On Point blog, page 207 of 265
Refusal hearing — sufficiency of evidence; lawfulness of blood draw after refusal
State of Wisconsin/City of Sturgeon Bay v. Bradley H. Hart, 2013AP85, District 3, 6/18/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court’s finding that Hart refused a chemical is not clearly erroneous, despite Hart’s being from Illinois, where the law is different, and his acquiescence, without physical resistance, to the blood draw done after his initial refusal. He was advised of Wisconsin law before he was asked to submit to a test,
TPR — failure to assume parental responsibility; sufficiency of the evidence
Patrick J.T. v. Shelly S., 2013AP778 and 2013AP779, District 4, 6/13/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP778; 2013AP779
Under the totality-of-the-circumstances standard for determining whether a parent has assumed parental responsibility, Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶22, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Shelly S.
Sex offender registration — court’s consideration of dismissed charges as part of exercise of discretion
State v. Christopher James Athas, 2012AP2151-CR, District 1, 6/11/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly considered previous sexual assault charges that had been dismissed when it was deciding whether to order Athas to register as a sex offender after his conviction for fourth degree sexual assault:
¶3 …. Whether to order sex-offender registration is part of the circuit court’s sentencing discretion.
Disorderly conduct — sufficiency of the evidence
State v. Christina V., 2013AP405-FT, District 3, 6/11/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s order adjudicating Christina delinquent of disorderly conduct despite the judge’s comments that what happened in the case was “somewhat of a guess” and that his conclusions were “[m]y best guess” and based on what “I suspect” happened. (¶¶12-13).
Though the trial court found none of the witnesses “all that reliable”
TPR — Effective assistance of counsel at fact-finding hearing
Jenna L.C. v. Dustin J.K.V., 2012AP2696, District 2, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects Dustin’s claim that his attorney was ineffective at the fact-finding hearing on a TPR petition alleging he had failed to assume parental responsibility for his daughter, Breyanna.
Trial counsel did not object to certain evidence about conduct Dustin allegedly engaged in shortly before he learned his girlfriend was pregnant with Breyanna.
Reckless driving, § 346.62(2) — sufficiency of the evidence
Winnebago County v. Rahb J. Kettleson, 2012AP2230, District 2, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The testimony of a citizen-witness–that a car operated by Kettleson “was probably going about 65 to 68[,]” came within five or ten feet of the rear of his vehicle before passing him, made at least six lane changes without signaling, and was traveling about the same speed while coming within approximately five to ten feet of other cars he was passing–was sufficient to support Kettleson’s conviction for reckless driving:
¶9 To convict Kettleson,
Traffic stop — reasonable suspicion to believe break-in was occurring
State v. John C. Baker, 2012AP2163-CR, District 2/4, 5/30/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The totality of the circumstances shows a police officer could reasonably suspect that a break-in had occurred or was about to occur at the time the officer temporarily detained Baker for the purpose of investigating that reasonable suspicion. The court concludes that even though “pulling one’s vehicle into a closed business during the middle of the night,
Courts had no jurisdiction to consider plea withdrawal motion filed more than five years after sentencing
State v. Juan M. Rodriguez-Faustino, 2012AP2777, District 1, May 29, 2013; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rodriguez-Faustino pled to a misdemeanor drug offense and, in January 2007, was placed on probation for 12 months. (¶¶4-5). In September 2012 he filed a motion to withdraw his plea, asserting his attorney was ineffective under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1475‑1476 (2010),
TPR — consideration of parent’s incarceration; exercise of discretion at disposition
State v. Roy W., 2013AP413, District 1, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects Roy W.’s arguments that “virtually every” factor under § 48.426(3) weighed in his favor and that the only ground for terminating his parental rights was his sixteen month prison sentence. (¶1). Based on a lengthy review of the record and the circuit court’s reasoning for terminating Roy’s parental rights (¶¶2-9,
Court of appeals tosses jury verdict in CHIPS case
Polk County v. Norman S., 2012AP2801, District 3, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity.
Given the court of appeals’s highly deferential standard of review for jury verdicts, it doesn’t throw them out very often. In this case, it did. A jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Norman S. was unable to provide necessary care so as to seriously endanger the physical health of his son,