On Point blog, page 222 of 262
TPR – Summary Judgment on Grounds – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Michael B. v. Marcy M., 2011AP2846, District 2, 5/16/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Marcy M.: Jane S. Earle; case activity
By responding (inadequately) to a TPR motion for summary judgment on grounds with a letter rather than evidence such as an affidavit, counsel provided ineffective assistance.
¶10 We disagree that counsel’s performance was “not ineffective.” In the face of summary judgment that would deprive Marcy of a jury determination on her failure to assume parental responsibility,
Ineffective Assistance – Failure to Impeach
State v. Ralph S. Stewart, 2011AP1424-CR, District 1, 5/15/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Stewart: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity
Counsel’s failure to impeach police officers, with their own reported statements, was deficient:
¶17 While matters of trial strategy are generally left to counsel’s professional judgment, counsel may be found ineffective if the strategy was objectively unreasonable. See State v.
Reasonable Suspicion – Anonymous Call
State v. Joel R. Medrow, 2011AP2314, District 1, 5/15/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Medrow: Chad A. Kanning; case activity
An anonymous call to the police reported that the caller had followed a possibly impaired driver who had turned parked in the front parking lot of the Cudahy Police Department; the report included the vehicle’s license plate number. The court concludes that, upon seeing Medrow just outside that vehicle,
TPR – IAC – Lack of Prejudice
Oneida County Department of Social Services v. Scott H, 2011AP2599, District 3, 5/15/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Scott H.: Brian C. Findley; case activity; companion case: Oneida County Department of Social Services v. Amanda H., 2011AP2599
Notwithstanding trial counsel’s concession of no strategic reason for allowing the jury to view documents reciting Scott’s “history of violent behavior,”
TPR – Severance; IAC – Lack of Prejudice; Grounds: Failure to Assume Parental Responsibility – Constitutionality
Oneida County Department of Social Services v. Amanda H, 2011AP2600, District 3, 5/15/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Amanda H.: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; companion case: Oneida County Department of Social Services v. Scott H., 2011AP2599
TPR – Severance
On joint trial for termination of parental rights, Scott’s disruptive conduct didn’t necessitate grant of severance motion by Amanda.
Charge Duplicity – Juror Unanimity
State v. Darryl P. Benson, 2010AP2455-CR, District 1, 5/8/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Benson: Mary Scholle, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity
Sexual assault charges were not duplicitous, and in any event, potential unanimity problem was resolved by the instructions:
¶17 To begin, we conclude that the amended information properly notified Benson of the charges against him. The counts were set forth with enough specificity to allow Benson to plead and defend himself and to protect him from being tried twice for the same offense.
State v. Demone Alexander, 2011AP394-CR, District 1, 5/8/12, WSC rev granted 11/14/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; for Alexander: Hans P. Koesser; case activity
Juror Selection / Dismissal – Right to Personal Presence
A defendant has a non-waivable right to personal presence at voir dire, ¶6 (citing, § 971.04(1)(c); and, State v. Harris, 229 Wis. 2d 832, 839, 601 N.W.2d 682 (Ct.
Rape Shield Law – Prior Untruthful Allegation
State v. Christopher Walter Hurns, 2011AP857-CR, District 1, 5/8/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Hurns: Rex Anderegg; case activity
Hurns wasn’t entitled to adduce, as an exception to the rape shield law, evidence of the complainant’s prior untruthful allegation of sexual assault; § 972.11(2)(b), as informed by 3-part test of State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 456 N.W.2d 600 (1990),
Postconviction DNA Testing, § 974.07; Sentencing – Harsh and Excessive Review
State v. Dwain M. Staten, 2011AP916-CR, District 1, 5/8/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Staten: Michael J. Steinle; case activity
Postconviction DNA Testing, § 974.07
Postconviction testing at state expense requires, among other things, that the defendant show a reasonable probability he wouldn’t have been prosecuted or convicted with exculpatory test results. Staten, whose defense to sexual assault was consent rather than misidentification,
Counsel – Challenge to Effectiveness – Machner Hearing
State v. William Martin, 2011AP2168, District 1, 5/8/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); pro se; case activity; prior history: unpublished decision (2007AP1293-CR)
Because the record conclusively demonstrated that Martin wasn’t entitled to relief, State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶26, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62, the circuit court properly denied without a hearing his claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective (for failing to argue appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in several respects).