On Point blog, page 30 of 262
COA holds error in information didn’t invalidate repeater enhancer
State v. Steven M. Nelson, 2021AP843-845, 4/4/23, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Nelson pleaded guilty to possessing meth as a repeater. He was eligible for the repeater enhancement because, on November 15, 2017, he’d been convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in Barron County Case No. 2017CF307. The information in this case noted the Barron County prior, but erroneously said it was another conviction for possessing meth. Postconviction and on appeal, Nelson submitted that the repeater enhancer is invalid because he didn’t receive notice of what the prior conviction was alleged to be.
COA reverses 15-day suspension of operating privileges
County of Grant v. Brad Alan Hochhausen, 2022AP1065, 4/13/23, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Hochhausen was convicted of speeding under §346.57(5). The circuit court imposed a 15-day suspension of Hochhausen’s operating privileges and a civil forfeiture pursuant to §343.30(1n). On appeal he argued that §343.30(1n) does not apply to convictions under §346.57(5), The court of appeals agreed and reversed.
Dad’s criminal record appropriately admitted into evidence during grounds phase of TPR
State v. B.L., 2023AP8, 4/11/23, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
“Barry” appealed an order terminating his parental rights to his 4 1/2-year-old daughter, Alice. He argued that the circuit court erred in admitting his criminal history during the grounds phase and erred in finding that it was in Alice’s best interest to terminate his rights. He lost on both issues.
Defense win: Frisking person before allowing him to sit in squad car was unlawful
State v. Jesse E. Bodie, 2021AP1656-CR, District 4, 4/13/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A state patrol officer unlawfully frisked Bodie before allowing Bodie to sit in his squad car because, under the circumstances of this case, the officer didn’t have an objectively reasonable basis to suspect Bodie was armed and dangerous.
COA denies IAC claims re failure to move for suppression and to cross-examine officer effectively
State v. Antwan Eugene Gill, 2022AP654-Cr, 4/6/23, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), case activity (including briefs)
Gill was convicted for possession of THC and for operating a vehicle with a detectable amount of THC in his blood. He argued that his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to move for suppression of the results of field sobriety and blood tests and for failing to exploit inconsistences between an officer’s testimony and his report and squad-cams footage. The court of appeals rejected both claims.
Defense win! Cop didn’t have reasonable suspicion to keep detaining driver who didn’t smell like weed
State v. Noah D. Hartwig, 2022AP1802, 3/30/23, District 4; (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)
On an early evening in January, an officer noticed an unoccupied car parked in the lot of a public boat launch. She observed a purse in the vehicle and contacted dispatch to see if she could find out anything about the car; she said he was concerned that its erstwhile operator might need some assistance on the cold and icy night. While the officer was waiting in her squad for dispatch to respond, Hartwig arrived in the parking lot driving his Jeep. A female passenger got out of the jeep and into the mysterious car. The officer turned on her emergency lights and approached the vehicles.
Daughter lacks standing to challenge mother’s protective placement
Waukesha County DHHS v. M.A.S., 2022AP877, District 2, 3/22/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
R.B. (Rose), a daughter of M.A.S. (Mary), filed an appeal of an order granting the County’s petition for a protective placement of Mary. The court of appeals holds Rose doesn’t have standing to appeal the order.
Minnesota administrative suspension counts as prior OWI
State v. Jenny E. Clark, 2022AP495-CR, District 4, 3/23/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Clark’s Minnesota administrative suspension for operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration counts as a prior OWI conviction under State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, 330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213.
COA holds moving motorist within parking not not unreasonable transport
State v. Adekola John Adekale, 2022AP1351, 3/9/20223, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer stopped Adekale’s vehicle for speeding and having a bad taillight. Adekale parked his car in a parking lot on the south side of a Motel 6. There were six passengers in the car, who “kept chiming in” and asking about the stop. They were boisterous and seemed to have been drinking. The officer asked them to leave, and they walked toward the hotel’s entrances, though the officer could not see if they went in.
Defense win! Evidence insufficient for 3rd standard recommitment
Marathon County v. T.R.H., 2022AP1394, 3/14/23, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Counties often seek recommitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c, the third standard of dangerousness. It is the easiest standard to satisfy–especially at the recommitment stage. But not this time. The court of appeals held that the county can’t just offer testimony that, at some point in the past, the person failed to care for himself, experienced delusions, and struggled with social interactions when not on medication. The county’s evidence must be more specific.