On Point blog, page 189 of 262
Even if field sobriety tests constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, police may request them based on reasonable suspicion of impairment
Village of Little Chute v. Ronald A. Rosin, 2013AP2536, District 3, 2/25/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rosin argues that field sobriety tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment because “[a]n inherent right as a human being is to control and coordinate the actions of [his or her] own body[,]” and, therefore “a fundamental expectation of privacy is implicated when a person is subject to the performance of [field sobriety tests].” (¶12).
Police lacked reasonable suspicion to seize driver of car in a parking lot suspected to be the site of illegal drug activity
State v. Chonsea Jerome King, 2013AP1068-CR, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
A police officer saw a car parked in a lot linked by “numerous [pieces of] intelligence” to illegal drug activity. It was 9:25 p.m. The officer watched it for about five minutes, but did not see anyone exit the vehicle or any activity outside the vehicle, though they did observe the interior lights in the car turn on and off “a couple [of] times.” (¶3).
Conditionally admitting evidence during TPR grounds hearing when evidence was relevant only to disposition was harmless error
Dane County DHS v. Nancy M., 2013AP1886 & 2013AP1887, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1886; 2013AP1887
During the first day of a fact-finding hearing to the court to determine whether there were grounds to terminate Nancy’s parental rights, the trial court admitted evidence about Nancy’s bonding with her two children. Nancy objected, and the County and GAL agreed the line of questioning was not relevant to the grounds phase of the TPR proceeding,
Trial counsel’s performance at TPR trial, if deficient, was not prejudicial
Aaron W.M. v. Britany T.H., 2013AP2123, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Britany claimed trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to: 1) hearsay testimony from the child’s father that related incidents of Britany’s bad parenting; and 2) the petitioner’s “golden rule” rule argument during closing, which asked the jurors to view the case as if the child were their own, thus improperly asking the jurors to “internalize and personalize the case,
Totality of circumstances supported stop, arrest for robbery
State v. Lamont C., 2013AP1687, District 1, 2/11/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
¶14 We conclude under the facts in this case that [Officer] Hoffman did have reasonable suspicion … to stop … Lamont C. Hoffman, relying on information provided to him by a robbery victim, located Lamont C. within minutes of the robbery. In the limited time Hoffman was able to speak with the victim,
Reading old implied consent form didn’t taint admissibility of blood test results
State v. Lawrence A. Levasseur, Jr., 2013AP2369-CR, District 4, 2/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The arresting officer used an implied consent form that pre-dated the 2009 amendments to § 343.305, so it omitted language about accidents involving death or serious injury–language that did not apply to Levasseur’s situation. The use of the outdated form didn’t strip the resulting blood test result of its statutory presumption of admissibility and accuracy,
Arrest under § 968.075 doesn’t preclude issuance of citation under municipal ordinance
City of Lancaster v. Todd A. Chojnowski & Eric T. Chojnowski, 2013AP1593 & 2013AP1594, District 4, 2/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1593; 2013AP1594
Arrest under § 968.075, the mandatory arrest law for domestic abuse offenses, doesn’t preclude a charge under city disorderly conduct statute. While § 968.085(8) prohibits the issuance of a “citation” to a person arrested under § 968.075,
Court appropriately considered sec. 48.426 adoptability factors before ordering TPR
State v. Shymika S.W., 2013AP2415, District 1, 2/4/14 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity
Issue: Whether, in terminating Shymika S.W.’s parental rights to her daughter, the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by ignoring § 48.426(3)’s “adoptability factors?” Those factors are found in § 48.426(3)(a) and (f), and they require consideration of the likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination and whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship as a result of termination,
Trial court didn’t improperly restrict voir dire of 6-person jury in traffic forfeiture case
Washington County v. Joseph Harvey Bingen, 2013AP1171, District 2, 2/5/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The trial court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion by denying Bingen’s request for additional voir dire of prospective jurors for his first-offense OWI trial. In particular, Bingen was not able to ask if any jurors had been the victims of or convicted of drunk driving.
Defendant can’t withdraw plea based on claim he wasn’t informed of the domestic abuse modifier, but there was no basis to assess the domestic abuse surcharge
State v. Ryan P. O’Boyle, 2013AP1004-CR, District 1, 2/4/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
O’Boyle’ claimed his lawyer was ineffective for failing to move to strike the references in the complaint to “domestic abuse” because that isn’t a separate, stand-alone charge. He also claimed counsel failed to explain that the disorderly conduct count to which O’Boyle entered a plea was charged as an act of domestic abuse under § 968.075(1)(a).