On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Laurence Evan Olson, 2010AP149-CR, District 4, 8/5/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Olson: Christopher W. Dyer; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶11      WISCONSIN STAT. § 347.13(1) provides that “[n]o vehicle originally equipped at the time of manufacture and sale with 2 tail lamps shall be operated on a highway during hours of darkness unless both such lamps are in good working order.” WISCONSIN STAT. 

State v. Theresa E. Palubicki, No. 2010AP555-CR, District 3

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Palubicki: Michael D. Petersen; BiC; Resp.; Reply

The burden of proving setoff rests with the defendant. Although Palubicki reached a settlement agreement with the hit-and-run victim, she did not meet her burden of proving that the agreement covered lost wages, therefore she is liable for them in restitution.

State v. Eric Michael Webley, No. 2010AP747-CR, District 4, 7/29/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Webley: Steven Cohen; BiC; Resp.

The police had reasonable suspicion believe Webley was driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding 0.02, and thus to perform field sobriety tests, after an indisputably proper stop for speeding, given the following (in addition to which, Webley admitted having had two beers):

¶8 … 

State v. Kevin A. Rhyne, No. 2009AP163, District 4, 7/29/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; Resp. Br.

¶7        “An officer may conduct a traffic stop when he or she has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred.” State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶13, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569 (citing State v.

Dane Co. DHS v. Laura E.N., No. 2010AP1172, District 4, 7/29/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Laura E.N.: Jean K. Capriotti

TPR – Evidence

Evidence that the mother was caring for an infant son not under CHIPS order wasn’t relevant to her ability to meet conditions for the return of her older daughters who were the subjects of the TPR proceeding, ¶¶13-16.

State v. James Robert Thomas, No. 2010AP332-CR, District III, 7/27/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Thomas: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply

The sentencing court exhibited objective bias, requiring resentencing, when it imposed the maximum on sentencing after revocation, given the court’s threat when it placed Thomas on probation to do just that if his probation were revoked.

State v. Carl Morgan, 2009AP74-CR, District III, 7/20/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Morgan: Ralph Sczygelski; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Sufficiency of Evidence Review

Review of a denied motion for dismissal at the close of the prosecutor’s case-in-chief is waived where the defendant proceeds to put in a defense. All the evidence, including the defense presentation,

State v. Kurt D. Neis, No. 2009AP1287-CR, District IV, 7/15/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Neis: Jacquelyn L. Wolter; BiC; Resp.; Supp. Resp.

Guilty Pleas – Collateral Consequence – Federal Gun Ban

Although Neis’s guilty plea to disorderly conduct, § 947.01, subjected him to the automatic federal firearm ban given the circuit court’s finding that the conduct related to domestic violence,

State v. Brittany A. Meye, No. 2010AP336-CR, District II, 7/14/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Meye: Kevin G. Keane; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶6        Meye argues that the odor of intoxicants alone is insufficient to raise reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop. We agree. We will not cite, chapter and verse, all the many cases in this state where either we or our supreme court found facts sufficient for an investigatory stop.

State v. Lyle A. Lay, No. 2010AP81-CR, District III, 7/13/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Lay: Timothy A, Provis; BiC; Resp.; Reply

An Alford plea may be one of “no contest” as well as “guilty”:

¶8      Lay is mistaken that an Alford plea cannot be entered within the context of pleading no contest.