On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Johnnie Austin, 2011AP2953-CR, District 1, 8/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Continued detention of Austin, following an indisputably proper stop for illegal parking, was supported by reasonable suspicion:

¶14      This court disagrees; the trial court properly found Officer Tisher’s continued detention of Austin reasonable.  If, during a valid traffic stop, an officer becomes reasonably suspicious of an individual,

State v. Craig R. Moss, 2012AP259-CR, District 3, 8/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Terry stop of Moss’s car supported by reasonable suspicion of involvement in drug activity:

¶10      While patrolling a high crime area in the middle of the night, Steffens observed a vehicle stop briefly in front of a known drug house.  When the vehicle observed Steffens’ squad car,

State v. Yvette A., 2012AP548, District 1, 8/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity

Parent’s failure to appear at grounds phase of TPR trial, because she was locked in a mental health unit, supported default judgment, where parent had documented history of checking herself into hospitals despite actual need for psychiatric treatment.

¶13      Because entry of default is a particularly harsh sanction,

State v. Michael P. Green, 2011AP2137-CR, District 2, 8/8/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity

Traffic stop, based on report by gas station attendant of suspected drunk driver, was sufficiently reliable to support investigatory stop.

¶10      This court has previously held that a tip shows sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigative stop when the informant identifies himself or herself to the dispatcher,

State v. Anthony S. Irving, 2011AP1908-CR, District 2, 8/8/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

A defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation, State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶20, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, but it must be triggered by a “clear and unequivocal” request for self-representation, State v. Darby,

State v. Tracy A. Stokes, 2011AP2379-CR, District 1, 8/7/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Stokes’ § 974.06 motion didn’t “set forth any reason, much a sufficient reason, for failing” to raise in his prior postconviction motion the issues presently raised, therefore the issues are procedurally barred, State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994),

State v. Dragisa Pavlovic, 2011AP2687-CR, District 2, 8/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Pavlic’s waiver of counsel so that he could represent himself at trial satisfied State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).

¶8        As a precautionary measure, the trial court granted Pavlovic a Klessig evidentiary hearing.  We conclude the trial court’s waiver colloquy complied with Klessig.  

State v. Marilyn M. Torbeck, 2012AP522-CR, District 2, 8/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

¶6        … For the State to charge Torbeck with OWI under § 346.63(1)(a), DFE must be either an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog, or a drug.  DFE is not listed as a controlled substance under either Wisconsin or federal law.  A “controlled substance analog” is defined as “a substance the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance.”  Wis.

State v. Paul H. Olson, 2011AP1728-CR, District 4, 7/26/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

¶11      Although Officer Welker did not observe Olson commit any traffic violations, the other facts known to Officer Welker at the time he initiated questioning demonstrate that he had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop.  The incident took place at 11:30 p.m.  “The hour of the day may … be relevant in that the individual’s activities may or may not be consistent with the typical behavior of law-abiding citizens at that time.”  State v.

State v. Jeremiah R. Connour, 2011AP1489-CR, District 3, 7/31/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

¶3 n. 2:

Connour’s thirty-eight-page statement of the case includes primarily verbatim Q & A trial testimony, but nonetheless omits relevant evidence necessary to address his postconviction claims.  Most of the remainder of Connour’s recitation of the “facts” inappropriately consists of several pages of argument.