On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Timothy Jon Eloe, 2011AP1970-CR, District 2, 2/29/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Eloe: John C. Orth; case activity

¶5        To be sufficient, a criminal complaint need only be minimally adequate in setting forth essential facts establishing probable cause.  State v. Adams, 152 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 447 N.W.2d 90 (Ct. App. 1989).  Further, the adequacy of the complaint is to be evaluated “in a common sense rather than a hypertechnical manner.”  Id.

State v. Miller X. Lark-Holland, 2011AP791-CR, District 1, 2/28/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Lark-Holland: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

¶7        Lark-Holland’s first complaint is that his trial lawyer did not emphasize the mitigating factor that he said he was forced into committing the robbery, and also made several comments that he says undercut his character.  …  These comments, however, when read in full context,

State v. Juan Angel Orengo, 2011AP137, District 1, 2/28/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Orengo: Robert R. Henak; case activity

Counsel’s failure to attempt severance, from a drug charge, of a felon-in-possession-of-weapon count, didn’t amount to ineffective assistance.

¶8        Wisconsin law recognizes that guns and drug dealers go together.  See State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86,

Dane Co. DHS v. Sophia S., 2011AP2639, District 4, 2/23/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Sophia S.: Faun M. Moses; case activity

Although the parent isn’t required to object to the sufficiency of evidence adduced in support of a default judgment on grounds for termination (the court rejecting the County’s argument on this point), there was a sufficient factual basis for the default.

State v. Anthony J. Wilson, 2011AP1782-CR, District 4, 2/16/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wilson: Joseph F. Fischer; case activity

A known citizen-informant’s report of a hit-and-run collision he observed, including pointing out the vehicle as it fled the scene, was sufficiently reliable to support reasonable suspicion for a stop, notwithstanding an inaccurate detail in the report (the vehicle’s color).

¶24      While not controlling here, 

State v. Sherri A. Wittrock, 2011AP1538-CR, District 2, 2/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wittrock: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

¶7        Where, as here, an officer relies on information provided by dispatch, “reasonable suspicion is assessed by looking at the collective knowledge of police officers.”  See State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5,

State v. Jordan T. Griffith, 2011AP2226-CR, District 2, 2/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Griffith: Walter Arthur Piel, Jr.; case activity

¶5        In order for an investigatory stop to be justified by reasonable suspicion, the officer must have a “‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.”  State v. Walli, 2011 WI App 86,

State v. Marquis O., 2011AP2642, District 1, 2/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Marquis O.: Carl W. Chessir; case activity

Grounds for terminating parental rights upheld, against argument that Bureau of Child Welfare didn’t make reasonable effort to provide services for Marquis O. to meet conditions for child’s return to him.

¶5        The termination of Marquis O.’s parental rights to Mariyana was based on the child’s having,

State v. Michael A. Imbruglia, 2011AP1373-CR, District 2, 2/8/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Imbruglia: Rick Ramirez; case activity

In circuit court, Imbruglia successfully challenged use of a Colorado conviction as an OWI enhancer (on the ground that statute isn’t “substantially similar” to Wisconsin’s). However, after another OWI arrest the very next day, the State reasserted that same conviction to enhance the new charge.

State v. James M. Johnson, 2011AP2374-CR, District 2, 2/8/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; case activity

Evidence – Johnson left voicemail message on complainant’s work phone – held sufficient to sustain conviction for violating temporary restraining order.

¶8        Regarding the nature of the voice mail message and its violation of the TRO, the TRO itself states that Johnson is to “avoid contact that harasses or intimidates the petitioner,” contact defined as including contact by phone.