On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Kent W. Hubbard, 2014AP738-CR, District 2, 8/13/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The totality of the circumstances established probable cause to arrest Hubbard for operating with a detectable level of restricted controlled substance. Further, the warrantless blood draw was justified under the exigent circumstances test articulated in State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), because there was evidence that Hubbard had used marijuana and alcohol, and evidence regarding the latter would be lost if the police took time to get a warrant.

Ozaukee County v. Laura B., 2014AP1011-FT, District 2, 8/13/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence was sufficient to justify an extension of Laura B.’s commitment and an order for involuntary medication and treatment.

City of LaCrosse v. Corina Ducharme, 2014AP374, District 4, 8/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The stop of Ducharme’s car was justified under the community caretaker doctrine because the officer had objectively reasonable grounds to be concerned about the safety of the driver, as the car was parked at a boat landing at 2:40 a.m. with its right blinker on, and a right turn would take the car toward the water.

State v. Robert J. Kowalis, 2014AP258, District 2, 8/6/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s refusal finding under § 343.305(9) is upheld because the officer had probable cause to arrest Kowalis for operating while intoxicated.

City of Bloomer v. James S. Frank, 2013AP2597, District 3, 8/5/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion in reopening suppression hearing to take additional evidence in the form of dispatch recordings which the city tried, but failed, to obtain before the suppression hearing in the case.

State v. Bradley Edward Magdzas, 2014AP250-CR, District 3, 8/5/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The police had reasonable suspicion to stop Magdzas and, once he was stopped, could reasonably ask him for his name and identification.

State v. Jimmy J., 2014AP573, District 1, 8/5/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Trial counsel had a reasonable strategic reason for not objecting to court’s instructing TPR jury that while agreement of 10 or more jurors was necessary as to each verdict question, the same 10 jurors should agree on all the answers.

State v. John W. Kaczmarek, 2013AP1745-CR, District 4, 7/31/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to discover before Kaczmarek’s bail jumping trial that the hearing notice mailed to the defendant had been returned, as there was other evidence he’d received notice of the hearing. Nor was counsel ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses, as one may have provided evidence that contradicted Kaczmarek and the other wouldn’t have provided much help to the defense. Finally, counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to object to an arguably erroneous jury instruction.

Portage County DHHS v. Julie G., 2014AP1057, District 4, 7/31/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The record shows Julie received the warnings required under § 48.356 even though the relevant notice form did not have her signature. In addition, Julie’s substantive due process rights were not violated because the conditions for return of her child imposed by the continuing CHIPS order were not impossible for her to meet despite her incarceration.

State v. Lester C. Gilmore, 2013AP2186-CR, District 2, 7/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to call a witness at a Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), hearing because counsel was concerned the witness was unpredictable and might undermine his argument and because he was instead able to rely on the witness’s written statement to the police, which itself showed the discrepancy between the witness’s statement and the information in the search warrant affidavit.