On Point blog, page 185 of 263
Ch. 51 respondent did not have right to be physically present at final hearing, so appearance by videoconferencing was not error
Price County DHHS v. Sondra F., 2013AP2790, District 3, 5/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A respondent in a ch. 51 mental commitment proceeding does not have either a statutory or a due process right to be physically present at the final hearing under § 51.20. To the extent § 885.60(2)(a) provides a right to be physically present, it does not mandate physical presence, and the right under that statute is forfeited if the respondent fails to object to the videoconferencing or fails to request to be physically present.
Police didn’t violate Fifth or Sixth Amendment in taking statement of defendant cited for forfeiture offense
State v. Thaddeus M. Lietz, 2013AP1283-CR, District 3, 5/20/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Leitz’s statements to police were not obtained in violation of either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment, so the circuit court properly denied his suppression motion.
Officer’s out-of-jurisdiction traffic stop justified by both “emergency situation” and “fresh pursuit” rules
New Berlin v. John Francis Downey, 2013AP 2352-FT, District 2, 5/14/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
An on-duty police officer had authority to stop Downey outside his jurisdiction because he was acting in response to an “emergency situation,” § 175.40(6)(a), and because he was in fresh pursuit of a law violator, § 175.40(2).
Pre-McNeely blood test results are admissible even if officer didn’t cite specific rule permitting the blood draw
Waukesha County v. Dushyant N. Patel, 2013AP2292, District 2, 5/14/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The result of a blood draw done in violation of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), are admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because police acted in conformity with clear, well-settled Wisconsin law that permitted the blood draw at the time it was done, even if the arresting officer didn’t cite that law in justifying the blood draw.
Tip from known informant provided reasonable suspicion for traffic stop
State v. Andrew K. Wenz, 2013AP2576-CR, District 1, 5/13/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Police had reasonable suspicion to stop his car because the content of a tip from a known, reliable informant allowed police to ascertain whether they were stopping the correct vehicle.
Traffic stop was unreasonably extended because officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct FSTs
State v. Gumersinda M. Gonzalez, 2013AP2585-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of a traffic stop by asking a driver to perform field sobriety tests, so evidence of THC possession obtained during the stop must be suppressed.
Stalking statute was not unconstitutional as applied to defendant; letters on which stalking convictions were based constituted a “true threat”
State v. Donald W. Maier, 2013AP1391-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
The First Amendment did not preclude prosecuting Maier for stalking based on letters he sent because the letters constituted a “true threat” and thus were not protected speech.
Steering levers in place of a steering wheel doesn’t make a utility terrain vehicle into a motor vehicle
State v. Shawn N. Hill, 2013AP2549-CR, District 2, 5/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A vehicle registered by the State as a “utility terrain vehicle” under § 23.33(1)(ng) is not a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). Thus, a defendant alleged to have operated the vehicle while intoxicated should have been charged under § 23.33(4c), not § 346.63.
Police had probable cause to ask for PBT
Village of Grafton v. Carl J. Schlegel, 2013AP2521, District 2, 5/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Police had probable cause to ask Schlegel to submit to a preliminary breath test under § 343.303 even though he wasn’t asked to perform field sobriety tests first, and the result of the PBT, along with the rest of the facts, gave police probable cause to arrest Schlegel for OWI.
Court of appeals grants discretionary reversal for a 1st-degree intentional homicide conviction
State v. Charles R. Kucharski, 2013AP557-CR, District 1, 5/6/14, petition for review granted 9/24/14, reversed, 2015 WI 64; case activity
This is a nice defense win, and the majority opinion makes sense. Kucharski shot and killed his parents and pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The only issue at his court trial was whether he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and comply with the law. The uncontested expert opinions answered “yes.” So the majority granted a new trial. The dissent took issue with the majority’s application of § 752.35, the discretionary reversal standard.