On Point blog, page 208 of 263
Arrest – police officer acting outside his jurisdiction under § 66.0313(2)
State v. Michael E. Zinke, 2012AP2087-CR, District 4, 4/4/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The stop and arrest of Zinke by a police officer well outside his jurisdiction was proper under a mutual aid statute, § 66.0313(2), even though the officer was “miles away” from his jurisdiction and initiated contact with the agency that had jurisdiction.
These are the facts: A Village of Westfield police officer was traveling on a county highway in Marquette County when he observed a vehicle repeatedly deviating from its designated lane.
Traffic stop – reasonable suspicion; good-faith mistake of fact
State v. Donald D. Laufer, 2012AP915, District 2, 4/3/13; court of appeals decision (recommended for publication); case activity
The officer’s erroneous reading of Laufer’s license plate, which caused the officer to wrongly believe that the plate might not be registered to the vehicle, nonetheless supported stop of the car under the good-faith rule, adopting the reasoning of State v. Reierson, No. 2010AP596, unpublished slip op.
Discretion of trial court — evidentiary decisions; mistrial motions
State v. Desmond Dejuan Laster, 2012AP1739-CR, District 1, 4/2/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in making two evidentiary rulings or in denying Laster’s motion for a mistrial.
On the first evidentiary ruling, the court of appeals holds the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to ask Hunt, a defense witness,
Restitution for damage to stolen van that is later used to commit robberies
State v. Devante J. Lumpkins, 2012AP1670-CR, District 1, 4/2/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Lumpkins is liable for restitution for damage to a stolen van he and two co-defendants (“The Jack Boys”) used to commit two armed robberies, even though Lumpkins was not charged with or convicted of the theft of the van. Restitution requires that there be a “direct victim” of the crime and a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the claimed damages (¶7),
OWI — conviction for “first” offense must be vacated where defendant has prior OWIs despite delay in moving to vacate conviction and even though priors were from another state
Clark County v. Rex A. Potts, 2012AP2001, District 4, 3/28/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Potts’s 1996 conviction for OWI in violation of a county ordinance is void and must be vacated because defendant had prior convictions for operating while intoxicated—even though Potts did not move to vacate the judgment until 2012 and even though the prior convictions were from Massachusetts.
The circuit court rejected Potts’s motion for relief from the 1996 judgment because of his delay in bringing the motion,
Ineffective assistance of counsel — failure to present evidence, ineffective cross examination. Privileges — Confidential informant, § 905.10(3)(b); disclosure of informant
State v. Kendrick L. Lee, 2011AP2126-CR, District 4, 3/28/12; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Ineffective assistance of counsel — failure to present evidence, ineffective cross examination
In a necessarily fact-intensive discussion that defies quick summary here, the court of appeals concludes Lee’s trial attorney was not ineffective for failing to present two categories of additional evidence or in her cross examination of one of the state’s witnesses.
Guilty plea — factual basis; value of stolen property; breach of the plea agreement
State v. Lisa A. Brabazon, 2012AP1171-CR, District 4, 3/28/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Guilty plea — factual basis; value of stolen property
The victim’s statements as to the value of the stolen property (which were set forth in the complaint) provided a sufficient factual basis for concluding that the value exceeded the $5,000 threshold for felony theft:
¶19 ….
Traffic stop – reasonable suspicion based on speed
State v. Marvin L. Dillman, 2012AP865-CR, District 2, 3/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop truck which she first saw “sideways” on the road and then observed accelerate quickly toward the curb before correcting itself and speeding away so quickly it required her to accelerate her squad car to 50 m.p.h. over three or four blocks to catch up:
¶7 Kollmann witnessed Dillman’s truck sideways in the roadway and then travel at a speed in excess of the speed limit.
Statute of limitations, § 939.74(1) — sufficiency of “John Doe” complaint’s identification of defendant for purposes of tolling statute of limitations; denial of right to self-representation or to substitution of counsel
State v. Rodney Washington, 2012AP1015-CR, District 1, 3/26/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Statute of limitations, § 939.74(1) — sufficiency of “John Doe” complaint’s identification of defendant for purposes of tolling statute of limitations
The crimes in this case—sexual assault and robbery—were alleged to have occurred in 1994 and 1995. In 2000, eleven days before the statute of limitations was to run,
Postconviction motion under § 974.06 – denial of hearing where record conclusively shows no basis for relief
State v. Romey J. Hodges, 2012AP1330, District 1, 3/26/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly denied Hodges’s § 974.06 motion alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, and properly advise Hodges regarding, a self defense claim. Based on the record Hodges has not shown his actions were reasonable self-defense; it is also clear from the record trial counsel knew the law of self-defense and gave Hodges effective representation.