On Point blog, page 48 of 262
Police had probable cause to arrest for OWI for purposes of refusal statute
State v. Taras O. Haliw, 2021AP1095, District 4, 1/13/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Haliw argues his license shouldn’t be revoked for refusing a chemical test for alcohol because the police didn’t have probable cause to arrest him for OWI, see § 343.305(9)(a)5.a. The court of appeals rejects his argument.
Admission of damaging hearsay a recommitment trial wasn’t plain error
Rock County v. H.V., 2021AP1760-FT, 1/13/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
This appeal concerns a recurring problem in Chapter 51 cases: the lack of objection to damaging hearsay at the final hearing. If the appellate lawyer raises ineffective assistance of counsel in the circuit court, the case will become moot before the issue is finally resolved. Here, the appellate lawyer when straight to the court of appeals, admitted the issue was forfeited, and argued “plain error.” The court of appeals rejected the argument based on a significant error of constitutional law.
COA: lawyer’s failure to communicate in homicide case wasn’t IAC; trial court didn’t err in preventing client from firing him
State v. Daimon Von Jackson, Jr., 2019AP2383, 12/29/21, District 2 (not recommended for publication) case activity (including briefs); petition for review of granted 3/21/22; dismissed as improvidently granted 5/8/23
Jackson admitted being involved in a planned robbery that ended in the shooting death of its target. He said–and eyewitness testimony and physical evidence corroborated–that he wasn’t the shooter; instead he said he was the lookout. The state charged him with felony murder, armed robbery and being a felon in possession of a gun. Eventually, he entered a plea to second-degree reckless homicide. He says this plea came about because his trial lawyer, by lack of communication or preparation for trial, left him no choice–and the circuit court refused to allow him to dismiss that lawyer.
Credit where credit is due….lack of a credit petition to DOC notwithstanding to the contrary
State v. Tanya M. Liedke, 2020AP33-CR, Distirct 2, 12/29/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court correctly concluded that Liedke wasn’t in custody for sentence credit purposes while she was on GPS monitoring in connection with the case on which she was sentenced. But she’s entitled to some credit for other time when she was in custody, and the circuit court was wrong to deny her request on the grounds that it was DOC’s responsibility to address her request.
Evidence supported verdict finding continuing CHIPS ground at TPR trial
Douglas County DHHS v. J.S., 2021AP1123, District 3, 12/29/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects J.S.’s claim that the County didn’t prove it made a reasonable effort to provide her with the services she was ordered in the CHIPS proceeding to use as a condition for returning her child to her home.
Defense win! Juvenile sex offender gets new lift-of-stay hearing
State v. T.A., 2020AP1350, 12/28/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Tanner (16) had sex with a girl (16) after she told him to “stop.” The circuit court adjudicated him delinquent and imposed but stayed a requirement that he register as a sex offender. Subsequently, the court lifted the stay and ordered Tanner to register as a sex offender for 15 years. The court of appeals here reverses the “lift of stay” and orders a new hearing because the circuit court relied on an inaccurate interpretation of Tanner’s J-SOAP-II score at the original hearing.
Defense win: Prosecutor improperly questioned defendant at trial about his exercise of right to remain silent when he was arrested
State v. Nestor Luis Vega, 2021AP126-CR, District 4, 12/23/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Vega testified at his trial on drug delivery charges and denied he had sold drugs to the informant and that the informant was not telling the truth. (¶12). On cross examination, the prosecutor, over defense counsel’s objections, asked Vega why he failed to give police his exculpatory version of events when he was arrested. (¶¶13-15). These questions violated Vega’s due process rights under State v. Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d 297, 421 N.W.2d 96 (19880, and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and the trial court’s error in allowing the questions was not harmless.
Community caretaker doctrine still applies to traffic stops
State v. Randy J. Promer, 2020AP1715-CR, 12/21/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).
Last term, SCOTUS rejected the idea that “community caretaking” is a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home. See Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021). Concurring opinions raised the possibility that the doctrine either no longer exists or applies only to the search of impounded vehicles. See our post. The court of appeals holds that the community caretaker doctrine continues to apply to traffic stops, and it justified the search and seizure in this case.
COA dinks County for not addressing remedy for D.J.W. error
Waupaca County v. G.T.H., 2021AP1490, 12/23/21, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
At Waupaca County’s request, the circuit court entered recommitment and medication orders against G.T.H. Six months later, the County conceded that the circuit court had failed to make the factual findings required by Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶¶3, 40, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.
Circuit court’s order for juvenile to register as sex offender was proper exercise of discretion
State v. K.B.W., 2021AP47, District 1, 12/21/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
K.B.W. argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it ordered him to register as a sex offender because it didn’t determine K.B.W.’s conduct was “sexually motivated,” as required by § 938.34(15m)(am)1. Though the circuit court didn’t make an express finding on that point, the record shows the issue was addressed and that the circuit court therefore properly exercised its discretion.