On Point blog, page 60 of 266
Affidavit in support of warrant for blood draw was supported by oath or affirmation
State v. Jeffrey L. Moeser, 2019AP2184-CR, District 4, 6/24/21 (not recommended for publication); PfR granted 11/17/21; affirmed, 2022 WI 76; case activity (including briefs)
Over a dissenting vote, the court of appeals holds that, under the facts of this case, the affidavit in support of the warrant to draw Moeser’s blood was sworn to under oath by the officer and therefore the warrant was not defective.
Missing one court date justified default TPR judgment
State v. M.R.K., 2021AP141, District 1, 6/22/21 (one-judge decision; not recommended for publication); case activity
The Latin word grex means “flock,” “herd,” or “group,” and is the root of several English words. Gregarious originally meant “tending to live in a flock, herd, or community rather than alone” but has become a synonym for “sociable.” Egregious literally meant “out of the herd” in Latin — something that stands apart. Its first meaning in English was consequently “outstanding” or “remarkable for good quality,” but over time that changed to become “very bad and easily noticed” or “flagrant.”
Merriam-Webster’s Words at Play. See also Sentry Ins. v. Davis, 2001 WI App 203, ¶21 n.8, 247 Wis. 2d 501, 634 N.W.2d 553 (“Egregious” is “extraordinary in some bad way, glaring, flagrant[.]” (citation omitted)). In Wisconsin TPR cases, it means “missing a single court date.”
Defense win! Trial counsel ineffective for failing to challenge inaccurate cell site claims, calling client a “scumbag”
State v. Ronald Lee Gilbert, 2019AP2182, 6/22/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
When last we saw this sex-trafficking case, the court of appeals had reversed the trial court’s denial of a Machner hearing on three claims. They were that Gilbert’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: challenge the admission of incorrect cell site location information (CSLI) testimony; demand discovery before trial; and impeach the State’s star witnesses with prior inconsistent statements. The discovery claim went away based on the subsequent Machner hearing testimony, but the court of appeals now again reverses the circuit court’s holdings on the other two, and orders a new trial.
Order placing child outside parent’s home was supported by the evidence
Wood County DHS v. P.R., 2020AP947, 6/24/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
P.R. unsuccessfully challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the CHIPS court’s decision to remove her daughter, K., from her home after K. alleged that P.R.’s spouse, M.R., sexually assaulted her.
COA reverses ch. 51 recommitment of person under ch. 55 protective placement
Outagamie County v. X.Z.B., 2020AP2058, 6/22/2121, District 3, (1 judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
This case involves the recommitment of a protectively placed person based on §51.20(1)(a)2.c., the 3rd standard of dangerousness. The court of appeals reversed the circuit courts’ recommitment order for insufficient evidence. And, for the second time in one week, it held that when circuit courts fail to make the requisite factual findings for a commitment that has expired, the remedy is reversal not remand for further fact-finding.
COA affirms waiver of juvenile into adult court
State v. T.G., 2021AP351, 6/23/21, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The State filed a delinquency petition against T.G., then 15, for stealing a car and causing an accident that left two passengers seriously injured. The State also petitioned for waiver of jurisdiction. Reviewing the petition de novo, the court of appeals held that Count 1 had “prosecutive merit.” Further, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in waiving T.G. into adult court.
Defense win! The remedy for a D.J.W. violation is outright reversal, not remand
Eau Claire County v. J.M.P., 2020AP2014-FT, 6/22/21, District 3; (1-judge opinion, ineligble for publication); case activity
A month ago District 3 reversed the recommitment order in this case because the circuit court had violated Langlade County v. D.J.W. That is, the circuit court ordered a recommitment without making specific factual findings tied to one or more the standards of dangerousness in §51.20(1)(a)2. Thus, the court of appeals remanded the case and ordered the required factfinding. Upon reconsideration, the court of appeals has issued a new decision holding that the correct remedy is outright reversal.
COA addresses moot recommitment appeal, finds dangerousness
Sheboygan County v. M.J.M., 2020AP1744, 6/9/21, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
This is new. M.J.M. appealed a recommitment order which expired during the course of his appeal. The usual kerfuffle regarding mootness ensued but this time (unlike here and here) the court of appeals acknowledged that the issue of whether recommitment may be dismissed as moot was pending before SCOW in Sauk v. S.A.M, and so reached the merits of this case. It then found sufficient evidence of dangerousness based on threats M.J.M. made during his expiring commitment and because of what he would do if treatment were withdrawn.
Court of appeals: maybe 3>4
State v. Roy C. O’Neal, 2020AP1270, 6/2/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A person who’s been indefinitely committed under ch. 980 is entitled to a discharge trial if he can show … well, er, nobody really knows what he has to show. In State v. Hager, our supreme court failed to reach a majority for any view on the statute (while arguably striking down the court of appeals’ attempt at a gloss). Given the absence of an ascertainable rule, it’s not too surprising that we get incoherent decisions like this one. What is a little surprising is the court of appeals’ decision to “treat [Hager‘s] lead opinion as controlling” on one aspect of the statute’s meaning. That was a three-justice lead opinion; four other justices disagreed on the point. Arguably. Is the court of appeals here treating a supreme court minority view as binding?
Discharge from probation didn’t count as successful completion of sentence for expunction purposes
State v. Keandrae J. Reed, 2020AP1921-CR, District 1, 6/2/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After being convicted of misdemeanor theft, Reed was placed on probation and given the chance for expungement. While he successfully discharged from probation, he isn’t entitled to expungement because he didn’t do enough to pay restitution to have “successfully completed” his sentence as required by § 973.015(1m)(b).