On Point blog, page 222 of 266
Sentencing – Bifurcated, Enhanced Misdemeanor
State v. Lavon J. Ash, Sr., 2012AP381-CR, District 2, 8/15/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Ash was sentenced to concurrent terms of one-year initial confinement, one-year extended supervision on two misdemeanor counts, a sentence structure he successfully challenges. Incompatible statutory mandates lie at the heart of the problem. In the first instance, § 973.01(1) requires bifurcated misdemeanor sentences, which simply isn’t possible for unenhanced misdemeanors: a bifurcated sentence must be served in prison,
Search & Seizure – Curtilage: Attached Garage
Village of Oregon v. Jeremy Florin, 2011AP1708, District 4, 8/16/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Suspected of drunk driving, Florin was followed by a police officer to his home, ignored the officer’s command to stop, and went inside via an open garage. The officer entered the still-open garage, knocked on the door to the home, induced Florin outside and eventually arrested him for drunk driving.
Traffic Stop – Reasonable Suspicion
Village of Jackson v. John W. Hespe, 2012AP680-FT, District 2, 8/15/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
“Unsafe,” but not necessarily “illegal” rate of speed supported traffic stop, State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, 341 Wis. 2d 576, 815 N.W.2d 675, followed:
¶6 Here, Hespe contends that while the court found that his speed was not normal,
Reasonable Suspicion – Prolonged Stop
State v. Johnnie Austin, 2011AP2953-CR, District 1, 8/14/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Continued detention of Austin, following an indisputably proper stop for illegal parking, was supported by reasonable suspicion:
¶14 This court disagrees; the trial court properly found Officer Tisher’s continued detention of Austin reasonable. If, during a valid traffic stop, an officer becomes reasonably suspicious of an individual,
Reasonable Suspicion – Drug Activity
State v. Craig R. Moss, 2012AP259-CR, District 3, 8/14/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Terry stop of Moss’s car supported by reasonable suspicion of involvement in drug activity:
¶10 While patrolling a high crime area in the middle of the night, Steffens observed a vehicle stop briefly in front of a known drug house. When the vehicle observed Steffens’ squad car,
TPR – Default Judgment, Grounds
State v. Yvette A., 2012AP548, District 1, 8/14/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity
Parent’s failure to appear at grounds phase of TPR trial, because she was locked in a mental health unit, supported default judgment, where parent had documented history of checking herself into hospitals despite actual need for psychiatric treatment.
¶13 Because entry of default is a particularly harsh sanction,
Reasonable Suspicion – Traffic Stop, OWI – Informant’s Tip
State v. Michael P. Green, 2011AP2137-CR, District 2, 8/8/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity
Traffic stop, based on report by gas station attendant of suspected drunk driver, was sufficiently reliable to support investigatory stop.
¶10 This court has previously held that a tip shows sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigative stop when the informant identifies himself or herself to the dispatcher,
Self-Representation
State v. Anthony S. Irving, 2011AP1908-CR, District 2, 8/8/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
A defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation, State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶20, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, but it must be triggered by a “clear and unequivocal” request for self-representation, State v. Darby,
Serial Litigation Bar
State v. Tracy A. Stokes, 2011AP2379-CR, District 1, 8/7/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Stokes’ § 974.06 motion didn’t “set forth any reason, much a sufficient reason, for failing” to raise in his prior postconviction motion the issues presently raised, therefore the issues are procedurally barred, State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994),
Self-Representation: Klessig Waiver
State v. Dragisa Pavlovic, 2011AP2687-CR, District 2, 8/1/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Pavlic’s waiver of counsel so that he could represent himself at trial satisfied State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).
¶8 As a precautionary measure, the trial court granted Pavlovic a Klessig evidentiary hearing. We conclude the trial court’s waiver colloquy complied with Klessig.