for that verdict.

State v. Terrance L. Ware, 2014AP378-CR, District 1, 12/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigative stop of Ware’s car gave the police reasonable suspicion that Ware or his passenger was dangerous and might have access to a weapon hidden in the car, justifying a protective search of the car for weapons. In addition, a police officer wasn’t vouching for another state’s witness by saying the witness “told the truth” after additional questioning.

State v. Charles A. McIntyre, 2014AP800-CR, District 3, 12/30/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

When pronouncing sentence in McIntyre’s case the circuit court repeatedly interchanged “consecutive” and “concurrent” when referring to Count One (of five). (¶¶2-5). Thus, despite the court’s several attempts at clarification during the sentencing hearing, the sentence imposed on that count was ambiguous because it was “undeniably confusing and capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two different ways.” (¶11). Nonetheless, the court’s intent was clear, so it properly amended the judgment post-sentencing to clarify that Count One was consecutive.