On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

Kenosha County v. A.C.S., 2022AP1821-1825, 2/15/23, District 2 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Here’s a fact pattern one hopes doesn’t come up too often. The county sought the termination of “Anna’s” parental rights to five children. It then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that she’d been convicted of a serious felony related to the death of another child. A hearing was set, but Anna’s counsel informed the court she’d be in trial in a homicide case. Expecting an adjournment–which both trial counsel and the court of appeals note is “common practice” in such a situation–the attorney told Anna the hearing would be put off. Counsel’s homicide trial then unexpectedly ended early, though she still had work to do to wrap it up. The TPR court apparently heard through the grapevine that the homicide trial was over. Without any successful contact–or much apparent effort to contact–Anna or her lawyer, the court held the scheduled hearing ex parte and, at the county’s request, granted summary judgment. Later, over Anna and her counsel’s protestations, the court terminated her rights.

Winnebago County v. J.D.J., 2022AP1138, 2/22/23, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Such a maddening case. J.D.J., a prisoner diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, was going to have a hard enough time winning a jury trial regarding his ch. 51 initial commitment. But the circuit court made his uphill battle impossible through a series of highly questionable pre-trial and trial rulings. Then the court of appeals, relying on nothing beyond its gut (i.e. not case law) affirmed.

Wood County v. P.M.P., 2022AP1815, 2/23/23, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In this appeal, P.M.P.’s sole challenge was to the circuit court’s application of the “best interest of the child” factors in §48.426(3)(a)-(f). P.M.P. conceded that the circuit court adequately considered the “substantial relationship” factor, but its analysis of the other facts was too terse. The decision required reversal under s Minguey v. Brookens, 100 Wis. 2d 681, 303 N.W.2d 581 (1981) and State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶27, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed.

J.C. v. R.S., 2022AP1215 , 2/16/23, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a rare Chapter 55 reversal, the court of appeals held that the petitioner failed to prove that the individual under review had a degenerative brain disorder that was likely to be permanent.

Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022AP230, 2/17/23, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Catherine” appeals the extension of her ch. 51 commitment. The recommitment hearing was originally set for a few days before her previous extension would expire. But three days before that scheduled hearing, Catherine requested an independent examination. She, the court, and the county agreed to a “stipulation for temporary extension to commitment” for 60 days. The final hearing was held near the end of this 60 days, 57 days after her commitment had been set to expire before the stipulation.

State v. Craig R. Thatcher, 2020AP1734, 2/7/23, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs).

A state trooper stopped Thatcher for a suspected OWI, the trooper read the Informing the Accused Form, and, according to Thatcher, provided additional, misleading information that influenced his decision to consent to a breath test in violation of County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 280, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995). The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision to suppress the results of the breath test and also the results of the subsequent blood.

County of Dunn v. Kevin J. Cormican, 2020AP1895, 2/7/23, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After being convicted of OWI 1st, Cormican appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the results of his blood test. He first argued that the arresting officer gave him information beyond what is on the Informing the Accused (ITA) card that was misleading and affected his decision to consent to the test. He also argued that due to the misleading information, his consent to the blood test was involuntary. The court of appeals affirmed.

Brown County DHHS v. T.R., 2022AP1094, District 3, 1/20/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In a TPR proceeding a motion for summary judgment may be filed any time before trial, as prescribed in § 48.297(1) and (2), and is not governed by the time limit for summary judgment motions prescribed in § 802.08(1).

Rusk County DHHS v. R.S., 2022AP1530, District 3, 1/20/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.S. (“Ruth”) argues that at the trial on the County’s petition to terminate her parental rights, the County Department of Health and Human Services didn’t prove it made reasonable efforts to provide the services ordered in the original CHIPS dispositional order. The court of appeals rejects the claim.

Rock Count v. H.V., 2022AP1585-FT, 1/20/23, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is an appeal from a ch. 51 recommitment under the 2nd standard– dangerousness to others. H.V.’s main argument was that the circuit court erroneously relied on hearsay to find that he is dangerous when not committed. The court of appeals disagreed and further found the county’s evidence sufficient to support the commitment.