On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Casey D. Schwandt, 2011AP2301-CR, District 2, 5/16/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Schwandt: Erik C. Johnson; case activity

Schwandt made a prima facie showing that he did not validly waive counsel in a 1997 OWI conviction used as a penalty enhancer.

General Principles.

¶5        A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction on the ground that his or her constitutional right to counsel was violated because he or she did not knowingly,

Michael B. v. Marcy M., 2011AP2846, District 2, 5/16/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Marcy M.: Jane S. Earle; case activity

By responding (inadequately) to a TPR motion for summary judgment on grounds with a letter rather than evidence such as an affidavit, counsel provided ineffective assistance.

¶10      We disagree that counsel’s performance was “not ineffective.”  In the face of summary judgment that would deprive Marcy of a jury determination on her failure to assume parental responsibility,

State v. Ralph S. Stewart, 2011AP1424-CR, District 1, 5/15/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Stewart: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Counsel’s failure to impeach police officers, with their own reported statements, was deficient:

¶17      While matters of trial strategy are generally left to counsel’s professional judgment, counsel may be found ineffective if the strategy was objectively unreasonable.  See State v.

State v. Joel R. Medrow, 2011AP2314, District 1, 5/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Medrow: Chad A. Kanning; case activity

An anonymous call to the police reported that the caller had followed a possibly impaired driver who had turned parked in the front parking lot of the Cudahy Police Department; the report included the vehicle’s license plate number. The court concludes that, upon seeing Medrow just outside that vehicle,

Oneida County Department of Social Services v. Scott H, 2011AP2599, District 3, 5/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Scott H.: Brian C. Findley; case activity; companion case: Oneida County Department of Social Services v. Amanda H., 2011AP2599 

Notwithstanding trial counsel’s concession of no strategic reason for allowing the jury to view documents reciting Scott’s “history of violent behavior,”

Oneida County Department of Social Services v. Amanda H, 2011AP2600, District 3, 5/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Amanda H.: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; companion case: Oneida County Department of Social Services v. Scott H., 2011AP2599

TPR – Severance 

On joint trial for termination of parental rights, Scott’s disruptive conduct didn’t necessitate grant of severance motion by Amanda. 

State v. Darryl P. Benson, 2010AP2455-CR, District 1, 5/8/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Benson: Mary Scholle, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Sexual assault charges were not duplicitous, and in any event, potential unanimity problem was resolved by the instructions:

¶17      To begin, we conclude that the amended information properly notified Benson of the charges against him.  The counts were set forth with enough specificity to allow Benson to plead and defend himself and to protect him from being tried twice for the same offense.  

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; for Alexander: Hans P. Koesser; case activity

Juror Selection / Dismissal – Right to Personal Presence 

A defendant has a non-waivable right to personal presence at voir dire, ¶6 (citing, § 971.04(1)(c); and, State v. Harris, 229 Wis. 2d 832, 839, 601 N.W.2d 682 (Ct.

State v. Christopher Walter Hurns, 2011AP857-CR, District 1, 5/8/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Hurns: Rex Anderegg; case activity

Hurns wasn’t entitled to adduce, as an exception to the rape shield law, evidence of the complainant’s prior untruthful allegation of sexual assault; § 972.11(2)(b), as informed by 3-part test of State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774, 456 N.W.2d 600 (1990),

State v. Dwain M. Staten, 2011AP916-CR, District 1, 5/8/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Staten: Michael J. Steinle; case activity

Postconviction DNA Testing, § 974.07 

Postconviction testing at state expense requires, among other things, that the defendant show a reasonable probability he wouldn’t have been prosecuted or convicted with exculpatory test results. Staten, whose defense to sexual assault was consent rather than misidentification,