On Point blog, page 251 of 269
Disorderly Conduct, § 947.01 – Sufficiency of Evidence; Resisting, § 946.41(1) – Jury Instructions
State v. Robert Lyle Lawver, Jr., 2010AP382-CR, District 4, 5/5/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Lawver: Cole Daniel Ruby; case activity
Conviction for disorderly conduct upheld on following facts:
¶9 The pertinent facts include the following. Lawver was walking at night down an unlit highway, traveling with traffic, so that he would not have been in a position to see motorists approaching from behind him.
Collateral Attack – OWI Prior
State v. Brian M. Joski, 2010AP2223-CR, District 3, 5/3/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Joski: Thomas J. Coaty; case activity
A prior conviction used to enhance a new sentence may be collaterally attacked on the basis of violation of right to counsel, in other words, that the defendant didn’t validly waive counsel within the requirements set by State v. Klessig,
Miranda – “Interrogation”
State v. Randy L. Martin, 2010AP505-CR, District 1, 5/3/11
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication), reversed, 2012 WI 96; for Martin: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity
Although Martin was in custody and had not received Miranda warnings, his statement wasn’t the result of “interrogation” and therefore wasn’t suppressible. When it appeared that Martin’s uncle was going to be arrested for possessing a gun found in their car,
Traffic Stop – Probable Cause – Good-Faith Mistake of Fact
State v. Andrew R. Reierson, 2010AP596-CR, District 4, 4/28/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Reierson: John Smerlinski; case activity
The officer’s erroneous reading of Reierson’s license plate, causing the officer to wrongly believe that his registration had expired, nonetheless supported stop of the car under the good-faith rule.
¶11 We conclude the circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress because the officer had probable cause to stop Reierson for operating with an expired registration,
Reasonable Suspicion – Investigatory Stop; Field Sobriety Testing; Citing Unpublished Opinions
State v. Allen L. Resch, 2010AP2321-CR, District 2, 4/27/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Resch: Christopher Lee Wiesmueller, Corinne N. Wiesmueller; case activity
Reasonable suspicion supported investigatory stop for possible burglary, where vehicle was parked in private business parking lot at 2:26 a.m., with engine running and lights off.
¶13 Specifically, as the trial court indicated, the time of day is an important factor in determining whether a law enforcement officer had a reasonable suspicion.
OWI – Enhancer – Collateral Attack
State v. George McGee, 2010AP3040-CR, District 3, 4/26/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for McGee: Steven G. Richards; case activity
McGee’s collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction used to enhance his present sentence is necessarily limited to denial of the constitutional right to counsel, ¶5. Although McGee represented himself in the challenged prior, he failed to show that his waiver of counsel was invalid.
No specific diagnosis, but evidence sufficient to support recommitment and involuntary medication
Brown County v. Quinn M., 2010AP3162, District 3, 4/26/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Quinn M.: Chandra N. Harvey, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
Evidence held sufficient to support extension of ch. 51 commitment upheld. 1. Mental illness. Expert testified that she was certain Quinn had a mental illness, though given his history of drug and alcohol use she could not provide a specific diagnosis with certainty.
Plea Bargain – Breach by Defendant
State v. Christian R. Colon, 2010AP839-CR, District 1, 4/19/11
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Colon: Amelia L. Bizzaro; case activity
Colon’s refusal to testify against codefendant Rivera constituted a substantial and material breach of his plea bargain, such that the State was freed from restrictions on its allocution, ¶¶9-16.
The sheriff placed Colon in a cell with Rivera the night before Colon was to testify,
3rd-Degree Sexual Assault, § 940.225(3) – Elements; Prior Inconsistent Statement; Sufficiency of Evidence
State v. Dennis J. Thornton, 2009AP3074-CR, District 2, 4/13/11
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Thornton: Angela C. Kachelski; case activity
Scienter is not an element of § 940.225(3). State v. Lederer, 99 Wis. 2d 430, 433, 299 N.W.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1980) (statute requires proof of victim’s nonconsent – in contradistinction, presumably, of defendant’s knowledge of lack of consent –
Implied Consent Law, § 343.305(5)(a)
State v. Joe R. Hechimovich, 2010AP2897-CR, District 4, 4/7/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Hechimovich: Corey C. Chirafisi; case activity
Compliance with implied consent law found. Although Hechimovich initially requested a breath test, after his blood was drawn at the hospital, the deputy “gave ample opportunity” during a 10-minute period for Hechimovich to renew the request for breath test. The deputy “conclud(ed) that when Hechimovich did not bring it up following his blood test,