On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Anthony S. Irving, 2011AP1908-CR, District 2, 8/8/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

A defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation, State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶20, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, but it must be triggered by a “clear and unequivocal” request for self-representation, State v. Darby,

State v. Tracy A. Stokes, 2011AP2379-CR, District 1, 8/7/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Stokes’ § 974.06 motion didn’t “set forth any reason, much a sufficient reason, for failing” to raise in his prior postconviction motion the issues presently raised, therefore the issues are procedurally barred, State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994),

State v. Dragisa Pavlovic, 2011AP2687-CR, District 2, 8/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Pavlic’s waiver of counsel so that he could represent himself at trial satisfied State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).

¶8        As a precautionary measure, the trial court granted Pavlovic a Klessig evidentiary hearing.  We conclude the trial court’s waiver colloquy complied with Klessig.  

State v. Marilyn M. Torbeck, 2012AP522-CR, District 2, 8/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

¶6        … For the State to charge Torbeck with OWI under § 346.63(1)(a), DFE must be either an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog, or a drug.  DFE is not listed as a controlled substance under either Wisconsin or federal law.  A “controlled substance analog” is defined as “a substance the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance.”  Wis.

State v. Paul H. Olson, 2011AP1728-CR, District 4, 7/26/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

¶11      Although Officer Welker did not observe Olson commit any traffic violations, the other facts known to Officer Welker at the time he initiated questioning demonstrate that he had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop.  The incident took place at 11:30 p.m.  “The hour of the day may … be relevant in that the individual’s activities may or may not be consistent with the typical behavior of law-abiding citizens at that time.”  State v.

State v. Jeremiah R. Connour, 2011AP1489-CR, District 3, 7/31/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

¶3 n. 2:

Connour’s thirty-eight-page statement of the case includes primarily verbatim Q & A trial testimony, but nonetheless omits relevant evidence necessary to address his postconviction claims.  Most of the remainder of Connour’s recitation of the “facts” inappropriately consists of several pages of argument.  

State v. Nick E. Sammon, District 2, 2011AP682-CR, 7/25/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Search Warrant – Erroneous Information in Application

A detective’s application for a search warrant of Sammons’ residence asserted that Sammons had been convicted in Texas for drug and burglary offenses (in fact, both had been dismissed after deferred adjudication of guilt). The assertions in the warrant application were based on the NCIC database,

State v. Chavis T. Sheriff, 2011AP1202, District 2, 7/25/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Sheriff’s failure to respond to a no-merit report operates as a serial litigation bar to his subsequent, § 974.06 attempt to argue that trial and postconviction counsel were ineffective. State v. Allen, 2010 WI 89, 328 Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 124, discussed and applied.

Dane County v. Amy Jolene Judd, 2011AP2106, District 4, 7/19/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Reasonable suspicion supported temporary stop, State v. Meye, 2010AP336-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App July 14, 2010) (“odor of intoxicants alone is insufficient to raise reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop”), distinguished:

¶7        I disagree that Meye is analogous to the present case.  

Jackson Co. DHS v. Robert H., 2011AP2783, District 4, 7/17/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Both federal and state Indian Child Welfare Acts require that termination of parental rights to an Indian child be supported by testimony of a qualified expert witness “that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child,” 25 U.S.C.