On Point blog, page 205 of 263
Sex offender registration — court’s consideration of dismissed charges as part of exercise of discretion
State v. Christopher James Athas, 2012AP2151-CR, District 1, 6/11/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly considered previous sexual assault charges that had been dismissed when it was deciding whether to order Athas to register as a sex offender after his conviction for fourth degree sexual assault:
¶3 …. Whether to order sex-offender registration is part of the circuit court’s sentencing discretion.
Disorderly conduct — sufficiency of the evidence
State v. Christina V., 2013AP405-FT, District 3, 6/11/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s order adjudicating Christina delinquent of disorderly conduct despite the judge’s comments that what happened in the case was “somewhat of a guess” and that his conclusions were “[m]y best guess” and based on what “I suspect” happened. (¶¶12-13).
Though the trial court found none of the witnesses “all that reliable”
TPR — Effective assistance of counsel at fact-finding hearing
Jenna L.C. v. Dustin J.K.V., 2012AP2696, District 2, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects Dustin’s claim that his attorney was ineffective at the fact-finding hearing on a TPR petition alleging he had failed to assume parental responsibility for his daughter, Breyanna.
Trial counsel did not object to certain evidence about conduct Dustin allegedly engaged in shortly before he learned his girlfriend was pregnant with Breyanna.
Reckless driving, § 346.62(2) — sufficiency of the evidence
Winnebago County v. Rahb J. Kettleson, 2012AP2230, District 2, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The testimony of a citizen-witness–that a car operated by Kettleson “was probably going about 65 to 68[,]” came within five or ten feet of the rear of his vehicle before passing him, made at least six lane changes without signaling, and was traveling about the same speed while coming within approximately five to ten feet of other cars he was passing–was sufficient to support Kettleson’s conviction for reckless driving:
¶9 To convict Kettleson,
Traffic stop — reasonable suspicion to believe break-in was occurring
State v. John C. Baker, 2012AP2163-CR, District 2/4, 5/30/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The totality of the circumstances shows a police officer could reasonably suspect that a break-in had occurred or was about to occur at the time the officer temporarily detained Baker for the purpose of investigating that reasonable suspicion. The court concludes that even though “pulling one’s vehicle into a closed business during the middle of the night,
Courts had no jurisdiction to consider plea withdrawal motion filed more than five years after sentencing
State v. Juan M. Rodriguez-Faustino, 2012AP2777, District 1, May 29, 2013; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rodriguez-Faustino pled to a misdemeanor drug offense and, in January 2007, was placed on probation for 12 months. (¶¶4-5). In September 2012 he filed a motion to withdraw his plea, asserting his attorney was ineffective under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1475‑1476 (2010),
TPR — consideration of parent’s incarceration; exercise of discretion at disposition
State v. Roy W., 2013AP413, District 1, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects Roy W.’s arguments that “virtually every” factor under § 48.426(3) weighed in his favor and that the only ground for terminating his parental rights was his sixteen month prison sentence. (¶1). Based on a lengthy review of the record and the circuit court’s reasoning for terminating Roy’s parental rights (¶¶2-9,
Court of appeals tosses jury verdict in CHIPS case
Polk County v. Norman S., 2012AP2801, District 3, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity.
Given the court of appeals’s highly deferential standard of review for jury verdicts, it doesn’t throw them out very often. In this case, it did. A jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Norman S. was unable to provide necessary care so as to seriously endanger the physical health of his son,
New trial in the interest of justice ordered for defendant who raised NGI defense
State v. Vicente Paul Vento, 2012AP1763-CR, District 1, 5/21/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Invoking its discretionary reversal power, the court of appeals holds Vento is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice on the issue of his mental responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 971.15 because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and based its verdict on speculative testimony from an expert:
¶28 We agree with Vento that there is a substantial probability that a new trial would produce a different result because he met his burden under Wis.
Ch. 51 mental health commitment — sufficiency of the evidence
Winnebago County v. Gina A.R., 2013AP226, District 2, 5/22/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activty
The court rejects Gina A.R.’s claim that the evidence at the final hearing was insufficient to show she is mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous, noting that much of her argument discusses facts not in the record and that the undisputed facts supported the commitment order. (¶¶4-6).