On Point blog, page 174 of 263
Court of appeals orders new trial due to impact of evidence relating to charges dismissed during trial
State v. Michael C. Hess, 2014AP268-CR, District 3, 11/11/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
While the trial evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Hess possessed methamphetamine, Hess is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice because the verdict may have been influenced by evidence offered to proved drugged-driving charges that were dismissed during trial.
Counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to request certain jury instructions or objecting to prosecutor’s closing
State v. Ryan P. O’Boyle, 2014AP80-CR, District 1, 11/4/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
O’Boyle’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are rejected because trial counsel’s performance wasn’t deficient.
Officer had probable cause to stop vehicle for tailgating
State v. Arik James Ulwelling, 2014AP814-CR, District 3, 11/4/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Police had probable cause to stop Ulwelling for violating § 346.14(1), which prohibits motor vehicle operators from following another vehicle “more closely than is reasonable and prudent”—i.e., tailgating.
OWI was properly charged as a first offense because prior was more than 5 years old
City of Kaukauna v. Grant R. Loescher, 2014AP954, District 3, 11/4/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Loescher’s 1997 conviction for first-offense OWI is not void because it was properly counted as a first offense despite his OWI conviction in 1992.
Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to pursue motion to dismiss for violating time limits under § 971.11
State v. Lawrence L. Holmes, 2013AP2342-CR, District 4, 10/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Because Holmes can’t show that the court would have granted his motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charges in the case with prejudice, he hasn’t shown he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s advice to enter into a plea agreement because he was going to lose the motion to dismiss.
Counsel wasn’t ineffective for waiving prelim and not moving to suppress statement
State v. Isaiah N. Triggs, 2014AP204-CR, District 1, 10/28/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for waiving a preliminary hearing in Triggs’s homicide prosecution or for failing to move to suppress Triggs’s confession. Further, the circuit court’s plea colloquy with Triggs was not defective and the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.
History of domestic violence supported increase of probationary period under § 973.09(2)(a)1.b.
State v. Millard Reno Bandy, Sr., 2014AP1055-CR & 2014AP1056-CR, District 1, 10/28/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP1055-CR; 2014AP1056-CR
A defendant’s history of domestic violence against a victim provided a basis for trial court to increase the period of probation under § 973.09(2)(a)1.b. even though the offenses for which the defendant was placed on probation didn’t involve physical harm or a direct threat to the victim.
Defendant wasn’t in custody when he was questioned while sitting in DNR warden’s truck
State v. David A. Myhre, 2014AP376-CR, District 4, 10/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Myhre was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he answered questions posed by a DNR warden while sitting in the warden’s truck. Thus, the warden was not required to advise Myhre of his Miranda rights.
Other acts evidence was harmless and PTAC amendment during trial was not prejudicial
State v. Sean T. Pugh, 2013AP1522-CR, District 3, 10/21/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
If the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Pugh had a prior conviction for an offense similar to the ones he was on trial for, the error was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence against him. In addition, the trial court properly allowed the state to amend the information to add party-to-a-crime modifiers because Pugh wasn’t prejudiced by the amendment.
Initial “stay” of juvenile sex offender reporting requirement wasn’t a permanent stay under § 938.34(16)
State v. Jermaine C., 2014AP467, District 1, 10/21/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court’s decision at Jermaine’s disposition hearing to stay the sex offender registration requirement wasn’t a permanent stay of the requirement under § 938.34(16) and State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1, because the record shows the circuit court was only deferring a final decision on a permanent stay pending reviews of Jermaine’s progress.