On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Cindy Lou Hilsgen, 2013AP659-CR & 2013AP660-CR, District 3, 11/19/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

When Hilsgen moved here from Minnesota her driver’s license was revoked, and she never got a Wisconsin license. She was charged in two separate cases with operating without a valid license. Relying on § 343.05(6), she claimed in postconviction motions that she should have been charged instead with operating while revoked based on the status of her Minnesota license.

State v. Ericka S. Thomas, Appeal No. 2013AP341-CR; District 1; 11/13/13 (not recommended for publication); case activity

This is a split decision over the proper application of § 973.20, the restitution statute.  The circuit court convicted Thomas of Medicaid fraud, sentenced her to imprisonment, and ordered her to pay $356, 366.33 (the total amount she and accomplices stole) in restitution.  At sentencing, her lawyer described her “extremely limited earning ability,” a statement bolstered by her PSI. 

City of West Allis v. Brandon J. Michaels, Appeal No. 2013AP710, District 1, 11/13/13; (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity

Michaels tried to appeal a municipal court conviction for disorderly conduct to the circuit court, per Wis. Stat. § 800.14.  He consulted the clerk of court and followed all of the instructions he was given.  That is, he filed a notice of appeal with the circuit court and served another one upon the City of West Allis Police Department. 

State v. Matthew Allen Lilek, Appeal No. 2012AP1855, District 1; 11/13/13, (not recommended for publication), case activity

The dispositive issue in this appeal was whether the defendant, who is legally blind and has suffered cognitive disabilities his entire life, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a no-contest plea to second degree sexual assault, with use of force, and to aggravated battery.  During the plea colloquy, defense counsel assured the court that experts had examined his client and,

State v. Steven L. Udelhofen, 2013AP1244-CR, District 4, 11/14/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s findings of fact regarding the circumstances of the stop of Udelhofen are not clearly erroneous despite the fact that he squad car video didn’t corroborate all the details of the officer’s testimony regarding his observations, applying State v. Walli, 2011 WI App 86,

State v. Jeffrey M. Halida, 2013AP1298, District 2, 11/13/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Halida was arrested for OWI after a motorcycle accident. In response to routine medical questions asked before the blood draw, he told the officer he took two Oxycodone pills earlier that day for a hand injury. (¶¶4-6). The officer’s reference to Halida’s statement at trial was not prejudicial because “[i]n view of the record,

Wood County Human Services v. James D., 2013AP1378, District 4, 11/7/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

One of the elements of protective placement is that the person has a disability that is permanent or likely to be permanent, § 55.08(1)(d). The County failed to prove this element by clear and convincing evidence because its psychological expert was unable to testify that James suffered from a permanent or likely to be permanent disability,

Sun Prairie v. Brent D. Curry, 2013AP1206, District 4, 11/7/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had reasonable suspicion to stop Curry, who was driving on a residential street at 3:40 a.m., turned around, sped past the officer’s car, and then turned at a high rate of speed into the driveway of a residence. He then sat in the car for a few minutes before getting out and walking up the driveway;

Dodge County v. Giovanina Louise Ray, 2013AP1588, District 4, 11/7/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The general prohibition against inattentive driving in § 346.89(1) covers falling asleep behind the wheel. Ray argued the statutory language prohibiting a person from being “so engaged or occupied as to interfere with the safe driving” of the vehicle required engagement or occupation with something “external” and doesn’t apply to sleeping because,

State v. Richard P. Selenske, 2013AP1403-CR, District 3, 11/5/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A dispute about a contract for the purchase of standing hay grew into a misdemeanor theft charge when Selenske, the farmer who owned the hay fields, would not let Kern, the farmer who purchased the hay, pick up the last of the bales. The bare-bones contract Selenske wrote didn’t include a completion date,