On Point blog, page 199 of 263
Circuit court properly exercised discretion in denying “new factor” time cut request
State v. David J. Lawrence, 2013AP796, District 4, 10/10/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court knew of Lawrence’s mental health diagnoses at sentencing, but after sentencing Lawrence was hospitalized after a psychological breakdown. (¶¶3-4). He requested sentence modification, arguing the court was not aware of all his diagnoses or his medication regimen. (¶5). Assuming that information was a “new factor,” the circuit court gave a reasoned explanation for why it declined to modify the sentence,
Warrantless entry into home to arrest for OWI was not justified by exigent circumstances
State v. Jeffrey G. Vanden Huevel, 2013AP1107-CR, District 3, 10/8/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
After rolling his car over early one morning Vanden Huevel left the scene of the accident and went back to his cabin. (¶¶1-7). A sheriff’s deputy named Kelley located the cabin and started knocking on a sliding patio door. (¶¶8-9). Kelley could see someone inside and told the person to open the door,
Court properly exercised discretion in ordering waiver of juvenile into adult court
State v. Taylor M.S., 2013AP1337, District 2, 10/2/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; not eligible for publication); case activity
The juvenile court properly exercised its discretion in deciding to waive jurisdiction over Taylor’s charges, rejecting Taylor’s contention that the court failed to consider all of the factors in § 938.18(5), in particular the availability of treatment and services as required by § 938.18(5)(c):
¶6 We agree with the State that the circuit court sufficiently addressed the adequacy and availability of services.
Parent in TPR not entitled to instruction about incarceration making it impossible to comply with conditions for return of her child because she had ample time before incarceration to comply
Ozaukee County DHS v. Callen D.M., 2013AP1157, District 2, 9/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Callen D.M. was not entitled to an instruction about the impossibility of meeting the conditions of a CHIPS order due to her incarceration, a TPR defense recognized in Kenosha Cty. DHS v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845:
¶13 The facts in Callen’s case stand in stark contrast to those in Jodie W.
Anonymous tip naming defendant and officer’s own observations combined to support traffic stop
Manitowoc County v. Ryan A. Spatchek, 2013AP986, District 2, 9/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
An anonymous call to police dispatch said Spatchek was operating while intoxicated and that the caller was concerned for his safety and provided verifiable information as to Spatchek’s location that was later confirmed by a deputy who subsequently found and followed Spatchek and made independent observations of his impaired driving (crossing the fog line approximately three times in one mile;
Counsel was not ineffective for not calling a witness he thought was unpredictable and “less than credible”
State v. Alejandro Rodriguez, 2013AP695-CR, District 2, 9/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Trial counsel was not ineffective for deciding not to call Rodriguez’s girlfriend as a witness. Counsel advised Rodriguez he thought it was not in Rodriguez’s interests to have her testify because her recantations made her credibility suspect, she refused to talk to counsel before trial, and Rodriguez had a no-contact order pertaining to her,
Juvenile waiver decision is not invalidated even though juvenile could not be waived on one of the two cases on which waiver was based
State v. Jace H., 2012AP2479, District 2, 9/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The state petitioned to waive Jace H. into adult court in two delinquency cases involving allegations of sexual assault of two different victims. (¶¶2-4). After the circuit court granted the waiver petition, Jace’s new lawyer determined–and the state conceded–the allegations in one of the cases occurred before Jace turned 15, a fact that precludes waiver under § 938.18(1)(c) (juvenile court may waiver jurisdiction over juvenile alleged to have violated a criminal law on or after his 15th birthday).
TPR — evidence of parent’s failure to meet conditions for return of other children under a CHIPS order in a different county
State v. Roberta W., 2013AP936, District 1, 9/24/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to evidence that Roberta W. had failed to meet the conditions for the return of two of her other children under a CHIPS order in a different county because that evidence was relevant under La Crosse County Dept. of Human Servs.
Court of appeals rejects use of collective knowledge doctrine to undercut reasonable suspicion
City of Stevens Point v. Katrina L. Shurpit, Appeal No. 2013AP538, 9/26/13; (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Shurpit challenged the investigative stop that led to her convictions for operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content and while under the influence of an intoxicant. A hit-and-run had a occurred in the vicinity a few minutes before her stop. The dispatcher told the arresting officer that the car involved was gray or green.
State loses restitution appeal; proof of damages and nexus to crime is just too skimpy
State v. Deris Huley, 2013AP682, 9/26/13 (1-judge ineligible for publication); case activity
It’s not often the court of appeals rules against the State.
Huley pled no contest to a misdemeanor hit and run of an attended vehicle, as a repeater. See §346.74(5)(a). The State sought restitution in the amount of $4,064.83 for the victim’s personal injuries. Noting that “restitution is the rule and not the exception” and that “the victim need only show that the defendant’s actions were the precipitating cause of the injury and that [the injury] was the natural consequence of the actions,” the court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the denial of restitution.