On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Dwayne F., Jr., 2014AP595, District 1, 6/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the best interests of Dwayne F.’s daughter would be served by a guardianship with the Child Welfare Bureau for adoption by her foster family, instead of placement with Dwayne F.’s father.

State v. Adam W. Miller, 2013AP2218; 6/5/14; District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The court of appeals holds that a circuit court may apply the § 939.62(1)(c) penalty enhancer to increase Miller’s term of initial confinement beyond the maximum prescribed by law without first imposing the maximum term of imprisonment, as in the maximums for both initial confinement and extended supervision.

State v. Patrick L. Hibl, 2013AP2723-CR, District 2, 6/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rejecting challenges to a restitution order, the court of appeals holds that the evidence in the record established a nexus between the crime Hibl was convicted of and the victim’s loss and that the circuit court took account of his ability to pay.

State v. Alberta R. Rose, 2013AP2783-CR, District 2, 6/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A police officer’s observations of a car “smoothly swerving three or four times” in its lane of travel over several blocks and then “appear[ing] to strike the center line” (¶2) provided reasonable suspicion to perform a valid investigatory stop of the car, even though an enhanced version of the squad car video showed the car didn’t hit the center line.

State v. Antonio D. Williams, 2013AP814; 6/3/14; District 1; (not recommended for publication); case activity

This appeal raises a host of issues but the most interesting concern the trial court’s decisions to: (1) prohibit defense counsel from cross-examining the State’s cooperating witnesses, all of whom were testifying in the hopes of receiving reduced sentences for themselves, about the maximum penalties they faced; and (2) allow the State to use a letter police found in an envelope marked “for my lawyer” to impeach Williams’s alibi witness.

State v. Joshua D. Winberg, 2013AP2661-CR, District 3, 5/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The driver of a car stopped based on officer’s knowledge that the car owner’s license was revoked was not unlawfully seized because, even thought it was immediately apparent the car owner was not driving, the police also immediately observed additional suspicious information that justified the continued detention of the driver.

Price County DHHS v. Sondra F., 2013AP2790, District 3, 5/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A respondent in a ch. 51 mental commitment proceeding does not have either a statutory or a due process right to be physically present at the final hearing under § 51.20. To the extent § 885.60(2)(a) provides a right to be physically present, it does not mandate physical presence, and the right under that statute is forfeited if the respondent fails to object to the videoconferencing or fails to request to be physically present.

State v. Thaddeus M. Lietz, 2013AP1283-CR, District 3, 5/20/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Leitz’s statements to police were not obtained in violation of either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment, so the circuit court properly denied his suppression motion.

New Berlin v. John Francis Downey, 2013AP 2352-FT, District 2, 5/14/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

An on-duty police officer had authority to stop Downey outside his jurisdiction because he was acting in response to an “emergency situation,” § 175.40(6)(a), and because he was in fresh pursuit of a law violator, § 175.40(2).

Waukesha County v. Dushyant N. Patel, 2013AP2292, District 2, 5/14/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The result of a blood draw done in violation of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), are admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because police acted in conformity with clear, well-settled Wisconsin law that permitted the blood draw at the time it was done, even if the arresting officer didn’t cite that law in justifying the blood draw.