On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

State v. Randy J. Promer, 2020AP1715-CR, 12/21/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).

Last term, SCOTUS rejected the idea that “community caretaking” is a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home. See Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021). Concurring opinions raised the possibility that the doctrine either no longer exists or applies only to the search of impounded vehicles.  See our post. The court of appeals holds that the community caretaker doctrine continues to apply to traffic stops,  and it justified the search and seizure in this case.

Waupaca County v. G.T.H., 2021AP1490, 12/23/21, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

At Waupaca County’s request, the circuit court entered recommitment and medication orders against G.T.H. Six months later, the County conceded that the circuit court had failed to make the factual findings required by Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶¶3, 40, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.

State v. K.B.W., 2021AP47, District 1, 12/21/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

K.B.W. argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it ordered him to register as a sex offender because it didn’t determine K.B.W.’s conduct was “sexually motivated,”  as required by § 938.34(15m)(am)1. Though the circuit court didn’t make an express finding on that point, the record shows the issue was addressed and that the circuit court therefore properly exercised its discretion.

Ozaukee County v. J.D.A., 2021AP1148, District 2, 12/15/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, requires a circuit court ordering a ch. 51 recommitment petition to make specific factual findings with reference to the relevant subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment order is based. At “Jane’s” recommitment proceeding, the circuit court cited a subdivision paragraph—specifically, § 51.20(1)(a)2.e.—but said little about the substance of the standard articulated under that subdivision paragraph and how the evidence proved the statutory elements of that standard. Thus, its findings were insufficient under D.J.W. and the recommitment order and medication order are reversed.

State v. Dallas R. Christel, 2020AP1127-1128-Cr, 12/8/21, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Christel argued that §940.235, which criminalizes strangulation and suffocation, (1) violates substantive due process on its face and as applied to him, (2) is overbroad, and (3) is void for vagueness. He also argued for a new-factor-based sentence modification on his bail-jumping convictions. The court of appeals torpedoed every claim.

State v. A.P., 2021AP1146-47, 12/7/21, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A.P. appealed orders terminating his parental rights to his two children. The court of appeals rejected his claim that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it refused to make his mother the guardian of the children and his new trial in the interests of justice claim.

Marathon County v. J.A.E., 2021AP898, 12/7/21, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

For an initial commitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c., the circuit court must find clear and convincing evidence that a mentally ill person’s judgment is impaired such that there  is “a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or others.” The court of appeals held that James’s hallucinations during his examinations, his refusal of medication, and his use of methamphetamine satisfied this standard.

Portage County v. C.K.S., 2021AP1291-FT, 11/24/21, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court recommitted C.K.S. but apparently neglected to specify the applicable standard(s) of dangerousness. C.K.S. appealed arguing that the court violated D.J.W. and that the county’s evidence of dangerousness was insufficient. The court of appeals declined to address the D.J.W. error. Instead, it reviewed the county’s evidence of dangerousness and held it insufficient under the only standards that could apply: the 1st, 3rd, and 4th standards.

State v. Lamondo D. Turrubiates, 2020AP233, 11/23/21, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police arrested Turrubiates and the state charged him with several counts having to do with an alleged assault on his girlfriend. During the arrest police took his phone. The state came to believe the phone might contain evidence of crimes by Turrubiates, and it moved the circuit court to compel him to provide his passcode, despite the fact that it had not yet obtained a warrant to search the phone. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). The court ordered Turrbiates to provide the passcode and he refused; it then found him in contempt of court and ordered him jailed until he reveals the code (though it stayed this sanction pending appeal).

State v. Sean B. Day, 2021AP1018, 11/24/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including brief)

Day was initially charged with repeated sexual assault of a child for sexual contact with a 14-year-old when he was 17. He ended up pleading to a single count of fourth-degree sexual assault and was put on probation. The circuit court failed to mention expunction at the sentencing hearing, but later–both in writing and at the postconviction motion hearing–it gave the reasons it did not find expunction appropriate.