On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Kenneth L. Hare, Jr., 2013AP1675-CR, 7/29/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

In this case, the court of appeals rejected Hare’s contentions that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the law of self-defense and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a separate IAC claim his trial lawyer’s failure to request a jury instruction on the law of theft.

State v. Matthew D. Campbell, 2011AP1445-CR, District 4, 7/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

After a victim admitted during cross-examination that she lied under oath during direct examination, the trial court advised the victim of her right against self-incrimination. (¶3-4). She invoked that right and was given immunity under §§ 972.08 and 972.085. (¶4). Cross-examination resumed, yielding additional admissions by the victim that she lied or gave inconsistent statements. (¶¶5-6). Under these circumstances, trial counsel was not ineffective for not moving to strike the victim’s direct examination testimony.

State v. Christopher T. Seiler, 2013AP1911-CR, District 2, 7/23/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Seiler’s compelled statement to his probation agent didn’t taint a subsequent police investigation that led to new charges because, the court of appeals holds, the police investigation was based on sources “independent” of his statements to the agent.

State v. Kenneth A. James, 2013AP2409-CR, District 2, 7/23/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

James insisted on going to trial even though the transcript from the preliminary hearing hadn’t yet been prepared, so he can’t complain now that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an adjournment so he could get the transcript.

State v. Brian A. Patterson, Appeal No. 2013AP749-CR, District 1, 7/22/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The State charged Patterson with 1st-degree intentional homicide in a shooting death, but the jury convicted him of a lesser-included offense: 1st degree reckless homicide.  In a cut-and-dried decision, the court of appeals held the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, and found no circuit court error in allowing the jury to consider 1st-degree reckless homicide, instructing the jury, or sentencing Patterson.

State v. Queentesta H., 2014AP761, District 1, 7/22/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court did not err in answering the first question of the special verdict forms submitted to the jury in Queentesta’s TPR trial because the jury could not have reached any other conclusion regarding those questions.

State v. Craig C. Meier, 2013AP2863-CR, District 4, 7/17/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The answer matters: If the pronouncement of sentence is ambiguous the court could “clarify[] and “reimpose[]” the sentences it originally intended, Krueger v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 435, 442-43, 272 N.W.2d 847 (1979); if the sentence is illegal, it must be commuted to the lawful maximum, § 973.13. In this case the court of appeals holds the circuit court’s initial pronouncement of sentences in this case was ambiguous, so it affirms the circuit court’s “correction” of the sentences to reflect the sentences the court intended to impose.

Green County DHS v. Ericka L.R., 2014AP1106, District 4, 7/17/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Assuming the “fair and just reason” standard for plea withdrawal before sentencing also applies to motions to withdraw consent to TPR before disposition, Ericka failed to establish a fair and just reason for withdrawing her voluntary consent to termination of her rights to her daughter.

State v. Daniel D. Bolstad, 2013AP2139, District 4, 7/17/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The court of appeals orders a new trial in the interest of justice because the prosecutor’s unwitting use of false testimony as critical evidence to establish that Bolstad was lying so clouded the crucial issue of credibility that it prevented the real controversy from being fully tried.

Kenosha County v. Vermetrias W., 2014AP861-FT, District 2, 7/16/14 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Vermetrias had been the subject of a Chapter 51 commitment order, which Kenosha County sought to extend. Section 51.20(1)(a)2 provides than an individual is the proper subject for commitment if he or she poses a danger to himself or herself or to others.  Vermetrias presented evidence that there was not a “substantial likelihood” she would become dangerous if her commitment ended.  The trial court ruled against her.  The court of appeals affirmed, but complimented those involved in this matter: